"If we endure through this cold winter, we shall see spring."
From President Ho’s notes of 5 November 1946: "Urgent Work at Present."
I
After the signing of the Preliminary Agreement, Uncle Ho returned to Bac Bo Palace. Quite a number of national and foreign pressmen were present as they had learnt of the news. As Uncle Ho came in, they crowded around him. President Ho informed them that we had signed a Preliminary Agreement with France. Speaking slowly, he told them briefly the main articles of the Agreement. He stressed that this was only a first arrangement: official negotiations between the Vietnamese Government and the French Government would soon be opened in Hanoi, Saigon or Paris. He told the pressmen that American, British and Chinese representatives had been present at the signing.
The Revolution had entered a new stage. The continued struggle would certainly be no less arduous and no less complex. A series of new tasks had to be tackled swiftly at the same time.
The Party Bureau had further discussions on how the Agreement should be explained to Party members and the people. It was necessary to make the whole Party and the whole nation understand our correct line, and the success we had achieved for the revolution, while realizing that the situation was still extremely complex, that we had to heighten vigilance and be ready to react if the French betrayed us. On the same afternoon, Uncle discussed the sending of men to various places to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. Comrade Hoang Quoc Viet was to head a mission to the South as soon as transport facilities were available. The next morning, Comrade Hoang Minh Giam would fly to Da Nang. I was asked to go to Haiphong the same evening, as Leclerc had asked to meet a representative of our government. In Uncle Ho's opinion, I should attend the mass rally held in Haiphong to explain the Agreement, for this port city was where the French were allowed to land first in the North.
Hanoi was less busy than on other days, because there had been the evacuation order. That night, voices speaking through megaphones resounded over quiet streets. Propaganda teams were announcing to the people that important new was to be carried in the Cuu Quoc to appear in the next morning. Some time after midnight, knocks on the door roused members of the Cuu Quoc staff: some self-defence fighters on patrol wanted to know what was the important news that was to be announced.
Our people in general had not been much aware of the negotiations between us and the French. Over the past few days, meetings had been held throughout the country, letters and telegrams had been pouring into the capital welcoming the formation of the Resistance Coalition Government headed by President Ho. All over the country the prevailing mood was a desire to fight. Everyone was expressing his determination and readiness to fight to the bitter end to defend the country.
At dawn on the 7th, many people were standing in the street corners waiting for the papers. The news about the Preliminary Agreement signed between our Government and the French Government was carried in the Cuu Quoc with big headlines. The French Government recognized the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as a free state. Both sides would observe a ceasefire. A contingent of 10,000 men of the Vietnamese Army would join the 15,000 French troops coming to replace the 180,000-men Chiang army which would be withdrawn.
In the same issue of the paper, there was also an appeal of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly on the occasion of the formation of the Resistance Coalition Government. The Standing Committee called on people to step up preparations, to further strengthen solidarity and to remain calm, avoiding all provocations and strictly obeying the Government's orders. In the new situation the appeal still retained its value.
The French colonialists' aggression in the South had roused the people to great indignation. Everyone was eager to fight the aggressors. The news that 15,000 French troops would come to the North came rather as a surprise to our compatriots. And in spite of the signature of Vu Hong Khanh at its foot, the Agreement was still opposed by the Nationalist Party. However, there was no sign of great disturbances among the people. Our countrymen had seen that the main representative of our people to sign the Agreement was Uncle Ho. 'Uncle Ho must have considered everything carefully,' - that was their first thought.
In the morning, Sainteny in his capacity as representative of the French government called on President Ho at Bac Bo Palace. That was the first official visit reflecting the new relationship between Viet Nam and France.
A large mass rally was convened for 4 p.m.
Back from Haiphong, I arrived at the meeting place in front of the City Theatre where I saw crowds thronging along all the approaches to the square. Policemen and self-defence fighters in charge of order had a hard time opening a way for the Government motorcade. Unlike other occasions, the people coming to the rally wore anxious looks on their faces. In fact few of them could fully realize the complex and perilous situation confronting the nation at that moment. Although they placed absolute confidence in their leader, they still worried about many things. Why did the French recognize us only as a free state? What was that Indochinese Federation? Would the Chiang army really withdraw? They had been behaving as if they were to stay on this land indefinitely. All those worries were legitimate and quite understandable.
The sea of people was quiet. News about clashes in Haiphong the previous morning had reached Hanoi. Some people knew that at that moment the French fleet had cast anchor in the Cua Cam river. It was also reported that Lu Han had left Chungking and was flying to Viet Nam. Everyone turned his eyes towards the balcony of the Theatre, waiting for the appearance of the presidium of the rally. Suddenly there was some disorder on the left side of the square. A saboteur had thrown a hand grenade. Being too nervous, he had forgotten to pull the safety pin. He was caught on the spot. He disclosed that the reactionaries had sent in four groups of saboteurs to disrupt the rally. After one of them was caught in the act, the others sneaked away hurriedly.
President Ho and the Bureau had decided to explain clearly to the people why we had signed the March 6 Preliminary Agreement. The representative of the Government explained to the people gathered there both the favourable and the difficult conditions confronting us against the very complex international background at that time. Owning to the heroic struggle of our people, the colonialists had had to give up their previous intention of regarding Viet Nam as an autonomous State only. The French government had to recognize our country as a free State. There is much difference between a 'free' and an 'autonomous' State. The free Democratic Republic of Viet Nam had its own Government, National Assembly, finances and army. It could be said that we had won the fundamental rights in internal affairs. Once we had won freedom, we would advance towards independence, complete independence. The French wanted to seize Nam Bo and make it a fait accompli. Our Government had laid bare this scheme and condemned it resolutely. Finally the French had to agree to hold a referendum on the unification of the three ky and undertook to accept its results. We had firm confidence in our people, in those who were taking arms in the heroic fight against the aggressors. The struggle was to continue. But Nam Bo would surely come back to the motherland. The entry of French troops into the North in replacement of the Chiang army had been agreed upon by the Allied powers. We did not want to have any foreign armies on our land. But when the over ten thousand French troops came in, the nearly two hundred thousand Chiang troops would withdraw. And eventually the French themselves would have to withdraw from our country. We had negotiated with the French so as to create new, favourable conditions for our struggle which would be a long one. We would use every means to consolidate and develop our political position, our military forces and economic strength in the advance toward complete independence and unity for our country.
Long, thunderous applause broke out, expressing the people's approval of the signing of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement. Then it was Vu Hong Khanh's turn to take the floor. He slowly stepped toward the microphone. Facing the people, he was obliged to call on the population to support the Government's diplomatic activities. His voice was inarticulate and lifeless. The audience responded with a few perfunctory hand clappings.
Suddenly rousing cheers thundered across the square, President Ho, calm-faced, with his familiar high forehead and beard, had just appeared on the balcony of the Theatre. His presence had not been announced beforehand. The applause and cheers lasted a long time. He had to quieten down the crowds by waving his hands repeatedly.
Uncle Ho said only a few concise words.
"Our country had been declared independent since August 1945. But so far none of the powers had recognized our independence. The negotiations between us and France would open the way to the international recognition of our country. It would lead us to an ever firmer position in the international arena. It was a great political success. We had become a free State in the world. According to the Agreement, the French troops were to be gradually and completely withdrawn from Viet Nam. The negotiations with the French testified to our political wisdom. Our compatriots should remain calm, united and disciplined. We had always regarded the Chinese as brothers. We had many friends and first of all, we had a government supported by the whole people. However, we must be vigilant and ready..."
He stopped for a while then went on:
"I, Ho Chi Minh, have fought with my compatriots all my life for the independence of my Fatherland. I would rather die than betray my country."
The people listened absorbedly to each of his words. Many eyes were wet with tears. The President had taken an oath before the nation. The struggle, extremely complex and of great importance for the nation's destiny, was still unfolding. The leaders could not publicly reveal all the facts and policies. Under such circumstances, the main thing was to maintain firm confidence.
Our people expressed absolute confidence in President Ho. The square resounded with repeated slogans 'Let's struggle resolutely for complete independence and unity', 'Let's resolutely obey all orders of the Government and President Ho', 'Long live President Ho!'
▴ II ▾
I had arrived in Haiphong on the night of the 6th.
The port-city was still smelling of gun powder. From the Chiang army's ammunition depot in the harbour, explosions were still to be heard from time to time. In the morning, when the clash started, the people had set up barricades in the streets with furniture from their own houses. In the suburbs, self-defence units had felled trees and set up barricades. Our car ran along deserted streets. Most houses were quiet behind closed doors and windows. Self-defence fighters in brown uniforms stood guard at street corners. Haiphong was ready for the fight.
We drove to the Viet Minh City Committee. Its secretary was Comrade Le Quang Dao. The comrades there told us that in the afternoon the Nationalist Party men had put out their flags at their headquarters, which was almost opposite the Haiphong Theatre, and clamoured about the 'exploits' of their Chiang masters over the loudspeakers.
In Haiphong, as in Hanoi, our National Defence Guard units had temporarily pulled out to the outskirts since last September to avoid clashes with Chiang troops. Only police and self-defence units remained in the city. The self-defence force was made up mostly of workers and poor labourers grouped in their various quarters. They numbered from a platoon to a company in each city ward. They managed to procure weapons by buying from the Japanese, from Chiang troops or by other means. Some were rather well armed, such as the self-defence unit of ward 7. The workers and youth patriotic organization, etc. had also set up armed self-defence units. There was a 200-man company of the shock self-defence force under the city headquarters. Besides, many people who were not affiliated to any self-defence organizations also procured pistols or hand grenades for themselves.
The Party Bureau's communication on the grave situation had reached Haiphong a few days before. Many old people and children had been evacuated. The City Committee was prepared to evacuate the whole population and apply scorched earth tactics if so ordered. Gun muzzles were ready everywhere, waiting for the enemy. When the clash between the Chiang troops and the French broke out, everyone was quite calm. The self-defence fighters in the harbour had managed to pick up some more weapons while the Chiang ammunition dump was burning.
On the morning of March 7, the French side was not ready for the meeting between our Government's representative and General Leclerc, so they proposed that the meeting be held in the afternoon. But as I was engaged by the mass rally with the Haiphong people and was to return to Hanoi immediately, as Uncle Ho told me to, we arranged for it to take place the next day. Comrade Phan My stayed behind to prepare for it.
The mass meeting by the Haiphong people was held at the coach station near the Lap River. A fairly high rostrum had been set up. The city was deserted but there were very large crowds at the meeting. They were those who had been assigned the duty of defending the city. The Haiphong population was made up mostly of labouring people. The crowds attending the meeting were rather plainly dressed but they all looked resolute and high-spirited. I explained to them why Uncle Ho and the Government had agreed to start negotiations with the French. According to the Agreement we had just signed, the French troops had arrived here by order of the Allies to replace the Chiang troops who were to go home. The French were also to withdraw from our country after a definite time. We would continue in our struggle till we achieved complete independence and national unification. Our compatriots should be closely united, highly vigilant and should strictly carry out all orders and policies of the Government and President Ho.
The shouts 'Long live President Ho' resounded down to the Cua Cam River where the French warships were moored. Vu Hong Khanh, who had accompanied me on the trip to Haiphong and was present at the mass meeting, was asked to address the people but he declined, giving lack of time as an excuse.
On the same afternoon, Comrade Phan My met with Leclerc. This general haughtily said 'We have started and we have arrived, whether or not you have acquiesced.' He said that the Chiang clique here had agreed to let the French land and he asked the Vietnamese side to do the same. Phan My refused to answer any requests by Leclerc.
On the 8th, I came back to Haiphong again. Some French units had landed according to the agreement with the Chiang troops and had pitched their tents along the river. They had landed tanks and armoured vehicles. Most of their equipment was American-made armoured cars, heavy artillery, uniforms and packs. If the war were to break out, we would be fighting a French expeditionary force equipped with American armaments.
Valluy came ashore to welcome the representative of our Government. He was a middle-aged general, of high stature, with gentle and polished manners.
A small ship took me out to sea to meet Leclerc. The Commander-in-Chief of the French expeditionary force was one of the rare generals who had become famous in France during the past few years. The French press extolled his exploits in leading an armoured division in the landing on the Normandy coast and further operations in Germany. He was the man entrusted by De Gaulle with the task of recapturing former French colonies in Indochina.
Leclerc was waiting on the deck of the Senegalais moored in the Cua Cam River. This four-star general had the looks and manners of a professional soldier. He was tall and thin in his field uniform. On his rather bony face, there appeared keen, small eyes and a greying moustache. His smiling features seemed to be easily changed to a face of gloom.
After a handshake and a few words of formal greetings, Leclerc said, in a rather gruff voice, 'I love France, and I want France's honour to be respected everywhere.'
I felt vexed, but restrained myself and replied, 'I am a Communist fighting for the independence of our country. I think that genuine patriots always respect the patriotism of others.'
The atmosphere of the talk gradually relaxed, I spoke of the extremely heroic struggle of our people against the Japanese fascists to liberate themselves from the fetters of slavery, then went on, 'You have fought against the German fascists, so there must be room for us to understand each other.'
Leclerc led me to the reception room of the ship. He introduced me to the officers present. Then the exchange of views continued. Leclerc promised to try to maintain the friendly relations between France and Viet Nam. He frequently stressed his personal role. We discussed with him the implementation of the Preliminary Agreement in the military field. Pending a formal agreement between the two Governments it was necessary to fix the places and the number of French troops to be stationed there when the French, together with Vietnamese troops, came to replace the Chiang army in its duties.
At this meeting, we and the French Command had agreed to hold joint meetings to reach agreements on the organization and activities of the replacement forces and the question of implementing the ceasefire.
▴ III ▾
'The revolutionary boat is gliding forward through the reefs.' The statement expressed in the directive on 'Situation and Policy' dated March 3 had been proved entirely accurate by what had happened. With the March 6 Agreement, the revolution again came to a turning point. Right after the signing of the Agreement, the Party Bureau met to evaluate the situation and work out new policies.
What causes had led the French to give up the declaration of March 24, 1945 by De Gaulle and sign this Agreement?
First of all it was the strength of our people's unity and struggle. This was the most decisive factor. Our fight against the Japanese in previous years, the great August general uprising and the heroic resistance in the South during the past six months had led the enemy to realize this new force. Confronted with a whole nation rising up in arms to seize power and fight resolutely for the defence of independence and freedom, even colonialist generals like Leclerc had to think twice before embarking on new military adventures. On the other hand, the difficulties facing French imperialism should be taken into account. The French bourgeoisie had been weakened during the years of the Second World War. Internally they had to deal with the mounting movement of the democratic forces. In Indochina, contradictions between the French and the Chiang clique had tended to diminish on the whole, but still caused misgivings to the French. Such a situation had forced the French to seek a new arrangement with us for the time being.
The March 6 Agreement was only an initial success for us. Negotiations were still going on between us and the French. What were the tasks of the whole Party and people at the present time?
France had not recognized the independence of the Indochinese countries. The national liberation revolution in those countries had not been completed. The goal of the Vietnamese revolution in this stage was still the complete liberation of the motherland, national reunification and consolidation of the Democratic Republic. If the country was to be completely liberated, colonialism had to be opposed. Now that the French government had signed the Preliminary agreement, the situation was somewhat different. As regards tactics, we had to determine the concrete enemy at the time so as to spearhead out attacks on him.
Three months earlier, in the directive 'Resistance and National Reconstruction' of November 25, 1945, the Party Central Committee, after giving an analysis of the situation, had pointed out that our main enemy was the French colonial aggressors. In the new situation, the Party Bureau pointed out that that our concrete and immediate enemy at that moment was the French reactionaries. These reactionaries were doing their utmost to destroy the democratic movement in France. They intended to join hands with US and British imperialism to encircle the Soviet Union. They still had plans to re-impose colonialist rule on Indochina. At that moment, they were undermining Viet Nam's unification and opposing our people's struggle for complete independence.
After the French had decided to use force to occupy Nam Bo we put forward the policy of establishing a national united front against the French colonialist aggressors. In the new situation, the Front should spearhead its struggle against the French reactionaries.
A number of new slogans were put forward: 'Association and equality with the new France', 'Let the peoples of Viet Nam and France unite to oppose the French reactionaries.'
In the military field, we had to maintain and strengthen our force to guard against every eventuality. At the same time we should intensify the struggle on other fronts: political, economic and cultural.
Proceeding from the above tactical reorientation, the Bureau forecast possible developments and set forth various tasks.
It was necessary to explain to the people, widely and deeply, that the signing of the Preliminary Agreement was a correct decision and a success for us. It was also necessary to combat both the idea that the signing was the end of all difficulties and the tendency to slow down preparations for the fight.
We had to guard ourselves against any treachery by the French colonialists. They might refuse to carry out their commitments or distort the contents of the Agreement. It might so happen that, after the landing and stationing of French troops in a number of bases, the colonialists would seek pretexts to attack us in an attempt to overthrow the people's power. To defend the fruits of the revolution was a basic question of utmost importance. The Bureau stressed that preparations for a protracted resistance war should be continued. In places where French troops were to be stationed, we should keep calm and set up liaison committees to settle problems involving both sides. We should quickly organize and educate the local people so that they would heighten their vigilance, while stepping up propaganda work among the French troops so that they would understand the just struggle of our people.
Dealing with the Chiang clique at that time also required great adroitness. The March 6 Agreement had placed them before a new conjuncture. They would realize that they could not maintain their interests in Indochina as before. We should oppose their scheme to prolong their occupation of this country and turn Indochina into a territory under international trusteeship.
Reactionaries in the country were plotting new schemes and new tricks. They were trying hard to distort the significance of the Agreement. They sought to provoke incidents to give the French colonialists a pretext to encroach on our position or denounce what they had signed. The Nationalists in the pay of Chiang wanted to stage a counter-revolutionary putsch. As they were alarmed at the prospect of being left behind by the Chiang clique, we should try to divide their ranks, winning those who had been led astray over to our side. The pro-French traitors might become active and collaborate with the French to undermine our struggle for independence. We should find effective means to prevent them from doing harm to the common cause.
The Bureau pointed out the French colonialists' dark designs regarding the question of Nam Bo.
They would hold that the March 6 Agreement was applicable only to Bac Bo and a large part of Trung Bo. They would step up the comedy of 'demanding self-government' and try to set up a puppet government in Nam Bo with a view to continuing the division of our country and placing before us a fait accompli.
With regard to the referendum in Nam Bo stipulated in the Agreement, they would seek to delay it for a time so that they could suppress the resistance movement and strengthen the forces of the puppet troops and government. In a referendum conducted under the bayonets of the aggressors, our compatriots would not be free to voice their aspirations.
The French would take advantage of the confusion before the ceasefire agreement was fully put into effect in Nam Bo to encroach upon our military positions and attack our political stand. They would try to dishearten our compatriots and create favourable conditions for the reactionaries' activities.
Our policy was to resolutely demand that the French carry out the ceasefire agreement strictly and recognize the legal status of the Viet Minh in the areas under temporary French occupation pending a formal treaty between us and France. In occupied cities, there would be a strong movement of political struggle for national unification.
The signing of the Preliminary Agreement had brought about a period of détente. We should take the greatest advantage of this valuable time to consolidate and develop our forces in every field as a basis for the long struggle to come.
The above points were set forth in the directive 'Make peace in order to advance' by the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, dated March 9, 1946. The directive concluded:
'Dear comrades,
'The Fatherland is facing a difficult time. But the revolutionary boat is gliding forward through the reefs. We have made peace with France to gain time, to preserve our force, to maintain our position so as to advance quickly towards complete independence.'
▴ IV ▾
D'Argenlieu returned to France in mid-February. Among the French ruling circles, there had been changes that ran counter to his wishes. General De Gaulle, his master who had appointed him High Commissioner in Indochina, had resigned. Felix Gouin, a Socialist Party member, was nominated Prime Minister of the provisional government. The Ministry of the Colonies, formerly held by one of De Gaulle's close associates had become the 'Ministry of Overseas France' and was held by Marius Moutet, also a Socialist. The Gouin government, with a majority of members belonging to the Socialist Party, had agreed to the plan of negotiation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, proposed by Leclerc, D'Argenlieu was most active in seeking support from rightwing elements in the new administration in France. He clamoured everywhere that the Viet Minh was an 'anti-French party', which could not be trusted, that 'Ho Chi Minh and the other Viet Minh leaders' were all 'Communist rebels'. Early in April, he came back to Saigon.
After the Preliminary Agreement of March 6 became public, D'Argenlieu made a speech over Saigon radio. The High Commissioner praised the morale of the French troops during the days after the Japanese coup. He blamed the Japanese for having aroused 'evil desires among the natives', meaning the Indochinese people's aspirations for independence. He expressed thanks for the British army who had helped France to return to Nam Bo. D'Argenlieu referred to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as 'the Hanoi authorities' or 'the Hanoi government'. He was compelled to mention what had been stipulated in the Agreement: 'The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has its own government, its own parliament, its own finances and its own army'. But he added: 'I should like to tell you that Cambodia also has its own government, its own army, its own finances and its own parliament'. He praised what the French had done in Nam Bo, i.e. the establishment of a consultative council. Finally, he expressed the hope that 'Indochinese in all walks of life' would 'proliferate and prosper'.
That colonialist-minded speech was immediately attacked by our press in vigorous fashion.
On March 9, 1946, the Minister of Overseas France, Moutet, submitted the Vietnam - French Preliminary Agreement to the Council of Ministers in Paris. The Agreement was approved by the French Government. But only a few days later, on March 14, Moutet himself stated that Cochinchina would have a free constitution and would 'enjoy a separate regime like the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam'. This showed that we should not expect much from the so-called Socialists in power in the French government.
With regard to the Agreement that the French government had just approved, the French in Indochina were most inconsistent in their words and deeds.
On March 13, Leclerc issued an appeal to French troops and citizens urging them to have a friendly attitude towards Vietnamese. Sainteny wrote in the newspaper L'Entente published in Hanoi: 'It is not with vain regret for an out-dated past that one can build up a fine and full future'. But at the same time, in Nam Bo, the French scattered leaflets from the air calling on the Vietnamese army to surrender their arms. On March 9, French troops were mustered in Ca Mau, Rach Gia? They launched surprise attacks against many positions held by our troops. Our armed forces resolutely fought back in self-defence. The guns were still booming in Nam Bo. In the North, the newly-landed French troops made movement without asking for our leave.
By mid-March, leaders of the Viet Nam Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party agreed to issue a Joint order on the integration of administrations and armies. The parties were to cooperate in a friendly way, refrain from attacking or arresting each other's members, refrain from intimidating the population, carry out propaganda freely in a lawful manner, and strictly abide by the Government's order.
Just one day after the order was published in the press, on March 16, the Nationalists had a group of their henchmen march in the streets shouting slogans against the signing of the Preliminary Agreement. When they arrived at Hang Dau square, our police forced them to disperse. Three of our policemen were injured when doing their duty. The Nationalists continued to stage kidnappings in the cities.
The situation developed according to the forecast of the Party Bureau in its directive 'Make peace in order to advance.' A new stage in the struggle, most complex and no less fierce, had started.
Two days after the signing of the Preliminary Agreement President Ho met with district chiefs and company commanders of the Hanoi self-defence corps at the city hall. He said, 'The signing of this ceasefire agreement does not mean an end to the war, nor is our moderate and mild attitude towards the French troops one of limpness or passivity. On the contrary, more than ever, we should strengthen our forces and heighten the morale of the whole people so as to cope with all eventualities. The spirit of resistance should be maintained and careful preparations be permanently in force without a second or a minute's relaxation'. He talked to the comrades there for one and a half hours.
In a letter to the Nam Bo people and fighters dated March 11, Uncle Ho wrote:
'During this ceasefire period, especially when troops from both sides have to remain at their present positions, it is more than ever necessary to make preparations, strengthen your forces and observe discipline. And later, when peace is achieved your mettle will be a valuable force to guarantee the complete independence of our country for the future.'
On March 13, President Ho sent a letter to our compatriots and to the government and peoples in the world denouncing the French for their acts contrary to the spirit of the Agreement. He called on our people to keep calm and be ready to act on order. He called on the peoples and governments in the world, especially the French people, to support our just cause and to demand that the French government carry out the Agreement. On the same day, President Ho sent a message reminding the French side of the need to open formal negotiations, as it had been agreed that such negotiations were to start at once.
Meetings and demonstrations surged up everywhere. In Hanoi, a hundred thousand people gathered on the grounds of the University students' hostels demanding that the French stop all acts contrary to the Agreement and open formal negotiations in Paris at once. The masses shouted the slogans: 'Support President Ho', 'We're ready to obey the Government's orders' and 'Nam Bo is part of Viet Nam'.
In spite of the reactionaries' acts of sabotage, we persisted in carrying out the policy of uniting various parties. A large gathering was held jointly by the Viet Minh, the Revolutionary Alliance and the National Party at the Municipal Theatre on March 17. Comrade Dong, on behalf of the Viet Minh, explained the necessity of rallying round the Coalition Government for the Resistance and expressed the Viet Minh's desire to achieve unity. Uncle Ho arrived in the middle of the meeting. A thunder of applause burst out in the auditorium and all the people present stood up. The military band played the tune 'Long live Ho Chi Minh.'
The reactionary elements of the Nationalist Part in the Coalition Government advocated seeking support from Chiang and the Americans. On March 12, Nguyen Tuong Tam, arriving at the Foreign Ministry in assume office, declared: 'China and the United States have the duty to maintain peace in the Far East.' He constantly spoke of the necessity to keep in touch with the Americans, to win the aid of the Americans and Chiang in every field. Nguyen Tuong Tam proposed that a goodwill mission be sent immediately to Chungking to strengthen Sino-Vietnamese friendship. It was certainly an idea of his masters. Vinh Thuy, who was then at the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission, the task of which was to advise the Government on diplomatic affairs, approved Tam's proposal. He expressed his wish to go to Chungking. The Chiang leaders in Hanoi also suggested that we should let Vinh Thuy go. We learned later that Marshall was present at Chungking at that time. It was possible that the US imperialists had seen in Vinh Thuy a card they might use later on. The sending of a mission to Chungking would also help lessen the contradictions between us and Chiang. Our Government agreed. It was a severe test for Vinh Thuy. He had said some fine words in August of the previous year: 'I'd rather be a citizen of a free nation than king of an enslaved country.' Some time later, he was again to be confronted with a choice: whether to march on with the people or relapse into a traitor's life. Before French troops arrived in Hanoi, Vinh Thuy had left the capital for China on board an American aeroplane. The short journey made by the last king of the Nguyen dynasty on the side of the people had ended. Not long after the outbreak of the national resistance war, Uncle Ho sent an emissary to Hong Kong to see Vinh Thuy and ask him to return home and join the resistance but he refused. In early December 1948, Vinh Thuy chartered a Catalina sea plane and flew to Ha Long Bay to meet Bolaert who had replaced D'Argenlieu as the French High Commissioner in Indochina. Thus Vinh Thuy's bargaining with his old master to resume the life of an enslaved puppet started.
▴ V ▾
Not until one week after the Preliminary Agreement was signed in Hanoi did the Chiang Kai-shek Army General Staff consent to let French troops take over northern Indochina in place of Chinese troops. The Sino-French accord under which the Chiang troops withdrawal would start on March 15 and end on March 31, 1946 was made public in Chungking on March 13. So the 200,000 Chiang troops had no legal right to remain there after that date.
Hanoi's armed self-defence units made their presence felt again, for the first time since the Chiang troops had entered the city. Before, only units of Chiang's 53rd Army Corps had stood guard behind earthworks at street corners, their helmets decorated with the white notched Kuomintang sun. Now, there were also our own self-defence fighters in their forage caps with the golden star on a red background. They looked quite impressive as they stood guard on the pavements, rifles in hand and hand grenades at the belt. This signalled a change. The city put on a new look, assumed a new spirit.
On March 18, 1,200 French troops were allowed to come to Hanoi, as replacements for the Chiang troops. Both the Vietnamese and the French issued separate communiques calling on the Vietnamese and French populations to remain calm in order to avoid any regrettable actions.
Along the roads the French troops were to go through, our compatriots and armed forces were on the look-out in case any incident should happen.
According to our regulations, every French convoy should fly a Vietnamese flag and be accompanied by Vietnamese liaison officers. The gun barrels in the vehicles should be completely covered. When they reached Hanoi the vehicles must enter it in groups.
Two hundred French military vehicles left Haiphong early in the morning. But it was not until noon that the first ones reached the Long Bien Bridge. The convoy, accompanied by armoured cars and Vietnamese liaison officers, had had to stop at every one of our militia men's check-points.
As the French troops went past, all the doors and windows of the houses along the route were closed. Nobody was in the streets except a few traffic policemen and self-defence fighters on duty. What met the eyes of the French Expeditionary Corps were banners hung across the streets bearing such slogans as: 'Viet Nam for the Vietnamese', 'Nam Bo is part of Viet Nam', in the Vietnamese and French languages. The presence of some French nationals who gathered at Trang Thi Street could not change the cold atmosphere of the whole city: a host turning his back on an unwanted guest.
At 5 p.m. on that day, Leclerc led a delegation including Sainteny, Pignon, Salan, Valluy to the Bac Bo Palace. Leclerc quickened his pace as he came to greet President Ho Chi Minh and smilingly remarked, 'Mr. President, we Vietnamese and French have now become friends.'
Uncle Ho invited Leclerc to sit beside him on the sofa. The Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Corps raised his glass to toast the health of President Ho Chi Minh. He expressed his hope that the official talks between the Government of Viet Nam and the French government would be held as soon as possible so as to provide an opportunity for the Vietnamese and the French people to cooperate in the pursuit of peace and happiness.
Some days later, as an expression of this spirit of cooperation and friendship, Leclerc proposed the organization of a military parade in which the Vietnamese Army and the French Army would take part.
A fully-equipped battalion of Vietnamese troops was sent to Hanoi from the suburbs. Although they lacked training in parade exercises our troops marched in good order and looked valiant. The troops, dressed in green uniform, had leather shoes and carried rifles with fixed bayonets. Commanders with long sabres led their units who advanced singing. The heroic words of their songs springing from hearts burning with revolutionary fire caused great excitement. For the first time the French saw a Vietnamese regular unit. They showed respect and admiration.
After the parade, before returning to the barracks, our troops marched through the main streets of the city. Once more, our compatriots in Hanoi were able to see an armed detachment of the Vietnamese army make its appearance in the capital. Passers-by stopped and people poured out of their houses onto the pavements to watch the scene. Along the streets through which the troops were passing, gay shouts rang out.
▴ VI ▾
During the month of March, Chiang troops refused to withdraw. A great number of Japanese troops had not yet been repatriated and several thousand more French troops arrived, consisting both of new soldiers, recruited in France, Germany and North Africa, and of those who had been arrested by the Japanese on March 9, 1945, and had just been released from custody. The number of foreign troops in the streets of Hanoi was greater than it had been during the first days of the revolution.
But the situation was now different from the time when Chiang troops had entered the capital.
Before, our troops had been forced to move to the outskirts. If we ever wanted to carry a large number of rifles through the city, we had to put them in a cart and cover them with rush mats. Now units of our armed forces were able to march freely through the streets of Hanoi. Formerly the Vietnamese sentries guarding the government offices had been ordered to withdraw temporarily behind the fences; now they were able to stand on duty in front of the offices, rifles in hand, without being troubled by the Chiang troops. Apart from the Chiang troops' check points, there were also those of our own troops and joint Vietnamese-French ones. The city's armed self-defence fighters were present everywhere, ready to defend their homes and fatherland and protect the people. By the Preliminary Agreement signed by our government and the French government, the Chiang army had to give our country de facto recognition as a sovereign state. They could no longer interfere in our security as in the past. They knew that they were about to pull out. As for the French, they were fully aware that Viet Nam was no longer their colony and they could no longer act as they had done before.
Although the situation was growing tense due to the presence of the French, the atmosphere had become more relaxed. It was true that the numbers of the enemy armies had increased, but nobody dared deny our sovereignty.
Through the emissaries sent by him to discuss with us the question of taking over from the Chiang troops, Leclerc affirmed that he would honour his commitments and expressed his wish that the Vietnamese government would do the same. Once, during a meeting with me, he wanted to know the Vietnamese people's attitude towards the French. I said to him:
'You and I are military men. Do you want me to speak frankly?'
'Of course,' he replied.
'The French are just paying lip service to peace, while their actions are those of aggressors. That's what the Vietnamese public think of them.' On March 23, Leclerc left Hanoi.
The command of the French forces in northern Indochina was transferred to Valluy.
No major clashes had yet occurred between us and the French since they arrived in Hanoi. The Chiang troops were still there and their presence forced the French to act cautiously. We deemed it necessary to exploit the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and the French at that time in order to drive away the Chiang troops as soon as possible, and force the French to do what they had pledged.
All of a sudden, on March 27, some days after Leclerc's departure from Hanoi, the French ordered a small detachment to break into the premises of our Finance Department. The French soldiers removed the Vietnamese flag and prevented the Vietnamese staff from entering. This office stood at a key crossroads on the road from the citadel to the old Governor General's palace. We found out later that Saigon had instructed Valluy to occupy that building so that it could be used as the headquarters of the French High Commissioner when the latter arrived in Hanoi.
That was the first act of provocation.
Our offices in the Liaison Commission strongly protested against this action by the French and demanded an immediate investigation. I also met Valluy to lodge a protest against this violation of our sovereignty and demanded that the French should leave the place at once and return authority to guard it to the Vietnamese troops.
Throughout North Viet Nam a wave of indignation was mounting, and on March 29 a general strike was called. People closed shops and markets and refused to cooperate with the French. There was a prompt response from the Chinese nationals too. Shops, restaurants and tea-rooms closed except a few French owned ones in Trang Tien Street and Trieu Quang Phuc Street? But even there, the Vietnamese employees refused to work and gathered in the streets to talk. Posters calling for non-cooperation with the French were stuck up on doors. The vans of the French commissariat, sent to purchase food, returned empty. Those French soldiers who had been given town leave, stood about on the pavements at a loss what to do. They realized that the Vietnamese people, who had been cold to them, were now showing outright hostility.
Our firm reaction caused the French to reconsider their policy and finally compelled them to return the Finance Office to us. The Vietnamese flag was hoisted again. The office personnel returned to work as usual. But the French still insisted on sharing guard duty and creating a joint body composed of twelve people from each side.
Our compatriots in the capital as well as the Chinese nationals refused to cooperate with French until a communique was issued by the Hanoi Administrative Committee calling on everyone to return to work and to reopen their shops.
The delegates of our Armed Forces and of the French Army met to discuss the implementation of the military clauses of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement. General Salan and General Valluy represented the French side and Vu Hong Khanh and myself the Vietnamese, in our capacity as Vice Chairman and Chairman of the Military Commission. After many prolonged meetings the two sides reached a temporary agreement on April 3.
Under this agreement, the French troops who assumed the task of taking over should be of French nationality; non-French nationals should only be used as guards in the Japanese P.O.W. camps. This condition was aimed at excluding members of the Foreign Legion from the take-over troops. The Vietnamese troops in the take-over force were part of the Vietnamese armed forces. They had their own command, and were placed under the control of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces receiving direct orders from the General Staff.
The French and Vietnamese troops should form a joint take-over force in Hanoi, Nam Dinh, Hue, Da Nang and some frontier towns. In other places such as Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Dong Hoi, Quang Tri, the French should nominally take over from the Chiang troops and then hand over to the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Plans for future movements of Vietnamese and French take-over troops should be discussed and agreed upon by the Commands of both sides and be submitted to the Vietnamese Government at least 48 hours before execution. Military vehicles used to carry supplies for such troops were allowed to carry at most four armed men each, with the total number of armed men in any convoy not exceeding sixty.
A Vietnamese-French Central Liaison and Control Commission was set up in Hanoi to supervise the implementation of the Agreement. If necessary similar regional commissions should be set up.
The two sides agreed to send a ceasefire Commission to southern Trung Bo.
The discussions on the procedures for realizing a ceasefire in Nam Bo were very heated and lasted several sessions. Our delegates strongly protested against the illegal attacks launched by the French troops in Nam Bo. We insisted that a ceasefire commission should be sent to Nam Bo to implement Article Three of the Preliminary Agreement. Salan eluded our legitimate request, arguing that the ceasefire question was to be settled by the two governments. This argument was refuted by our delegates. Due to the negative attitude of the French side, the discussions did not achieve any results.
Clashes took place in many places where French troops were stationed. In Haiphong, on April 11, French troops blatantly occupied the premises of many offices. Our compatriots there immediately closed shops and markets, went on strike in protest against the French action and our delegates in the Vietnamese French Liaison and Control Commission made a strong representation. The French had to withdraw from the places they had illegally occupied. Some days later, while the people of Haiphong were gathering for a mass rally, the news came that the French had sent 500 troops to Hanoi without notifying us. Meanwhile a number of French troops had started to attack the Haiphong headquarters of the Democratic Party near Ha Ly bridge. The rally at once turned into a demonstration. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets in the rain, shouting angry slogans. The next day a general strike took place. The city was deserted. Shops closed. Long lines of empty buses and taxis were standing at the stations. There were no ferry boats to cross the river. Filled with apprehension the French sent armoured cars which took up position at the ends of the streets. Finally they had to apologize. At the end of April another clash took place between the French troops and our self-defence units. The French made attacks with tanks and armoured cars against us in Tran Hung Dao Street, Station Road and Ho Chi Minh Boulevard. Our self-defence units fought back fiercely. It was a long time before the Haiphong Vietnamese-French Liaison and Control Commission could restore order.
In the middle of April, a Vietnamese delegation headed by Comrade Hoang Quoc Viet, together with a number of French officers, flew to Nha Trang to enforce the ceasefire. Here the French had summoned former mandarins and village notables to work for them. Those who refused to cooperate with them were terrorised. Their scheme was to restore their protectorate over the areas they occupied in southern Trung Bo. Our delegation made repeated representations to the French authorities there. After seven days, as the discussions had failed to yield any results due to the obstinate attitude of the French side, our delegation left Nha Trang.
▴ VII ▾
Towards the end of March, d'Argenlieu suggested that a meeting should be held between him and President Ho Chi Minh to discuss the relations between the two countries. He proposed that the meeting be held aboard a French cruiser, in Halong Bay.
Some weeks earlier, the newspaper Cuu Quoc (National Salvation) had carried a commentary strongly criticizing d'Argenlieu's colonialist attitude. The French High Commissioner's position had been very clearly revealed. So what question did he really want to solve? Why did he choose to hold his meeting on board a cruiser anchored offshore, and not Hanoi or Saigon? Given d'Argenlieu's record since his arrival in Indochina, especially since March 6, Uncle Ho and his comrades-in-arms had to study the offer very seriously. Anyhow the Preliminary Agreement had just been ratified by the French Government. The news of the signing of the Agreement had had echoes throughout the world. Many foreign newspapers considered it as a good way of soling the hostilities then existing between colonies and colonial powers. What was most important was that in such a meeting the tens of millions of our people in both North and South Viet Nam would certainly back our government's position. Uncle Ho also desired to meet with the French High Commissioner in order to press for the immediate holding of official negotiations in Paris, where the French reactionary elements in Indochina would find it difficult to conceal the truth about the talks from the public. So Uncle Ho decided to accept the Admiral's invitation.
On the morning of March 24, Uncle Ho, wearing his broad-brimmed hat and carrying his stick, got into his car. He was accompanied by Hoang Minh Giam and Nguyen Tuong Tam. At Gia Lam airport they were met by Sainteny and boarded a French sea-plane.
About 10 a.m. the okay reached Ha Long Bay. The Catalina alighted on the sea. The High Commissioner and Leclerc had been waiting aboard the cruiser Emile Bertin.
The welcoming ceremony took place in a solemn atmosphere.
A salute was fired from the guns. Host and guest shook hands. Introductions were made in turn by d'Argenlieu and Uncle Ho. The cruiser set sail towards the open sea. A cocktail party was held aboard the cruiser. Raising his glass, the Admiral said:
'This is the first meeting held to strengthen the friendly relations between France and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. May I propose a toast to the health of the President and to the prosperity of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam'.
D'Argenlieu stressed the fact that this was the first meeting. He wanted to imply that it was he who represented France in Indochina, and not Leclerc, who had met President Ho in Hanoi.
Uncle Ho was straightforward in his reply to the Admiral. He said:
'The present meeting is the result of the March 6, 1946 Agreement. So far as the Vietnamese government is concerned, it has strictly implemented the Preliminary Agreement. And we also request a sincere from the French side, so as to help bring about friendship between Viet Nam and France.'
President Ho was invited by d'Argenlieu to review the fleet. The warship steamed past a line of ships carrying big guns, their barrels pointing to the sky. Then she cast anchor. The strap of his hat pulled down, leaning on his bamboo stick, President Ho, with d'Argenlieu by his side, reviewed the French fleet. As the ships went past the French Navy seamen shouted hurrahs to welcome the President of the Democratic republic of Viet Nam.
As regards this meeting, some people say that d'Argenlieu was forced to meet President Ho under pressure from Leclerc, who had been instructed by the French government to open preparatory talks in Viet Nam before conducting official negotiations. Others consider it as part of the High Commissioner's delaying tactics. It was d'Argenlieu himself who suggested that a preparatory conference be held in Dalat. D'Argenlieu feared that the unstable political situation existing at that time in France would lead to too many concessions to the Viet Minh. He still entertained the hope that de Gaulle would soon return to power. And for the moment he had not yet succeeded in building up his puppets for the autonomous State of Cochinchina. Moreover he was taking advantage of the welcome ceremony to President Ho to bring up his fleet as a show of force.
After the review, President Ho and the French High Commissioner settled down immediately to an exchange of views.
Uncle Ho wanted the negotiations to open immediately in Paris, d'Argenlieu on the other hand did not want an early conference, nor did he want it to be held in Paris. He said that as the French government had not been fully informed of the situation, a preparatory conference would be necessary. He suggested Dalat as the venue of these preparatory talks, for, in his opinion, Dalat would become the capital of the federation of Indochina. Uncle Ho saw the Commissioner's scheme of deferring the official negotiations clearly. He said he did not see the need for holding preparatory talks. D'Argenlieu stuck to his guns: as long as the French government was not fully aware of all the problems in Indochina there could not be any official negotiations.
There was also a long debate on the seat and date of the official talks. Uncle Ho insisted on Paris. His suggestion was supported by Leclerc and Sainteny on the grounds that to hold it in Paris, the capital of France, would prevent the conference from being troubled by extremist elements (i.e. the Viet Nam Nationalist Party). Finally d'Argenlieu had to accept the proposal. The date of the departure of the Vietnamese delegation for France to hold official negotiations was fixed for the last quarter of May. Uncle Ho also agreed to the holding of preparatory talks in Dalat. But he made it a condition that the French delegates attending the preparatory talks should be sent by the French government from France. It was also agreed that, by the middle of April, at the same time as the French delegation left the country for Viet Nam to attend the preparatory talks, a Vietnamese parliamentary delegation would pay a good will visit to the French National Assembly and the French people.
Salan later related that the meeting at Ha Long Bay led to an irreconcilable rupture between the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Corps and the French High Commissioner.
That afternoon as he was watching the sky and sea of the aft deck Salan was summoned by the admiral. D'Argenlieu, pale-faced and trembling with anger, was in his cabin. He told Salan: 'General Leclerc has acted impolitely towards me. I would like to request you to bring him to reason. During these few weeks he has been talking to Mr. Ho Chi Minh to his heart's content. It is my turn now, that's obvious. I don't want to chase after a Munich conference in Indochina, going from one concession to another. If I accept Paris, Mr. Ho will start making new demands'.
Salan looked for Leclerc and told him what had happened. That very afternoon Leclerc left for Saigon.
On the plane back to Hanoi, President Ho told Salan: 'If the Admiral was intending to use his ships to intimidate me, he made a big mistake. Those ships cannot go upstream on our rivers'.
▴ VIII ▾
On March 11, in a letter sent to our fellow country-men in Nam Bo, Uncle Ho told them about the recognition by the French government of our country as a free and sovereign State. He wrote: 'This is thanks to the heroic struggle of the people all over the country, especially our compatriots in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo and of all our fighters during the last six months.' He pointed out that the negotiations 'will create political conditions which we should know how to exploit in order to achieve our goal - a completely independent Viet Nam.'
Later, at the Second Congress of the Party in 1951, in his political report, he referred to the March 6 Agreement and remarked that our compatriots and Party members in Nam Bo had considered that that policy had been correct.
Indeed, for our compatriots in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo the Agreement brought them new faith. Those who were fighting against the aggressors saw clearly that they had won a great victory when the French government was forced to recognize Viet Nam as a free State. Our compatriots were still more delighted at the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek troops would have to pull out. Some people said: 'By a mere signature Uncle Ho has managed to drive nearly 200,000 Chiang Kai-shek troops out of our country.' The Agreement created a new opportunity for our compatriots in their long struggle.
It was the enemy who was puzzled, bewildered, in face of the newly-signed Agreement. The former administrators and their puppets were at a loss. They were angry at every word, every sentence in the Agreement. They put many questions: Why do they call the Hanoi authorities the 'Vietnamese government'? Why does the French government officially recognize the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as a free State? Why is the French government pledging to accept the result of a referendum about the unification of the three Ky? - For them Nam Bo was simply a French colony.
In a session of the Consultative Council on March 12, Cédile, the French Commissioner in Cochinchina explained: 'The March 6 Agreement is only a local agreement between the Hanoi authorities and the French Commissioner in Bac Bo. If a Vietnamese government is referred to, it is by mere courtesy, and does not imply recognition of a single government for the three Annamese countries. Before long Cochinchina will have its separate government, parliament, army and finances? all the rights enjoyed by the other countries in the Federation.'
Those words of Cédile reflected d'Argenlieu's attitude and scheme. On March 8, when Valluy came, in the name of General Leclerc, to inform him of the newly signed March 6 Agreement, d'Argenlieu said at once: 'I am amazed, really amazed, General. France has such a fine expeditionary corps yet its commanders would rather negotiate than fight.'
Thus the opposition of the reactionary elements in Saigon to the spirit and letter of the Agreement was advocated and encouraged by the highest representative of France in Indochina.
Instead of implementing the Agreement by ceasing all hostilities and holding a referendum as was laid down in the clauses which had been signed, d'Argenlieu speeded up the formation of an 'autonomous government' of Cochinchina, in order to carry out his policy of splitting Nam Bo from Viet Nam.
After the signing of the Agreement in some places such as Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan the French feigned a desire to establish contact with our military units with the view of arranging a ceasefire. In reality, these were only ambushes. Through lack of vigilance, one of our units was caught and suffered some losses.
The High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps imposed many arrogant conditions on our armed forces. They demanded that our 'March South' units should withdraw to the North, and our troops in Nam Bo should come together and hand over their weapons to the French before returning to their native localities.
The enemy in South Viet Nam had laid bare his true colours: he had betrayed the Agreement. Our compatriots and fighters remembered clearly President Ho's words: 'Hold firm to your fighting positions.' And so all the enemy's treacherous acts were immediately beaten off.
With the Ninth Colonial Infantry Division and the Armed Division moving to the north, the French had only one division left in the south, the third Colonial Infantry. The French forces were not only smaller in numbers they were also more scattered. The recently set up puppet machinery was still very weak.
Like a river bursting its banks, our people from the plains to the mountain regions rose up as one man, swept away the local puppet machinery plank by plank and restored the revolutionary power. With any weapon they could lay hands on, the people arose and fought side by side with the army. A series of enemy posts were wiped out, encircled or abandoned by their defenders. Many important roads and water communication lines were cut. Together with the local cadres our troops had organized many armed propaganda units. Fast-moving units of our armed forces penetrated into temporarily occupied areas. Each time our troops attacked a village, the people at once sounded the gongs, beat and drums and, making their way to the puppets' offices, forced them to admit their crimes and return all they had plundered. Within a short period of time, vast areas in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo were freed from enemy control. There was a new fighting spirit all over South Viet Nam.
Guerrilla warfare was widespread. Everywhere there were rallies and demonstrations. As they were equipped only with rudimentary weapons, our army and people in Nam Bo had to depend mainly on stratagems to defeat the enemy. The Kinh Sang post in Cai Be district was on the bank of a canal? The enemy soldiers stationed there exerted a strict control over the passing boats. One day, in broad daylight, one small unit of ours went past the post by boat, disguised as traders. The soldiers ordered the boat to come near the bank so that they could check it. Our men invited them to board the boat and then killed them with scimitars and daggers. After that they landed and wiped out the other soldiers in the post.
In Cao Lanh district, Sa Dec province, a platoon of puppet troops was stationed near a market-place. On market days, the soldiers would come looting in the market-place. One morning, no sooner had they left the post than our troops assaulted it. Those who had stayed behind surrendered. Hearing the shots, all the people in the market-place fled, leaving their belongings behind. When the shooting ended they returned to find that everything they had left remained untouched. As our troops went past, parading their prisoners and carrying trophies, they were acclaimed by the people who stood along the road.
Women in many places took part in the fighting to wipe out the enemy and capture weapons. Some used bamboo flails to kill the enemy right in the market-places. Others would use a wicker fish trap to catch an enemy soldier by his head and capture his rifle.
The puppet troops and administration were facing a new situation: the revolutionary force was continuously growing. The March 6 Agreement bound the French to accept the abolition of the colonial regime. What would become of the puppets, after the referendum? Their immediate cause for fear was that the French troops' bayonets had become powerless and could no longer be used to shield them. The best way for them was to rally to the people. Many puppet agents and officials came to our cadres to hand over their seals and files, ready to accept any punishment meted out to them. Groups of puppet soldiers surrendered with their weapons. Some offered to help wipe out enemy posts from within.
In Saigon and other cities a movement of political struggle surged up. Rallies, demonstrations, and strikes were held in protest against the French violations. The press denounced the farce of French stage-managed 'autonomy' and condemned the collusion between the traitors and the aggressors in their scheme of dividing the country.
Armed activities were even conducted inside Saigon city. On April 8, one task force crossed the Saigon river and blew up a big ammunition depot. A platoon of French troops guarding the depot was wiped out and four thousand tons of ammunition destroyed. The explosions shook the whole city, heavily damaging the premises of the head-quarters of the French Expeditionary Corps General Staff including Leclerc's own office.
On the same day the French delegation to the Dalat preparatory conference arrived in Saigon. In the evening Leclerc gave a dinner in honour of the delegation. Max André, the head of the delegation was displeased with the explosion at the depot. He said to Leclerc: 'I suppose that those responsible will be punished for their negligence.' Leclerc angrily replied: 'I am the only one responsible here.'
Was it because the four-star general realized that his statement a month before - 'Cochinchina has been pacified' - was erroneous? For him everything would have to begin again from the beginning.
▴ IX ▾
The Sino-French agreement signed in Chungking on March 13 stipulated that the replacement of Chinese troops by French troops should begin as from March 15 and end of March 31, 1946.
On the afternoon of March 18, upon his arrival in Hanoi, Leclerc went to the former Governor General's palace to meet Lu Han. Those who accompanied him related how, when the General Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Corps praised Sino-French friendship, Lu Han replied coldly: 'We are executing the order of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.'
The blue-uniformed soldiers of the 53rd Army Corps continued to add more sandbags to their fortifications at the crossroads. At the same time as the French white-helmeted military policemen were riding their motor-bikes along Trang Thi Street to make their presence felt, Lu Han would also send his yellow-uniformed guards with their wooden stocked Mauser pistols to stroll along the pavements. Chiang troops looked at French troops with the indignant eyes of those whose food had been carried off by others.
March 31, the deadline for the Chiang Kai-shek troops' withdrawal arrived. The first clash between Chiang troops and French troops flared up. It occurred over a very trivial thing. Some French soldiers refused to pay a pedicab driver after a ride. The driver tugged at the sleeve of a French soldier to insist on payment. Some Chiang soldiers on guard nearby opened fire at the French soldiers. The French soldiers returned fire which grew intense.
The incident was still unsettled when, the following day, April 1, two cars, one belonging to the Chiang troops and the other to the French army, accidentally collided. The Chiang troops opened fire. The French generals in Hanoi resignedly tried to find some way to settle the matter.
During these clashes our people and armed forces remained calm and maintained strict discipline. We just stood by, not interfering in their clashes nor their attempts at settlement.
The relations between the Chiang troops and the French were becoming tense. With the Chiang soldiers waiting for a chance to open fire fighting could break out any moment.
Apart from carrying out propaganda activities against the Preliminary Agreement, Chiang's henchmen kidnapped and assassinated isolated French soldiers to get their rifles and money. But their main aim was to cause confusion and bring about a direct confrontation between our side and the French troops. However, thanks to the efforts made by the Vietnamese-French Liaison and Control Commission, most of the incidents provoked by them to undermine relations between us and the French were settled.
The biggest clash between Chiang's troops and the French occurred on April 21. As in the previous cases, it started with a minor incident: two cars, one belonging to the Chiang troops and the other to the French, collided in front of a flower shop at the Trang Tien crossroads. The bonnet of the Chiang troops' car was smashed and a number of the soldiers were injured. This led to an exchange of fire between the Chiang troops and the French. Shots were also fired in Bo Ho restaurant by the Sword Lake, Hang Da Street, Cot Co Avenue and Mai Ha De Street. This incident lasted more than one hour and involved machine-guns as well as ordinary guns. Not until after 5 p.m. could the two sides come to a settlement. This engagement had caused scores of casualties.
The Chiang troops were seeking a pretext to stay on. As they had been unsuccessful in provoking clashes between our side and the French, they were trying to create minor confrontations between themselves and the French.
But in China events were happening to harm the position of Chiang Kai-shek. Towards the end of March 1946, the Red Army launched a great offensive in the Northeast and advanced into the capital of Heilungkiang. The General Staff of the Chiang armed forces could no longer retain their 200,000 troops in Viet Nam.
In mid-April General Juin, Chief of Staff of the French Army arrived in Chungking. He had been instructed by the French government to persuade Chiang to implement the March 13 Agreement. Juin came just at the moment when the Chiang administration's capital was being transferred to Nanking. So he had to catch up with them and wait several days. He eventually met Pai Shung-hi and Wang She-chie, who agreed to withdraw their troops from northern Indochina in the shortest possible time. In late April Lu Han was summoned to Nanking where he was ordered to withdraw his troops from Indochina and move them to Northeast China.
But it was not until the middle of May, however, that Lu Han finally ordered his troops to withdraw from Thanh Hoa, and only one month later did Chiang troops start to pull out from Hanoi.
It was obvious that they were deeply attached to this strip of land to the south of their country where they could lead a quiet, affluent life, away from the inevitable punishment meted out to them for their way against the Chinese people. Before leaving this country they plundered everything within reach. In one instance, Chiang soldiers even demolished the staircase of a house where they were quartered and sold the wood in the market.
Their troops withdrawal dragged on and was not completed till September 18, 1946, that is six months after the deadline set by the Sino-French agreement. That was the very same day as the date on which in the previous year, they had made their massive advance into our country. As they advanced they had ordered their henchmen to seize power in the towns their troops were marching through. They had believed that their time had come. The Chungking government had always borne in mind the promise of the late US President Roosevelt to give them this fertile peninsula when the Second World War ended. Now all their mirages of a new paradise had turned to nought. The autumnal wind of that year blew them out of our country, like fallen leaves.
With the 180,000 notoriously barbarous and anti-communist troops driven out of the country, together with all their dark and vicious schemes, our revolution had got rid of an extremely dangerous enemy, and a heavy load - both material and spiritual - had been lifted from its shoulders.
▴ X ▾
'According to the government's plan, we will ensure that everyone in the country has sufficient food, clothing and schooling.' In his letter to anti-illiteracy teachers at the beginning of the year, President Ho again stated that the lofty goal of the revolution was finally to liberate the nation, liberate the exploited classes and to bring about a free and happy life - material as well as spiritual. The people should enjoy not only independence and freedom, but also wealth and happiness. For him, the ideal of the revolution was not something remote or abstract, it was very nearby, concrete, and closely connected with the people's everyday life.
With the signing of the March 6 Agreement, a period of compromise lay ahead of us. While continuing to force the French side to implement the clauses of the Agreement we went on vigorously building our country in every field.
'Increase production' and 'Fight illiteracy' were the two major slogans set forth by uncle Ho. By the end of 1945 President Ho's appeal to the people to increase production in order to combat famine had had a great effect. In order to push up production and create better working conditions for the poor peasants, a decree was issued on the reduction of farm rents by 25 per cent.
Uncle Ho attached great importance to the fight against illiteracy, a heavy heritage left behind by the colonial regime.
In response to his appeal some 10,000 anti-illiteracy teachers and millions of our people took part in the fight to roll back this enemy.
Uncle Ho felt greatly the importance of increasing the knowledge of all the citizens of the independent country, and wholeheartedly dedicated himself to the cause. The anti-illiteracy department sent him a book entitled 'Methods of teaching Vietnamese to beginners'. He read the book carefully and wrote down a note on the fly leaf: 'Anti-illiteracy teachers must study this book carefully. Then they must set to work to teach our illiterate compatriots in order to wipe out illiteracy quickly. By so doing they will fulfil the sacred task assigned them by our fatherland.'
On April 13, Uncle Ho visited an evening class in Hang Trong Street. The learners' makeshift desks consisted of door panels. The teacher, a bespectacled young man, was writing model letters on the blackboard. His students belonged to different generations and were dressed in every kind of style. They bent over their boards studiously working. The white-haired head of a long-robed old man was seen near the black mop of a little boy in shorts. Leaning on his bamboo stick, Uncle Ho watched the scene and was deeply moved. He said encouragingly: 'Both teacher and learners are fighters on the anti-illiteracy front'. In a letter sent to anti-illiteracy teachers he wrote: 'I hope that within a very short time your ardour and effort will bring about glorious results and all our fellow-countrymen will learn to read and write. Nothing, even bronze statues and stone stelae can compare with such an honour.'
In face of a tense situation, in order to defend the achievements of the revolution against the enemy from within and without, our Party advocated building up the people's armed forced, consolidating our national defence, continuing to arm the revolutionary masses and stepping up the building of the people's army. The self-defence forces, which had increased in numbers, constituted a network spreading to all corners of the country, especially in the cities and towns where French troops were stationed. Self-defence units formed the backbone of the people's struggle against provocations and violations of the Agreement by the French army. French troops started to have apprehensions about the 'Viet Minh in square badges' meaning the members of self-defence units. In Hanoi the self-defence cadres training school opened its second class in April.
With the founding of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam favourable conditions were created for the rapid growth of our armed forces. The March 9 instructions of the Party Standing Committee pointed out that 'especial attention should be paid to the training of political and military cadres to guide the new movement.'
In March 1946 the Bac Son Military and Political School was opened by the Party; in May the Tran Quoc Tuan Military School was opened by the Ministry of National Defence; in June, the Quang Ngia Secondary Infantry School was set up by the Southern Viet Nam Resistance Committee - In every regiment there were also military and political school to train squad and platoon commanders.
The curriculum for political education consisted of the present situation and tasks, Viet Minh policies, introduction to Communism, summary of dialectical and historical materialism, and political work in the revolutionary army. The most important lectures in the Bac Son military and political school were given by members of the Central Committee of the Party.
The curriculum for military education consisted of guerilla tactics, individual basic training, and combat actions. The syllabus for guerilla tactics was based on the book 'Methods of Guerrilla Warfare' written in the base area during the anti-Japanese resistance. So far as regular warfare was concerned, lacking experience we had to make a selection from the tactics of various countries.
On May 22, 1946, Uncle Ho went to Son Tay to inaugurate the Tran Quoc Tuan Military School. Self-defence units and youth from the province lined up along the road to welcome him.
In the wide school-yard cadets in khaki uniforms had gathered to listen to his instructions.
Having exhorted the cadres to stand united, work hard and observe strict discipline, Uncle Ho said: 'To be loyal to the fatherland and faithful to the people is the sacred duty, heavy responsibility and also the honour of all the combatants of our country's first national army.'
'Be loyal to the Fatherland and faithful to the people,' that behest of Uncle Ho's has become historic. Right from its earliest days he showed our army how to make a clear distinction between the old armies of the past and the new army of the revolution. That historic behest has been embroidered in golden letters on the army banner and will guide our combatants in the fulfilment of their glorious tasks and the building of our army into an invincible force.
Since the last days of November 1945 the situation had become very tense. Our Party had to go underground. Uncle Ho pointed out to the Party Standing Committee that, together with consolidating and broadening the Viet Minh Front, we should form a very broadly-based national united front to include all strata of the population including those who were still outside the Viet Minh Front. The idea of uniting all forces which could rally to our side to fight the enemy was one of the great ideas which permeated all his revolutionary activities.
He suggested that this new front should be given the name of Hoi Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam (Viet Nam National Alliance). The goals of the front were: independence, unity, democracy, and prosperity. All Vietnamese, irrespective of nationality, religion or social origin, could become members of the Alliance. Uncle Ho suggested shortening the name to Lien Viet just as he had shortened Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh (Alliance for the Independence of Viet Nam) to Viet Minh.
On May 27, the Lien Viet was officially founded. President Ho was elected Honorary Chairman of the Alliance. Huynh Thuc Khang was elected President of its Executive Committee. Ton Duc Thang was elected Vice-President. The political organizations which joined the Lien Viet were: the Viet Minh, the Democratic Party, the Viet Nam Revolutionary Alliance and the Viet Nam Nationalist Party.
Besides there were also various religious committees and trade-union organizations. Patriots who had not yet joined an organization now joined the Lien Viet. This was the beginning of the great influence of the broader-based national united front, founded on the initiative of President Ho, on our people's struggle for independence and democracy.
▴ XI ▾
Some days after the meeting between President Ho and d'Argenlieu at Ha Long Bay, early in April, Reuter reported, 'D'Argenlieu has been named head of the delegation to enter into negotiations with the Government of the DRVN? The delegation will consist of representatives of the Ministries of Economics, Finance, Defence and Overseas France.'
If the report was correct this could only be a scheme of the French reactionaries. D'Argenlieu was a faithful follower of the most wicked type of old style colonialism. Talks between us and him could not produce any good results. The fact that a representative of the Ministry of Overseas France was to be a member of the delegation implied that Viet Nam was still considered as a French colony.
Our press immediately denounced this reactionary manoeuvre to sabotage the agreement. We demanded that the official negotiations be held in Paris on the principle of equality. The French should renounce their intention of including a representative of the Ministry of Overseas France in the delegation. The right people to represent the French government in the talks with liberated Viet Nam would be officials of the French Foreign Ministry. The Reuter report was not confirmed, nor was it denied.
Uncle Ho and his comrades were discussing sending delegations to France and Dalat. The Parliamentary delegation who would pay a friendship visit to the French National Assembly and people would be headed by Comrade Pham Van Dong, who would later also lead the Vietnamese delegation to the official negotiations in Paris. I was designated deputy-head of the government delegation to the Dalat preparatory talks. This delegation would be headed by Nguyen Tuong Tam, then the Foreign Minister of the coalition government of the DRVN.
On April 16, the two delegations set out for the talks. The delegation to Dalat left the Bac Bo Palace at 6 a.m. Uncle Ho had come there earlier to see the delegation off. Once again he told us: 'The Nam Bo question and the cease-fire question should be on top of the agenda.' He shook hands with each member of the delegation.
It was drizzling. The city was quiet. As the news of the departure of the two delegations had come too late, the people did not turn out to see them off. But some days before, rallies had been held to support the two delegations.
A number of journalists put questions about the prospects of the negotiations. It was difficult to answer them. The answers were still ahead of us. We would reach a political settlement with the French if the French sincerely honoured their commitments and respected the fundamental rights of a free Viet Nam. The success of the negotiations depended not only on us but also the opposite side. The struggle between the progressive forces and the reactionary forces in Indochina and in France was still raging. The first indications were not very promising. It had been reported that Max André would lead the French delegation. The French government had complied with our request and sent their representatives directly from France. But Max André was a man from the banking world, a member of the Catholic MRP. The leaders of this movement were representatives of the French monopoly capitalists closely connected with the US and the Vatican. With such an interlocutor the conference could not be expected to proceed smoothly. So far as our side was concerned the composition of our delegation was not homogenous. Nguyen Tuong Tam had refused to sign the agreement the previous month and at the last minute Vu Hong Khanh had to sign on his behalf. Besides, some delegates from Nam Bo whose names were on the list failed to arrive at the time of departure.
At 7 a.m. the plane took off. From above we could see, beneath the clouds, now the jade blue of the sea with its white waves, now the green foliage of the Truong Son Range. Then there would be a river shining with sunlight, winding like a snake. Our ancestors had said that 'the mountains and rivers are like a piece of beautiful embroidery.' That was just the image of our fatherland as it was viewed behind the aeroplane's wing.
That day we only reached Pakse where the French Dakota stopped for refuelling. Just before take-off there was a mechanical failure and the delegation had to stay there to wait for another plane from Saigon. We strolled about the streets, visited an ancient pagoda, then went to the bank of the Mekong. This broad river, red with alluvium, separated Thailand from Laos. On either bank of the river the terrain was flat. The news of the arrival of the government delegation brought along a great number of Vietnamese nationals; such unexpected meetings were very moving.
The following day the plane flew on to Dalat. As soon as we descended from the plane, we were struck by a complete change in the weather. In Pakse it had been very hot but here it was cool like a late autumn day. Dalat was a health resort, a tourist city reserved for the French and Vietnamese belonging to the so-called 'upper-classes'. There were villas, big and small, everywhere. There were hotels and avenues where one might stroll about and look at the landscape, the endless hills of pines around the city. A really beautiful city.
Our delegation was put up at the Lang Biang Hotel. The hotel looked out onto a quiet lake surrounded by lines of trees. It was beautiful but was called by the French the 'Lake of Signs'. Beyond the lake there were mountains.
On April 18, at 9 a.m., it was announced that at 10.15 a.m. d'Argenlieu would receive the heads of the two delegations at his residence. Then the High Commissioner would meet all the members of the two delegations in order to introduce the French delegation, with Max André as the newly appointed chief delegate. There had been no discussion between us and the French side about this. The Admiral was acting in a patronizing fashion hoping to receive the two delegations at a federal palace in his capacity as High Commissioner. It was known that after meeting the two delegations, the High Commissioner would open the first plenary session. This was also unilaterally decided by the French. Of course, we could not agree.
We sent the secretary of the delegation to inform the French side that the head of the Vietnamese delegation wished to meet d'Argenlieu to discuss the points recently put forward by the French.
At 10 a.m., all the members of the French delegation were present at d'Argenlieu's palace. Correspondents and journalists were there too. They all waited for us until 11 a.m. As we firmly refused to come to the meeting arrogantly called by d'Argenlieu, the situation was very tense.
The French side thought out a face-saving solution: they invited us to a dinner party. So the first meeting between the High Commissioner and the two delegations took place round a dining table. D'Argenlieu missed the opportunity to open the conference in his capacity as High Commissioner of the Federation.
This was my first meeting with d'Argenlieu. This defrocked priest had small, wily eyes under a wrinkled forehead and thin lips. After spending a moment with him, my impression was that he was an experienced, cunning, arrogant and mean man. Such a one could belong only to the past, to the colonial system.
D'Argenlieu boasted that he knew a lot about us. He inquired after my family, asked about the years in which I conducted underground activities, and about the period of terror under the Japanese. Then he expressed his wish to meet me again for further talks. He also invited me to a mountain-climbing party the following Sunday. Both sides touched upon the prospects of the Vietnamese-French relationship. I said: 'There will certainly be many difficulties ahead, but these difficulties are to be overcome. Given a common effort from both sides we Vietnamese can surmount them.'
During the talks, d'Argenlieu said that he was called by some people a 'man of silence and asceticism'. Certainly, what the High Commissioner was trying to imply was that he was still a priest at heart. But in reality, he was not so much a priest as a perfidious politician.
The two sides agreed to meet again in a plenary session the following day. The opening session would be presided over by a member of the Vietnamese delegation. This was the first concession made by the French side. It did not mean, however, that the obstacles had been reduced at all, nor that there had been a rapprochement in the positions of the two sides.
The preparatory Conference held its first plenary session on the morning of April 4, at the Yersin Secondary School. The French delegation contained many former administrators such as Messmer, Bousquet, Pignon, etc, and economic, financial and military experts. Some of them had been present in Indochina since the early days of the 1945 August Revolution. Messmer, in particular, had been parachuted into the North in September, 1945. He had been captured by our militiamen but later on had managed to escape.
The political sub-committee met on April 20. We moved that the creation of a favourable political atmosphere for the negotiations and the ceasefire in Nam Bo should be put on the agenda. The French side began to put forward many devious arguments. They tried to avoid discussion of our proposal, by saying that those questions went beyond the competence of the two delegations. We referred to the legal foundations of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement and to common sense in order to force the French side to meet our request. After a long argument, the French made a partial concession. They agreed to include on the agenda the question of 'Creating a favourable political atmosphere for the negotiations'. We insisted on putting the question of 'a ceasefire in Nam Bo' on the agenda as well.
During the break, the French delegates had a consultation. When the session was resumed, Pignon, political adviser of the French delegation, stated that they were not empowered to consider the question of a ceasefire in Cochinchina. We retorted:
'We wish to know if the French delegation is empowered to discuss the issues raised in the March 6 Agreement.'
Pignon, with much reluctance, replied:
'Yes, we are.'
'Is it not, then, written in this Agreement that 'the two Governments shall, at once, take decisions on all necessary measures to put an end to the hostilities?'
The French were thus driven into a corner. By the end of the morning session, they had not yet found a reply. So, the question had to be set aside.
In the afternoon, I went for a walk along Cam Ly spring. The reactionary attitude of the French was all too clear. The negotiations could hardly end well. Anyway, the talks between us and the French would continue? The path was carpeted with pine needles. Wild flowers grew on the banks of the spring. The town was quiet, the air cool and the scenery beautiful. Dalat was, indeed, a magnificent place. The cool breeze and the murmuring pines urged me on until I realized that it was getting dark. I returned to the hotel.
In the evening, I hadn't been working long at my desk when there was a knock on the door and it was immediately opened. One of the comrades rushed in and said excitedly:
- 'Please come upstairs. Comrade Thach has arrived!'
Pham Ngo Thach was then fighting in Nam Bo. His name had been announced in the list of our delegation but we had always thought he would never be able to make it. We wondered how he had managed to arrive here at the beginning of the conference. The French still did not know of his arrival.
In a moment, all the delegates, except Nguyen Tuong Tam, turned up. Comrade Thach looked thin, swarthy but vigorous. Happy and deeply moved, we all gave him a tight hug. His voice still bore the militant sentiment of fighting Nam Bo. He told us about his trip from Saigon. It was really a risky adventure. He spoke of the situation in Nam Bo, the sacrifices and heroic deeds of the combatants and the people. We chatted far into the night.
The following day, Comrade Thach was arrested by the French in front of the Parc Hotel. Though our delegation made an energetic remonstrance, our Government protested against the illegal French action, and our people held meetings in many places to demand his release, he was only set free after the negotiations ended.
▴ XII ▾
The Conference continued in earnest. Apart from the plenary sessions and the sub-committees' sessions, there were several exchanges in the lobbies - Max André, Messmer, Bousquet and, sometimes, even d'Argenlieu joined in these informal talks. However, no progress was made in the negotiations as regards the questions at issue.
Our delegation's single-mindedness was apparent in all the discussions. Nguyen Tuong Tam alone stayed away from most of the sessions and seldom took part in the consultations among our delegates.
The question of the ceasefire dragged out over several sessions. The conference's atmosphere became stifling. The French side knew for sure that we would not give up. Our firm and well-reasoned dealing with the question of the Nam Bo ceasefire drove the French into a difficult situation. Bousquet, an economic specialist on Indochina, had to admit: "This question caused us no end of trouble. The (i.e. the Vietnamese side) were in the right." A few other French shared Bousquet's opinion.
After the first sessions, the Dalat people began to grumble about the French side's absurd arguments. A French delegate even said: "You have redoubtable dialecticians in your delegation".
The French could not find any excuse for rejecting our request but they were still unwilling to put the issue on the agenda. Clearly, the French were not anxious for a ceasefire in Nam Bo.
Now a question arose within our delegation: Was it worthwhile to continue the negotiations?
On April 23, the two delegations held a plenary session. Again, we raised the question of a ceasefire in Nam Bo. The French made a concession... They proposed to set up a limited mixed Commission, comprising persons who were not members of either delegation here, to bring about a ceasefire in Cochinchina and, at the same time, to solve other urgent problems. This Commission would convene first in Dalat, and later in Hanoi.
We knew this was simply an attempt at procrastination. But it was thanks to this concession by the French that the negotiations could continue.
Late in April, General Juin, the French army Chief of Staff dropped in on the Dalat conference on his way back to Paris from Nanking. I met him for about twenty minutes and made my position clearly to him:
"The French must put into effect a ceasefire in Nam Bo in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement. Otherwise, the Vietnamese people will continue to fight to the end. I want to tell you that, in the name of the resistance."
Heated debate occurred not only in the political sub-committee, but also in all other sub-committees, military, economic and cultural.
On economic matters, we stood firmly for the preservation of our fundamental economic interests to ensure a favourable development of the national economy. At the same time we made certain concessions to French economic interests in Indochina.
The problems to be handled by this sub-committee were:
- Customs
- Currency
- The existing French business enterprises in our country.
Big difference of opinion centered around the currency problem and the problem of French business undertakings in Viet Nam.
On culture, the two sides reached some agreement. But we disapproved of the French request to set up in Indochina a number of cultural centers under the Federation's direct control and the French proposal to use French as the second official language after Vietnamese.
On the military issue, several exchanges of opinions failed to bring about any result. For this was dependent on the political issue and no military agreement was possible as long as the political problem remained unsettled.
The political issue was the fundamental and the most arduous and time-consuming problems throughout the negotiations.
Our principled position was: Viet Nam must be a free country. The Indochinese Federation would be of an economic character and should not be allowed to be detrimental to the fundamental rights of Viet Nam.
On the relationship between the countries of the Indochinese Federation and France, our delegation declared the ending of the governor generalship. We advocated organizing a federation which would be, in fact, solely economic. The French representative in the Federation would work as a diplomatic officer. The Indochinese Federation would ordinate the customs and currnncy policies, and the planning of construction works among the Federation countries on the principle of respect for their sovereignty.
The French side wanted the French High Commissioner to be representative of the French Union and, at the same time, President of the Indochinese Federation. They demanded that legislation, foreign trade, finance, foreign exchange, transport, health, research and invention, culture, science, economics, the statistics service, post, telecommunications and radio, and immigratton be all under Federal control... The French thus revealed beyond any doubt their design to revive the former Governor General's rule.
The French requested that we recognize the manifesto concerning the rights of citizens within the French Union. We favoured the democratic principles in the manifesto but refused to recognize it as yet. Even the French people had not yet recognized this manifesto. And in fact the French side had no definite idea as to what the French Union they proposed would be like.
On foreign affairs, our position was that Viet Nam would have its own Ambassador to France and the French High Commissioner here would be the diplomatic representative of France in Viet Nam. A free Viet Nam would have the right to appoint its ambassadors to the countries within the French Union and to other countries. The French wanted the representative of France in Viet Nam to be a French official appointed by the French High Commissioner, and Viet Nam to have diplomatic representation in other countries only through the French Union.
As regards Nam Bo the March 6 Preliminary Agreement had provided for the holding of a referendum to settle the question. Our stand was the that objective of a ballot was not to ascertain who should have sovereignty over Na,m Bo, because the Vietnamese territory was made up of all the three ky, North, Centre and South. The referendum was in order to ask the Southern people whether they wanted to remain a ky in the framework of a unified Viet Nam. But the French wished the referendum to deal with the question of Vietnamese sovereignty over the southern part of Viet Nam, Nam Bo, formerly Cochinchina.
In our opinion, and as a matter of course, a referendum needed to be held in Nam Bo only. But the French demanded also a referendum in Trung Bo, formerly Annam, and Bac Bo, formerly Tonkin, about sovereignty over these two ky.
We held that, to ensure the legality and equity of the referendum, genuine freedom for the voters was indispensable. Therefore, we proposed that a temporary administration represented by a thirty-member council be set up in Nam Bo. This council would elect an executive committee whose task would be to bring into effect within a short time a ceasefire, to release all political prisoners, to put an end to all terrorization and to ensure freedom of action for the people's political organizations. The French side replied in ambiguous terms that they would ensure freedom for the referendum in Cochinchina, and that they did not approve of Vietnamese participation in the present administration in Cochinchina.
A big gap remained between our position and that of the French. To all appearances, the representatives of the new France who took part in the negotiations lagged far behind the actual situation brought on by the fundamental changes that had taken place on this peninsula. Their mentality remained, to a large extent, that of the old-fashioned colonialists of the French Empire. Max André, head of the French delegation, increasingly revealed himself as a diehard reactionary. Once, in a reception, he said "France has been very generous to Viet Nam. She has made too many concessions already. We can't have another Munich here."
Meanwhile, in France, on these first days of May, the new draft constitution was rejected in a referendum. This was another setback for the movement of struggle for democratic liberties in France. The rightists had scored a success. The French reactionaries in the colonies would become even more aggressive. Our struggle would be even more arduous.
On May 10, another plenary session was held. We stuck to our position on the holding of a referendum in Nam Bo. The French delegates remained obdurate. We told them outright that some Frenchmen nurtured a design to sever Cochinchina from Viet Nam; this design could not be tolerated and would certainly fail. After a heated debate, our delegation got up and left the conference room.
That night, after a consultation within the delegation, I sat up late. It was murky outside the window. The lake and the mountains could no longer be discerned. The lovely pine hills and the wild woods of Lang Biang plateau were blurred in the darkness. The resistance waged by our people and our guerilla fighters from those distant mountain peaks and dense jungles was going on and could not yet come to an end. Since the beginning, we had made regular reports to Uncle Ho and other comrades on developments at the conference. Our press and radio had kept the public informed of our delegation's struggle at the conference. Uncle Ho and the comrades at home were closely watching the progress of the negotiations. In the session this morning, I had said to the French delegation "The Vietnamese combatants, who have gone through untold hardships in the struggle for the freedom of the nation, can only accept peace in justice and honour... In the name of a nation which has been tempered in labour and struggle for thousands of years I can assure you that, so long as Nam Bo is separated from Viet Nam, every Vietnamese will struggle his utmost to bring it back to the bosom of the Fatherland. If our voice finds no response and the Agreement is not respected, we shall not be responsible for anything that may happen later on... History will testify to the truth of our words..." We had told the French all that was necessary to tell. But the French still clung to their colonialist stand. We were now able to make a better assessment of the frenzied opposition by the reactionaries. The negotiations brought home to us a truth in a just struggle for independence and freedom for one's country, diplomatic activities invariably depended on the people's might. It was indispensable for every Vietnamese to have sufficient energy and determination to raise his own might. Our people had to be strong. Our country had to be strong. Diplomatic activities must stem from that basis. Once, I recalled, Uncle Ho had said "Strength is like a gong and diplomatic activities may be likened to its sound; a loud sound can only come from a big gong."
The session this morning became the last one of the Dalat conference. However, this was but a preparatory negotiation held on the spot. The link between us and the French had not been completely cut off.
▴ XIII ▾
We came back to Hanoi from Dalat on May 13. Our National Assembly delegation which was on a visit to the French National Assembly and the French people had not yet returned. One week after the delegation's departure from Hanoi, Saigon news agencies reported that a "Cochinchinese mission" had left for France to inform the French Government of the present situation and request autonomy for Cochinchina. The mission was headed by Nguyen Van Xuan. This was just another trick by the High Commissioner.
On May 18, under the headline "Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Nation", the Cuu Quoc published in the capital city wrote "On this day of May 19, fifty-six years ago (1890) Ho Chi Minh was born.
"It is he who, with his skill and determination, has founded and fostered several Vietnamese revolutionary organisations. The dynamism of almost all Vietnamese combatants is the result of his talented training..."
The article spoke of President Ho's contribution to the revolution, exalting him as the soul, the personification of the Vietnamese revolution and highlighted the great significance of May 19.
For the first time, the entire Vietnamese nation learned of the date of President Ho's birthday. To him, our people owed the change in their life for the better. We prepared to celebrate his birthday. As we were well aware of his modesty, we kept the anniversary as simple as possible.
On the same day, d'Argenlieu arrived in Hanoi. This was the first time the French High Commissioner had come to the capital of our country. The objective of this visit was as invidious as all his other schemes. At the meeting in Ha Long Bay, the High Commissioner had agreed with President Ho that our Government's negotiating delegation would leave for France on May 31 at the latest. The day was drawing near and the political situation in France was still in a muddle. Political parties were fully engaged in the election campaign. It was not clear who would gain power in the French government. D'Argenlieu did not want the Vietnamese government delegation to come to France for negotiations in such a situation. Besides, Cédile's actors were not yet ready to stage their play of an "autonomous Cochinchina" and the French Government had not yet formally adopted the political solution of the High Commissioner. Therefore, d'Argenlieu wanted to request President Ho to postpone the departure of our Government's delegation for France. He also intended to take this opportunity to give us forewarning of the imminent founding of the "autonomous state of Cochinchina."
At 6 p.m, d'Argenlieu, accompanied by General Valluy and Crepin, went to pay their respects to President Ho at the Bac Bo Palace.
With Uncle Ho to receive them were Messrs Huynh, To and a few of us. Proposing a toast in honour of the High Commissioner, Uncle Ho said
"The capital city of the new Democratic Republic of Viet Nam is glad to receive the representative of France. Following our consultations in Ha Long Bay, the Dalat preparatory conference and the friendship visit of the Vietnamese National Assembly delegation to the French National Assembly, your visit, today, will surely mark a new development in Vietnamese-French relations."
With great civility, d'Argenlieu replied
"Mr President, tomorrow is your birthday anniversary. May I wish you, Mr President, a long life. I am confident that, from now on, the friendship between France and Viet Nam will grow closer and more intimate day by day."
Early on May 19, the comrades in the Standing Bureau and the Government came to present the their birthday greetings to Uncle Ho. This was a rare occasion for us to be all with him on his birthday. In a poem dedicated to his memory and composed in early Spring 1970, To Huu wrote
As usual he was, perhaps, away
Leaving all the greetings to the nation...
Uncle Ho was often away on the occasion of his birthday anniversaries.
He tried to refuse, to put away the glories which were reserved for him. He did not like to speak of his achievements and to listen to eulogies in his honour.
Stirring drumbeats resounded before: the Bac Bo Palace. The children were coming. Uncle Ho went out to bring them in. A dozen boys and girls came on behalf of all the young pioneers in the city and its outskirts to present to Uncle Ho their birthday greetings. Among them was one who had to make his own living as a newsboy and another who came from the Hang Bot orphanage. They vied with each other in their rush to pin "Young Pioneer" badges onto his coat and to make him gifts of the letters "i" and "t" which were symbols of the popular literacy movement and pamphlets of statutes and songs of the Young Pioneers' Association for National Salvation.
Uncle Ho's present to the children that year was a bach tan ("hundred domes") ornamental plant grown in a pot. He pointed to the lush plant and said
"This is my present to you, children. Later, its branches will develop into a hundred domes. Take good care of it so that it may grow strongly! That's the way to show affection for me."
The children sang a gay song to thank him. As they left carrying the plant with them, a group of more than fifty men and women entered. The men wore khaki and the women black peasant pyjamas. There were representatives of fighting South Viet Nam who came to present their greetings.
Having received their greetings, he said
"Thank you very much for having come to wish me a long life. As a matter of fact, the press here had made too much of my birthday. I think that at the age of fifty-six I do not yet deserve to receive your wishes for longevity. It is still a young age. And I must confess that I am ashamed seeing you here, in comfortable and joyous North Viet Nam, while Nam Bo is still deprived of peace.
Tears trickled down his cheeks. Theirs also welled up in the eyes of the Nam Bo representatives.
A few moments later, the Central Board for the New Life Style, set up the previous month by Government decree, came to greet him. Its members seized the opportunity to ask him to give the movement a motto. He said
"You want a motto? Here it is:
"Diligence, thrift, integrity, uprightness, total devotion to the public service and complete selflessness."
One of them suggested that it was already a familiar motto now they should like to ask him for a new motto which would encourage the New Life Style.
Uncle Ho smiled.
"Everyday we eat, drink and breathe to live. These are the things our forefathers had to do. We have to do them now and future generations will have to do the same. Thus, to eat, drink and breathe can never be considered outmoded. It is the same with diligence, thrift, integrity, uprightness, total devotion to the public service and complete selflessness."
The same day, an AFP correspondent asked him, in an interview, about the disruption of the Dalat conference. He answered
"In a sincere frank and sometimes even brutal manner, representatives of the two countries have made their positions clear. But this is a good thing. For we now understand each other better than before. Mutual agreement has been reached on some questions and differences remain on others. Anyway, this was only a preparatory conference. It is the task of the Paris Conference to adopt the provisions agreed upon in Dalat and to iron out the conflicting viewpoints: which, in my opinion, are not irreconcilable. The two nations should agree with each other to bring about friendly cooperation. We shall lay a solid foundation for the future negotiations."
In face of the French reactionaries' acts of sabotage, he still did his best to obstruct them so that in case a war could not be avoided, the period of accommodation would at least be stretched.
During his few days in Hanoi d'Argenlieu made every effort to persuade President Ho to postpone the Vietnamese delegation's departure for France for formal negotiations. He tried to present this as a necessity that would serve the interests of the negotiations and of Viet Nam. In the talks, he artfully touched upon an existing "difficulty" i.e., he "could no longer continue to block the Cochinchinese people's aspirations for autonomy." He sought to justify beforehand his treacherous act - to be effected later - against the March 6 Agreement.
However, all his crafty words could not in any way cover up his brazen and odious schemes and action. We knew very well that any delay in the formal negotiations would further facilitate the realization of the fait accompli policy pursued by d'Argenlieu and the reactionaries in Indochina. Uncle Ho firmly demanded that the High Commissioner keep the Vietnamese delegation's date of departure to that already agreed upon at Ha Long Bay, i.e. by the end of May 1946 at the latest. Having failed in his mission of persuasion, d'Argenlieu, disappointed, returned to Saigon on May 22.
The press in Hanoi reported that, on May 31, the Vietnamese delegation would leave for France for formal negotiations.
There was not much time left for the High Commissioner. Now, all the efforts of the reactionaries in Saigon were focused on the farce of "autonomous Cochinchina" which should be staged before the negotiating delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam set foot on French soil.
▴ XIV ▾
The imperialists tried to cover up their ugly features by a screen of lies. Though the French colonies were nearly twenty times as large as France in area, the famous statesman Clemenceau, then Minister of War, had still done his best to prove to the world that France was not an imperialist country. President Poincare himself had declared that France was the first colonialist power to know how to colonize. When the colonialists spoke of their humane mission to bring civilization to the backward nations, this meant draining them dry, poisoning them by means of alcohol and opium and keeping them in ignorance.
The colonialists and administrators in the colonies were like ostriches1 greedily swallowing all the resources of the colonized peoples and directly committing numerous crimes. They would even cheat their own compatriots and the metropolitan government. Uncle Ho had become well aware of this during his stay abroad. It was understandable that the French people in France were quite ignorant of what their representatives were doing in remote countries, but even those who were in the government often had only a vague idea about what was happening. Uncle Ho noticed that "the proletariats of the two countries do not know each other and that is why they are prejudiced against each other, and "imperialism and colonialism have always used this mutual suspicion to hinder their propaganda work and sow division among these forces which should he united." For him imperialism was a "leech with two suckers" of which one sucked the blood of the colonies and the other that of the metropolitan country. Both of them must be cut off before imperialism could be exterminated.
1 President Ho used this simile to castigate the boundless greed of the colonialists. The French expression estomac d'autruche designates a stomach that will digest anything.
It was because he was resolved to tear to pieces this veil of imperialist deception that the revolutionary Nguyen Al Quoc had first taken up his pen as a journalist, lecturer and even a writer of satirical plays. His journalistic career, in particular, was prolific and original. His biting articles, written in French, formed a pitiless exposure of colonialism. But the small clique who controlled the government possessed many modern means of propaganda and would resort to any underhand trick to spread lies and deception.
After the Second World War, the French imperialists alleged that the French had returned to Indochina to liberate the people there from the yoke of Japanese fascism. Moreover the colonialists claimed that the Viet Minh was an organization of rebels in the pay of the Japanese fascists. Our National Assembly delegation which had just re-turned from France informed us that not only did many Frenchmen not know who we were but even our own compatriots in France had only a vague idea of the situation in our country.
Uncle Ho continuously reminded us that in revolutionary activities it was necessary to rely on our own forces but at the same time he also attached importance to winning the sympathy and support of our friends. His boundless confidence in our people was matched by a strong belief in the working people of other countries. From the moment of the victory of the August Revolution, he often reminded us of the need to make other peoples know the Vietnamese revolution and support our just struggle. He himself received almost all the foreign journalists who came to Hanoi. All those who had met him felt great admiration for him and through him they got to know our country better.
Uncle Ho saw the signing of the Preliminary Agreement as a good opportunity to intensify our propaganda abroad. The March 9 directive of the Standing Bureau of the Party Central Committee declared that "Contact with the French Communist Party should be established without delay with a view to common action between us and the French comrades." During the German occupation the French communists had acted as the vanguard of the people's national liberation, movement against the German fascists. The French Communist party enjoyed high prestige among the masses. In spite of the strong counter attacks of the reactionary forces, the struggle for democracy and progress in France had recorded many successes. Uncle Ho was well aware of the close ties between the French people's struggle and our own national liberation struggle.
For all these reasons, the Standing Bureau demanded that France should open the official negotiations in Paris. These would certainly benefit by the sympathy and support of progressive French opinion and would avoid being harassed by the colonialists and administrators, whose interests were inseparable from those of the colonial regime. Even if the negotiations did not lead to any favourable result, this would also be an opportunity for many French people to gain an understanding of the Vietnamese revolution which would prove advantageous for our long-term struggle in the future. However, the choice of Paris as the seat of the negotiations would also involve us in a number of difficulties. Many of our leaders would be engaged at the same time in negotiations which might be prolonged, far from the country meanwhile the situation at home might undergo sudden changes. Uncle Ho held discussions with leading comrades on the judiciousness of his own journey to France on the occasion of these negotiations. It should be remembered that the French reactionaries had once condemned him to death. Therefore if the negotiations met with difficulties and the French made a volte-face the worst might happen. After weighing the pros and cons he and the comrades nevertheless decided that he should go with the delegation.
Comrade Pham Van Dong led the delegation which was composed of Hoang Minh Giam, Phan Anh, Ta Quang Buu, Nguyen Van Huyen, Trinh Van Binh and others. Nguyen Tuong Tam's name figured on the list but at the last minute claiming to have fallen sick, he refused to leave. Some days later the Nationalist Party explained that by his refusal to participate in the delegation Tam wanted to express his disapproval of the negotiations between us and the French.
Uncle Ho accompanied the delegation but did not take part in it. He went to France as an honoured guest of the French government.
The date of departure came.
May 30. Under torrential rain fifty thousand Hanoi inhabitants went to the grounds of the University students' hostels in perfect order for a farewell meeting. They brandished posters which read "Fully Sovereign Viet Nam", "Nam Bo is Vietnamese land". "Territorial integrity for Viet Nam", "Support President Ho Chi Minh", "Support our delegation", "Greetings to the French people".
This was the first time our compatriots had come to pay respect to Uncle Ho before a great journey.
At 7.30 a.m. President Ho and the delegation arrived at the meeting place. Also present at the meeting was Salan, appointed by the French High Commissioner to accompany the President during his tour. Uncle Ho said
"As instructed by the Government and in conformity with the people's will, we, the delegation and I, are going to Paris to enter into official negotiations... In all my life I have been pursuing only one aim - to serve the interests of my fatherland and the happiness of my people. If I have had to take refuge in the mountains, suffer prison terms, or brave danger, it is because of this aim. And, since power was won by the force of our national union and the people entrusted the care of public affairs to me, I have worked day and night to achieve this aim. At all times and in all places I have pursued only one aim - to work for the benefit of the country and people. This time I promise you, dear compatriots, that the delegates and I will do our utmost to be worthy of the confidence that the nation has put in us...
To help win victory for the struggle in the diplomatic front, he gave four recommendations
- To unite closely, avoid all division.
- To practise thrift as much as possible in order to escape shortage and famine.
- To strive to keep order, and strictly obey Government orders.
- As regards foreign residents, it is necessary to treat them well and with moderation.
During the afternoon and late into the night, from all directions cars followed one another to enter the capital. These brought delegates from the provinces who came to see the President and the governmental delegation off. The cars carried portraits of Uncle Ho and were covered with slogans.
Early on the morning of the 31st, Uncle Ho wrote a message to the people of Nam Bo
"...You in Nam Bo are citizens of Viet Nam. Rivers may dry up, mountain may erode; but this truth can never change.
"I advise you to unite closely and broadly. The five fingers are of unequal length but they are united in the hand.
"The millions of our follow-countrymen are not all alike; but they are descended from the same ancestors. We must therefore be generous and broad-minded and admit the fact that the descendants of the Lac and the Hong are all more or less patriotic. With regard to those who have gone astray, we must use friendly persuasion. Only in this way can we achieve unity, and broad unity will bring us a bright future."
The members of the delegation, all dressed in formal suits, arrived at the Bac Bo Palace. Uncle Ho came out from his room, still in his everyday khaki suit - the only change being that on that day he had put on a pair of black leather shoes.
From daybreak the people were heading for Gia Lam, waving his portraits and flags. The Long Bien bridge was reddened under the fluttering flags. The weather was bad and the sky was covered by cloud as if it were sharing the general grief of the people who had come to say good-bye to Uncle Ho before his long journey.
The airport was thronged with people. The President made a tour to greet all the delegates and compatriots who waved their flags, clapped their hands and burst into cheering, pushing forward so as to see his face more clearly.
Before climbing the steps into the aeroplane, he squeezed old Huynh Thuc Khang's hand, saying "To fulfil the mission assigned me by the people I must be absent for some time. I expect you and the comrades to solve the difficulties that will crop up in the country. I hope that you will 'remain unchanging in face of many thousand changes'."
Greatly moved, Old Huynh grasped Uncle Ho's hands for a long time. Uncle had entrusted him with the post of acting president during his absence.
Unexpectedly he called the members of the delegation. They gathered around him. After a minute's solemn silence Uncle said
"We who have been assigned an important mission are going to leave. Before the people present here, let us pledge to remain united and be of one mind whatever the circumstances so as to fulfil our task toward the motherland."
All raised their hands shouting "We swear." As for our people, in seeing him off, they showed him that they had full confidence in him.
Two military aircraft with the delegation on board took off one after the other and disappeared in the cloudy sky.
On that day we were haunted by an anxiety that none of us dared mention. At that time plane crashes often occurred. The ex-king, Duy Tan, whom the French were bringing home by air, had been killed in an accident on the way back.
As though he had foreseen the worry felt by us and our fellow countrymen, at each stop he sent us a new telegram. In the first telegram, dated June 2, 1946 on his arrival in India, he wrote "We have arrived safely in Calcutta after spending one night in Rangoon. We shall resume our journey tomorrow. We ask the government to convey our thanks to our fellow-countrymen and the French friends who came to see us off in Gia Lam. Many kisses to the little children..."
▴ XV ▾
In April when General Juin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, called at Calcutta on his way to Chungking, d'Argenlieu had sent him a letter through a messenger demanding the recall of Leclerc on the grounds that the latter had refused to execute orders from his superiors. As a result of this, Juin decided to appoint Leclerc Inspector General of the French troops in North Africa. Thus the Admiral had his hands free, having succeeded in getting rid of his main adversary in Indochina.
Though the French reactionaries in Saigon had done all they could to delay the journey of the delegation, the two aircraft with Uncle Ho and the delegates aboard were heading for the French capital. The French High Commissioner had to act quickly by the only policy left to him - that of the fait accompli. Without waiting for any answer from the French Government, he rushed ahead with his comedy of "Autonomous Cochinchina", hastily scenarioed by Cédile.
On June 1, just a day after Uncle Ho's departure, the formation of the so-called "provisional government of the Republic of Cochinchina", headed by Doctor Thing, was announced in Saigon. As an aid to confusion, an agreement was signed between the representatives of France and the Republic of Cochinchina which repeated almost word for word, Article I of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement. "The French government recognizes the Republic of Cochinchina as a free State having its own government, parliament, army and finances and forming part of the Indochinese Federation and French Union." There was an annex to the agreement. What clearly revealed the puppet character of the "provisional government of the Republic of Cochinchina" was the fact that it was to have a French adviser, in the person of Cédile, who was publicly declared to be responsible for the internal and external security of the "Republic".
The Standing Bureau was well aware that the French reactionaries in Indochina were cynically intensifying their sabotage hoping to create difficulties to these negotiations held at a time when the political situation in France was far from stable. The struggle in the time ahead would certainly be very complicated. We had to remain highly vigilant.
We knew that D'Argenlieu would not stop there.
On the morning of June 26, while working in the Bac Bo Palace, I was informed that General Valluy had come and asked to see me.
On entering Valluy gave a salute, then said at once "I come as a soldier executing an order from my superiors. I have a note to transmit to the Vietnamese government."
I had more than once discussed military questions with Valluy. Though outwardly pleasant; open-hearted and courteous he was a cunning and perfidious man. At the banquet given on the occasion of Uncle Ho's departure, he had brought his daughter who had just come from France. Presenting her to us and joking about his age, he said, "Let the young people sit together."
This time his manner was different from usual. I had the impression that this was a new provocation. "Give me the note, please," I said.
He handed me the note and stood waiting. It was a brief communication, addressed to the acting President of the government of the DRVN "As he has already informed President Ho Chi Minh when he was in Hanoi, the French High Commissioner in Indochina, Admiral D'Argenlieu, has given orders to the French army to occupy the Moi highlands (Tay Nguyen, Ed)."
It seemed to me that Valluy observed me attentively while I was reading the note. This was a new move from the crafty unfrocked priest. I said to Valluy, "If you have come here only to discharge the mission given you by your superiors, your task is fulfilled."
He left.
On the evening of the same day we learned that at 4 a. m. the French had launched a surprise attack on Tu Bong near Deo Ca. Their aircraft flew very low to strafe our positions. At 10 a. m. they landed in Dai Lanh but, meeting strong opposition on our part, they had to withdraw.
On June 22, they attacked our positions at Cung Son. Repulsed by our forces, they once more pulled out.
On June 23, the French launched a sudden attack at Pleimedden on the road between Pleiku and the Cambodian border.
Hostilities became widespread throughout the Tay Nguyen Highlands.
D'Argenlieu's scheme was obvious - his seizure of the Tay Nguyen Highlands would be the preliminary to the formation of a "Republic of Tay Ky". Our armed forces there received the order to hit back resolutely at any aggressive French action. The acting President sent a note to the French, refuting their allegations and strongly protesting against their illegal action. It read "President Ho Chi Minh was never informed by the French that they would occupy the Tay Nguyen region and he never in any way agreed on such an occupation."
Meanwhile, on June 25, an incident took place in Hanoi. The French occupied the former Governor General's palace. Even before the withdrawal of the Chiang Kai-shek troops we had more than once held discussions with the French on taking over this sector. Valluy had agreed to wait for the decision of the official negotiations in Paris. Now no sooner had Lu Han left the place than the French troops had occupied it. We protested against this. Valluy tried to deny responsibility by claiming that this was a detachment entrusted with keeping watch over the building.
The French encroachment on the former palace of the Governor General aroused strong indignation among the people.
"We cannot let the French reactionaries and colonialists go on doing as they please. We must prevent them. On June 27 various parties and political organizations called on the people to hold a general strike in Hanoi, Haiphong and every town with French presence. The government let the people show their condemnation of the illegal actions of French troops but orders were given to public services, water stations and electric plants to continue working.
Protest demonstrations took place at the same time wherever there were French troops. The resolute attitude of our government and people caused anxiety to the French forces. Valluy had to declare that his troops had only entered the former Governor General's palace to take it over on the withdrawal of the Chiang troops - the palace, he agreed, would be guarded jointly by the Vietnamese and French troops pending the decision of the Paris negotiators.
▴ XVI ▾
In July the French command demanded that we allow them to organize a march through the main streets of Hanoi to celebrate July 14.
We had not yet made any answer when, on July 11, the Standing Bureau received a report from the Security Service that the reactionaries of the Nationalist Party were preparing a very serious provocation. According to their scheme their men would lie in ambush along the route of the French troops and open fire on them, throwing grenades. They hoped to cause the French to open hostilities with us thereupon they would distribute leaflets calling on the people to overthrow the government and next offer their own hands to the French. For the moment they were making feverish preparations, printing leaflets and collecting weapons.
We knew that though the men of the Nationalist Party publicly made frenzied criticisms of our talks with the French, they were secretly trying to join hands with them. They had been in contact with them for a long time. As for the French, while they carried out negotiations with us, they were indulging in some murky scheming. Some of the French reactionaries planned to use Vietnamese traitors to draw them into this adventure.
The security comrades were instructed to follow every activity of the counter-revolutionaries closely.
At that time the Nationalist Party was made up of two reactionary groups. One, with Vu Hong Khanh at its head, had been living abroad for a long time, supported by Chiang Kai-shek; it had lost contact with the country. The other, including Nguyen Tuong Tam, Chu Ba Phuong and others, belonged to the pro-Japanese Dai Viet party set up in 1939. About the beginning of 1945, the Dai Viet group, foreseeing the defeat of the Japanese, had gone to Yunnan to seek Vu Hong Khanh. The two groups merged together under the name of Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Viet Nam Nationalist Party) in order to win the favour of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomingtang (Quoc Dan Dang in Vietnamese). Though the Dai Viet leaders had joined forces with Vu Hong Khanh's group, they looked down on it. What they wanted was a refuge to avoid being charged with collaborating with the Japanese fascists. Apart from this they still nurtured their own designs. When Lu Han withdrew, the pro-Chiang elements trod on his heels in their hurry to go abroad. Most of the Dai Viet group remained in the country, waiting for an opportune moment to serve the new masters, and the scheme of provocation was theirs.
Well aware of their reactionary designs the Standing Bureau decided to refuse the French permission to hold their march for security reasons and instructed the Police to act promptly so as to nip the counter-revolutionaries' designs in the bud.
On July 12, at daybreak, a police commando unit rushed into the headquarters; of the Nationalist Party at 132 Minh Khai Street and searched the house. The reactionaries were caught red-handed with pieces of material evidence - a printing machine and heaps of leaflets still wet with ink.
At 7 a.m:, the Bac Bo Police launched simultaneous raids on many offices of the Nationalist Party in Hanoi. In three houses by lake Thuyen Quang the reactionaries resisted with machineguns but the police, acting in coordination with the self-defence, succeeded in forcing them to surrender.
At 7 On Nhu Hau Street1, the police discovered a press for making false banknotes and a room littered with instruments of torture - electric charge devices, pincers, hammers and so on. The walls were stained with blood. In the garden at the back of the house, we unearthed seven bodies some of which had been dismembered. Two persons kidnapped for ransom were saved just at the moment when the assassins were about to execute them.
1 Today Nguyen Dia Thieu street.
While the police were carrying on their search, a man in shorts entered carrying a Japanese sword. Striking an attitude he proclaimed himself in a loud voice as a leader of the Nationalist Party and a member of the National Assembly and declared that no one had the right to interfere with him. One of the kidnapped persons pointed his finger at him affirming that he was the man who, the day before, had threatened him with his srword and forced him to write a ransom note.
The people came in great numbers to see the bodies we had unearthed. Some identified members of their families. It is not easy to imagine the motives that urged the reactionaries to commit such crimes. Among the victims, some were our cadres who had been kidnapped and then liquidated; some were women who had been seized while passing by their offices, raped, robbed and finally murdered, while others were pedicab-drivers whom those brutes had killed so as not to have to pay them.
At 6 a. m. the following day, the police continued their search of the Nationalist Party centre in Quan Thanh Street. This was close to where the French had troops stationed and the reactionaries thought that they would protect them. When our police came they took up position behind a thick wall and fired at us with machineguns. There was a prolonged exchange of fire. Two hours later, the French came in their armoured cars hoping to intimidate our police force. But, our representative in the Liaison and Control Commission intervened at once and the armoured cars had to beat a retreat. In the end our men gained entry into the house, and seized many documents that they had not had time to destroy.
At the H. Q. of the Nationalist Party in Do Huu Vi (present-day Cua Bae) Street, we found still more bodies of men, women and even French soldiers whom the reactionaries had killed to provoke incidents between the French and our administration. Among the doci.tlnents captured, we found a plan for a campaign of assassination and kidnapping. The Nationalist Party had been conspiring to murder French officers and men and kidnap french women and children. This was to have been carried out in Hanoi itself between July 10 to 17 by a group of special agents.
Mr. Huynh Thuc Khang came with us to look at the Nationalist Party centre in On Nh.u Hau Street.
A few days later, some Nationalist Party men came to Bac Bo Palace and requested an interview with the acting President to justify the revolutionary line of their party. When he heard this Mr. Huynh asked at once, "Where are they?"
Rising up he went out leaning on his stick. Seeing them at the foot of the stairs, he pointed his staff at their faces and shouted
"Rascals! Robbers! And you have the face to give yourselves out to be nationalists and patriots!"
He turned his back on them and came back to his office.
After the On Nhu Hau street affair, even the most politically naive people who so far had more or less believed in the propagandist stunts of the Nationalist Party saw what they were up to.
On July 16, at a press conference acting President Huynh Thuc Khang declared "Unity is indispensable if we want to build our democratic republic, but no one should use 'unity' as a pretext for taking illegal actions. I advise all political groups and parties and all citizens to stand united. But, in the interests of the State, those who have taken illegal actions must be brought before the law. Genuine members of the Nationalist Party are ensured the right to act freely within the framework of law. The law is applied to everybody. Those who kidnap, hold to ransom or assassinate people must be severely punished by the law. The 10 articles of the National Edict signed by President Ho Chi Minh and Vice-President Nguyen Hai Than have laid down regulations regarding such cases. I only apply them. This is not an affair between political parties. The searches which have just been carried out are dictated by public security."
▴ XVI ▾
In July the French command demanded that we allow them to organize a march through the main streets of Hanoi to celebrate July 14.
We had not yet made any answer when, on July 11, the Standing Bureau received a report from the Security Service that the reactionaries of the Nationalist Party were preparing a very serious provocation. According to their scheme their men would lie in ambush along the route of the French troops and open fire on them, throwing grenades. They hoped to cause the French to open hostilities with us thereupon they would distribute leaflets calling on the people to overthrow the government and next offer their own hands to the French. For the moment they were making feverish preparations, printing leaflets and collecting weapons.
We knew that though the men of the Nationalist Party publicly made frenzied criticisms of our talks with the French, they were secretly trying to join hands with them. They had been in contact with them for a long time. As for the French, while they carried out negotiations with us, they were indulging in some murky scheming. Some of the French reactionaries planned to use Vietnamese traitors to draw them into this adventure.
The security comrades were instructed to follow every activity of the counter-revolutionaries closely.
At that time the Nationalist Party was made up of two reactionary groups. One, with Vu Hong Khanh at its head, had been living abroad for a long time, supported by Chiang Kai-shek; it had lost contact with the country. The other, including Nguyen Tuong Tam, Chu Ba Phuong and others, belonged to the pro-Japanese Dai Viet party set up in 1939. About the beginning of 1945, the Dai Viet group, foreseeing the defeat of the Japanese, had gone to Yunnan to seek Vu Hong Khanh. The two groups merged together under the name of Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Viet Nam Nationalist Party) in order to win the favour of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomingtang (Quoc Dan Dang in Vietnamese). Though the Dai Viet leaders had joined forces with Vu Hong Khanh's group, they looked down on it. What they wanted was a refuge to avoid being charged with collaborating with the Japanese fascists. Apart from this they still nurtured their own designs. When Lu Han withdrew, the pro-Chiang elements trod on his heels in their hurry to go abroad. Most of the Dai Viet group remained in the country, waiting for an opportune moment to serve the new masters, and the scheme of provocation was theirs.
Well aware of their reactionary designs the Standing Bureau decided to refuse the French permission to hold their march for security reasons and instructed the Police to act promptly so as to nip the counter-revolutionaries' designs in the bud.
On July 12, at daybreak, a police commando unit rushed into the headquarters; of the Nationalist Party at 132 Minh Khai Street and searched the house. The reactionaries were caught red-handed with pieces of material evidence - a printing machine and heaps of leaflets still wet with ink.
At 7 a.m:, the Bac Bo Police launched simultaneous raids on many offices of the Nationalist Party in Hanoi. In three houses by lake Thuyen Quang the reactionaries resisted with machineguns but the police, acting in coordination with the self-defence, succeeded in forcing them to surrender.
At 7 On Nhu Hau Street1, the police discovered a press for making false banknotes and a room littered with instruments of torture - electric charge devices, pincers, hammers and so on. The walls were stained with blood. In the garden at the back of the house, we unearthed seven bodies some of which had been dismembered. Two persons kidnapped for ransom were saved just at the moment when the assassins were about to execute them.
1 Today Nguyen Dia Thieu street.
While the police were carrying on their search, a man in shorts entered carrying a Japanese sword. Striking an attitude he proclaimed himself in a loud voice as a leader of the Nationalist Party and a member of the National Assembly and declared that no one had the right to interfere with him. One of the kidnapped persons pointed his finger at him affirming that he was the man who, the day before, had threatened him with his srword and forced him to write a ransom note.
The people came in great numbers to see the bodies we had unearthed. Some identified members of their families. It is not easy to imagine the motives that urged the reactionaries to commit such crimes. Among the victims, some were our cadres who had been kidnapped and then liquidated; some were women who had been seized while passing by their offices, raped, robbed and finally murdered, while others were pedicab-drivers whom those brutes had killed so as not to have to pay them.
At 6 a. m. the following day, the police continued their search of the Nationalist Party centre in Quan Thanh Street. This was close to where the French had troops stationed and the reactionaries thought that they would protect them. When our police came they took up position behind a thick wall and fired at us with machineguns. There was a prolonged exchange of fire. Two hours later, the French came in their armoured cars hoping to intimidate our police force. But, our representative in the Liaison and Control Commission intervened at once and the armoured cars had to beat a retreat. In the end our men gained entry into the house, and seized many documents that they had not had time to destroy.
At the H. Q. of the Nationalist Party in Do Huu Vi (present-day Cua Bae) Street, we found still more bodies of men, women and even French soldiers whom the reactionaries had killed to provoke incidents between the French and our administration. Among the doci.tlnents captured, we found a plan for a campaign of assassination and kidnapping. The Nationalist Party had been conspiring to murder French officers and men and kidnap french women and children. This was to have been carried out in Hanoi itself between July 10 to 17 by a group of special agents.
Mr. Huynh Thuc Khang came with us to look at the Nationalist Party centre in On Nh.u Hau Street.
A few days later, some Nationalist Party men came to Bac Bo Palace and requested an interview with the acting President to justify the revolutionary line of their party. When he heard this Mr. Huynh asked at once, "Where are they?"
Rising up he went out leaning on his stick. Seeing them at the foot of the stairs, he pointed his staff at their faces and shouted
"Rascals! Robbers! And you have the face to give yourselves out to be nationalists and patriots!"
He turned his back on them and came back to his office.
After the On Nhu Hau street affair, even the most politically naive people who so far had more or less believed in the propagandist stunts of the Nationalist Party saw what they were up to.
On July 16, at a press conference acting President Huynh Thuc Khang declared "Unity is indispensable if we want to build our democratic republic, but no one should use 'unity' as a pretext for taking illegal actions. I advise all political groups and parties and all citizens to stand united. But, in the interests of the State, those who have taken illegal actions must be brought before the law. Genuine members of the Nationalist Party are ensured the right to act freely within the framework of law. The law is applied to everybody. Those who kidnap, hold to ransom or assassinate people must be severely punished by the law. The 10 articles of the National Edict signed by President Ho Chi Minh and Vice-President Nguyen Hai Than have laid down regulations regarding such cases. I only apply them. This is not an affair between political parties. The searches which have just been carried out are dictated by public security."
▴ XVII ▾
Since the departure of Uncle Ho, in the meetings of the Standing Committee, Comrade Nhan1 and the other members regularly exchanged their views on the unfolding of the negotiations in Paris and on the increasingly tense home situation. Our messages to Uncle Ho and the delegation had to pass through the hands of the French. Most of the telegrams sent with reports on the implementation of the Preliminary Agreement were blocked up in Saigon by the French while those of Uncle Ho reached us very late, sometimes after ten days. For us, these were moments of anxious expectation. We had more than once protested to the French against this. Our only means of following the situation was by listening to the radio and reading French and Western newspapers which would give no more than a brief communique on the sessions of the talks. However, through the documents left by Uncle Ho and the stories of some comrades who had the good luck to accompany him, we can give an account of his multiple activities during this period and the main lines along which the negotiations developed.
1 Pseudonym of Comrade Truong Chinh, then Secretary General of the Indochinese Communist Party.
Uncle Ho again took the road he had first taken 35 years ago. Since then the revolutionary current had never ceased to flow. The young Vietnamese who had "lost his fatherland" and had gone to work on board the Latouche-Tréville had become the first President of the free Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
On May 31, owing to bad weather, the plane carrying President Ho and our delegation had to stop over at Pegu, an airfield near Rangoon.
On June 1, they arrived in Calcutta. The representative of the British Governor-General and the French Consul went to the airport to greet the President and accompany him to the Great Eastern Hotel, the largest hotel in the city. Uncle Ho stayed in this city for two days. Overseas Vietnamese came from every corner of India to meet him, some having covered hundreds of kilometres. Many women cried when leaving him.
On June 4, the delegation arrived in Agra. Uncle Ho and the delegation visited famous monuments and beauty spots.
On June 5, the delegation arrived in Karachi. The Governor told the delegation that the Government in London had informed him of President Ho Chi Minh's passage and instructed him to greet the President.
On June 6, Uncle Ho arrived in Habbaniya, Irak. The weather in this country was so hot that trees could not grow. To soften the view iron trees painted in green had been erected.
On June 7, the plane was heading for Cairo. It circled over Jerusalem for the President to have a clearer view of the ancient capital of Palestine. The delegation spent three days in Cairo. The Egyptians were then struggling hard to demand the withdrawal of British troops. The city was beautiful, airy, and animated with boats lying at jetties by the river, but the atmosphere was tense. Here Uncle Ho received a telegram from Paris - "President Ho Chi Minh is requested to rest a while in Biarritz until the new French government which will receive him in Paris is formed."
On June 11, the plane left Cairo for Biskra in Algeria.
On June 12, the plane landed in Biarritz, a very beautiful seaside resort on the west coast of France, not far from Spain. At the airport only representatives of the local authorities were on hand to greet them, for the French government had resigned, and was only taking charge of the day to day business of the State. Uncle Ho stayed in the Carlton Hotel in Biarritz while our negotiating delegation went on to Paris.
On the following day, overseas Vietnamese from every corner of France, some with their families, came to Biarritz to greet our President. They made collections for the delegation to bring home for the public funds. Greeting telegrams were sent to the President from our compatriots who had emigrated to England, the United States, New Caledonia and other countries.
French political organizations such as the French Communist Party, the CGT and the France-Viet Nam Association which had been founded a few days before sent their representatives to Biarritz to meet our President. Uncle Ho met some of his old comrades among the delegates of the PCF. He explained to them the policy applied by our Party in the complicated situation of the past few years and its directives at present.
The French press began to publish news about Viet Nam and discuss the Franco-Vietnamese negotiations.
During his stay in Biarritz, our President made a careful study of the existing situation in France.
Living conditions were still very difficult for the French people after the war. The bread ration was 300 grams a day, the meat ration 100 grams a week and the butter ration 500 grams a month. The hotel staff confided to him that since the first days of war each of them had only been able to buy one suit and one pair of shoes. The French workers were carrying out a fierce struggle for a 25% wage increase.
The new French government was formed ten days after the arrival of Uncle Ho in Biatritz, with Bidault, a leader of the MRP as Prime Minister. Moutet still headed the Department of Overseas France and was responsible for affairs concerning the French Union.
On June 22, the French government invited Uncle Ho to come to Paris.
The President's plane carried the flags of both Viet Nam and France. The yellow-starred red flag was flying for the first time in French skies.
Before landing, the plane circled over the city of Paris. Uncle Ho could recognize the Eiffel Tower, the grey and white dome of Les Invalides, the Sacré Coeur basilica on Montmartre hillock and the Arc de Triomphe with so many avenues fanning out from it. It was twenty-three years ago, on a summer day, that he had calmly left this city which was so familiar to him. Paris was still as it had been during World War Two. France had declared it to be an open city. People thronged Le Bourget airport to greet the President. A large Vietnamese flag was fluttering from the summit of a great mast and others were to be seen among the Tricolours.
When the plane had taxied to a halt, the Minister of Overseas France and the Head of Protocol representing the French government and accompanied by generals of the French land, naval and air forces, went out to meet President Ho Chi Minh and accompanied him into the air terminal. The fact that the Minister of Overseas France had been appointed to receive the President helped us to sense the attitude of the new government to the Viet Nam problem. However, all the diplomatic formalities were solemnly observed. A red carpet stretched from the air terminal to the car. Representatives of French political parties and mass organizations as well as large numbers of Vietnamese residents crowded round to greet the President. In the name of the French women, a delegate offered him a bouquet and embraced him.
The brass band played the national anthems of Viet Nam and France. Tears welled in the eyes of many Vietnamese nationals on hearing the Vietnamese anthem resound for the first time in France. Ho Chi Minh and the representatives of the French government saluted the flags then reviewed the guard of honour. Thousands of Parisians including children cheered him and tossed flowers into the air. The President stopped a long time to talk to representatives of Vietnamese residents - workers, students, intellectuals - forgetful of the French officials accompanying him. Hundreds of cameras and movie cameras were directed at this Head of State who had come to the French capital in his modest khaki suit.
An agency reporter gave his microphone to the President asking him to say some words to the French people. "I thank the French government and people," Uncle Ho said, "for offering me this solemn welcome. I hope that in future the Vietnamese and French people may cooperate with each other in an equal, sincere and cordial way."
A procession of cars and outriders accompanied the President to the Hotel Royal Monceau, a large hotel situated near the Elysee palace. Along the road French people greeted him by waving streamers and shouting words of welcome.
▴ XVIII ▾
President Ho Chi Minh was not officially received by the French government until eleven days after his arrival in Paris. This delay was an unfavourable sign for the negotiations.
Let us take a look at the general situation in France at that time.
For many years political power in France had been in the hands of a group of capitalists and especially financiers who control!ed banking, industry and commerce.
Lenin had already noted that "Unlike British colonialist imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism."
The classical French policy was to invest ever more capital abroad for profitable purposes while protecting French and the colonial markets by setting up a strict customs barrier so as to hamper the inflow and competition of goods from other capitalist countries. The French method of colonial exploitation consisted in draining their natural resources by exporting them to the metropolitan country while exploiting the natives by paying them the lowest possible wage and imposing high taxes. The French colonialists maintained the economy of colonial countries in a perpetual state of backwardness.
The French grand bourgeoisie was notoriously cunning. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the men in power in France had supported the German and Italian fascists, finding in fascism a means to oppress the French workers, animated by a long tradition of revolutionary struggle. They supported Hitler's and Mussolini's intervention in Spain, and helped Franco suppress the Spanish Republicans. Together with the British bourgeoisie they hoped to use the Nazis to annihilate the Soviet Union. The French authorities had allowed the Germans to invade Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, aiming to direct the fascist attacks toward the East. But before advancing further in this direction, the fascists had turned round and within a few weeks, had seized France.
During the German occupation the French grand bourgeoisie had played a two-faced role. On the one hand they had collaborated closely with the German fascists, helping Hitler continue his aggression against Europe - on the other, they joined hands with the English and Americans, waiting for an opportune moment to act in case the Allies triumphed. The French Communist Party had taken the lead in organizing the People's resistance to German aggression. It was not only the Vichy administration that had given a helping hand to the fascists in repressing the patriots, de Gaulle himself had also tried to restrict the resistance movement inside France.
After the war, France, though standing on the side of the victorious allies, was in fact a defeated country exhausted by occupation. The French bourgeoisie had been weakened and its political influence was declining. Industrial production had fallen far below its pre-war level and industrial equipment, not having been renewed for a long time, had become out-of-date. The French army was, in the words of a French political commentator, a "foetus in the womb of the US army." The outlet for French products in Europe had shrunk as some countries there had left the capitalist orbit. The French grand bourgeoisie had lost many plants, mines and banks in Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. Meanwhile the Communist Party, which had been tempered during its long years of struggle against German fascism, had gained a high prestige among the people. The democratic forces were causing great anxiety to the French grand bourgeoisie as well as to the British and American imperialists faced with the new situation which had just been created in Europe. De Gaulle, who had always claimed to stand above the parties - a claim also made by many bourgeois papers - was in fact representative of the interests of the finance capitalists. Relying on the hundreds of thousands of American and British troops stationed in France, De Gaulle disarmed the revolutionary armed forces which had been fighting against the Nazi army of occupation. All his efforts were aimed towards liquidating the democratic institutions and founding a dictatorial regime. The Communist Party tried hard to lead the workers' struggle for the defence of their economic interests and for freedom and democracy. The workers' struggle against the monopoly capitalists who were trying to free themselves from their bad position was very fierce.
In October 1945, De Gaulle was forced to organize general elections to elect a constituent assembly which was to draft the constitution of the 4th Republic. A provisional government was set up with De Gaulle as President. This government was formed of members from the three main political organizations, the MRP, the Communist Party and the Socialists.
In early 1946 De Gaulle suddenly offered his resignation. His intention was to ferment political disturbance in France which would create favourable conditions for him to come back to power with a dictatorial regime. A provisional government was founded with Felix Gouin, a Socialist as President. This government approved the Preliminary Agreement signed between France and Viet Nam. The French Communist Party advocated seizing this opportunity to enter into alliance with the Socialist Party, form a government composed of communists and socialists and evict the pro-Gaullist rightists. This was a real possibility because the two parties held the majority of seats in the government. But the leaders of the Socialist Party turned down this proposal.
In March 1946, the Gouin government sent Leon Blum, a leader of the Socialist Party, to Washington to ask for loans. After eleven weeks of bargaining, the US agreed to lend 650 million dollars to France on condition that the latter gave preferential customs treatment to US goods. It was widely believed that the Americans had urged the French to purge the communists rapidly from the government. To oppose the French people and prop up their weakening rule the finance capitalists chose to rely on the USA which had been enriched by the war and was now the ringleader of the imperialist camp.
In May 1946, the first draft constitution was put to referendum. It was democratic and progressive in many points. De Gaulle, although he had declared his withdrawal from the political arena, started to attack it. As a result of the frenzied campaigning of the reactionary forces helped by pressure from De Gaulle, the constitution was rejected. The Gouin government fell. The French people had to go once again to the polls to elect another constituent assembly.
At the June elections, the French Communist Party's position remained stable but the Socialist Party lost many votes on account of its indecisive attitude. The MRP greatly benefited from De Gaulle's influence and also gained some more seats. Thus the post of president of the provisional government went to Bidault, a leader of the MRP who had for long collaborated with De Gaulle as Foreign Minister. This government, in spite of the participation of a number of communists, was leading to the right and showed a tendency to depend ever more on the Americans. The new administration in France tried to sabotage the March 6 Preliminary Agreement and did not respect the agreements reached between France and the DRVN regarded by the finance capitalists as very dangerous and capable of leading to downfall of the French empire.
However the programme of President Ho Chi Minh's reception was carried out in all its solemn protocol.
On July 2, at 11 a,m., the chief of Protocol followed by high-ranking French officials went to the Hotel Royal Monceau to seek the President and accompany him to the reception party offered by the French government.
The car procession passed through streets which had been forbidden to traffic.
The Hôtel Matignon was hung with Vietnamese and French flags. After the military band had played the national anthems of both countries, President Ho reviewed the guard of honour. President Bidault went out to meet him and led him into the reception hall to present him to the members of his government.
Before the party began Bidault read his welcoming speech
"Mr. President,
"On behalf of the French people, I am very glad to receive the President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. I regret that events over which we had no control have delayed the reception which we have been wishing to offer you ever since your arrival in France. Your presence here is a great delight to the French people. It testifies to the traditional friendship between the two peoples. This friendship, which has been obscured for some time, must again become stronger and more sincere."
Bidault praised President Ho Chi Minh for his "courteous and heartfelt words appropriate for the reception which Paris and France wish to reserve for friendly countr!es" He extolled the French Union as an "original creation animated by a great humane spirit." He spoke of the "poetical and glorious scenery" of the castle of Fontainebleau where the Vietnamese and French delegations were to meet. He said that the "two parties were going to work together with sincerity and mutual understanding." He spoke about the meeting of Confucianism and Western philosophy, the new concept in relations among free men, the evolution and ideals of mankind, etc.
There was nothing precise in this speech from the French President so full of brilliant abstract words. President Ho Chi Minh replied "I am greatly moved by the warm welcome offered me by the French people and government. Paris, this immortal city, is the cradle of the noble ideals of the 1789 revolution, it has remained faithful to its ideals in the bloody confrontation between the democratic and fascist blocks. It is probable that many difficulties are lying ahead in the Fontainebleau Conference the duty of which is to establish the foundation for relations between France and the new Viet Nam. But sincerity and mutual confidence will clear away all obstacles. Both eastern philosophy and western philosophy extol this principle of conduct: 'Don't do to others what you don't want others do to you.' I am convinced that in such conditions the future conference will lead to a good result."
On July 3, President Ho laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe. He also visited Versailles. In the summer of 1919, he had gone to Versailles where the Allies were meeting to work out a peace treaty terminating World War One. He had then handed them a petition, asking that independence be granted to Viet Nam.
On July 4, he visited the war memorial on Mount Valerien. It was on this hill that many French partisans had been executed by the German fascists in the Second World War. We can understand the emotion felt by Uncle Ho as we read the following lines in his notes "Seeing the monument to the French combatants massacred by the Germans while fighting for independence and freedom we felt sorrowful and greatly moved. Independence and freedom in any country are won at the cost of the blood of its combatants and as a result of national union. Therefore, those who truly esteem the independence and freedom of their country should respect those of other nations."
▴ XIX ▾
Formal negotiations between the Vietnamese and the French delegations did not start till July 6, in the palace of Fontainebleau, 60 km from Paris.
D'Argenlieu hastened to return to France coming one week before President Ho Chi Minh's arrival in the French capital.
D'Argenlieu felt that, with the Gouin Government's downfall and Bidault's recent coming to power, he now had a good chance to realize De Gaulle's policy towards the colonies. He made every effort to meet the leaders of the new Government in order to win their approval for his course of action in Indochina. He was said to have requested the French authorities to let him lead the French delegation to the negotiation. The High Commssioner wanted to show that his power extended beyond Inidochina, as far as this conference. The new French authorities while not in fact opposing D'Argenlieu's line on Indochina, refused his request to lead the delegation. They did not want to incense public opinion during President Ho Chi Minh's stay in Paris. Moreover, they were afraid our delegation might refuse to deal with him; they were aware of our dislike of the man after our experience in Dalat. They advised the High Commissioner to keep out of the way. D'Argenlieu went back to Saigon disappointed.
The nomination of the French delegates to the negotiations was not approved by the French Government until July 5, one day before the beginning of the conference. Leading the French delegation was the same Max André, head of the French team to the Dalat preparatory meeting. The French delegation was largely composed of the same people who had been in Dalat Messmer, Pignon, Torel, Gonon... A new military personality, Admiral Barjot was appointed to the delegation in addition to General Salan. The Admiral was one of De Gaulle's close associates. In an attempt to defuse possible criticisms, the French Government included in the delegation three deputies from the three principal Parties in the Government: the Communists, the Socialists and the MRP. Professor Paul Rivet, a progressive personality who represented the Socialist Party, withdrew after the delegation's caucus meeting to prepare for the first session, saying that he did not want to become an accomplice in the scheme to betray the provisions signed on March 6, 1946 by the representatives of France. Max André later admitted that before going to Fontainebleau he had been instructed by French Premier Bidault ta make sure by every means possible that Viet Nam "would not become a new pawn in the Soviet world chess game."
At 10 a.m., our delegation and the French delegation entered the court of honour of the palace of Fontainebleau.
Vietnamese and French flags were hoisted over the palace, Max André delivered an opening speech, congratulating the representatives of Viet Nam and wishing the conference good success. The French delegation was resorting to the tactic of talking generalities, avoiding discussion of any concrete questions.
In his reply, Comrade Pham Van Dong said
(...) While the Vietnamese people were striving to resist the Japanese invaders, the Vichy government sold out Indochina to the enemy. In August 1945, the Vietnamese people rose up to seize power and founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Since that day, Viet Nam has been an independent country. Under the leadership of President Ho the Vietnamese people have set about their national construction in peace."
Our delegation pointed out that it was the dispatch of the French expeditionary army to Viet Nam which had rekindled the war. Later, France signed the March 6 Agreement with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam...
"However, has France respected this Agreement? It is with deep concern that we have to tell you that a number of provisions related to the cessation of hostilities have not been implemented by the French authorities in Viet Nam..."
Our delegation denounced France for continuing the war in Viet Nam, sending troops to encroach upon the Tay Nguyen Highlands and perpetrating acts of violence in North Viet Nam, of which the most glaring was the recent seizure of the former governor-general's residence in Hanoi. Our delegation emphatically protested against the design to divide Viet Nam, the appearance of an "autonomous Cochinchina" rigged up by the French authorities in Saigon and their recognition of its self-styled "provisional government."
At the end, our delegation stated, with complete frankness
"The March 6 Agreement was not designed to provide for the French troops safe entry into North Viet Nam, and the policy of fait accompli adopted by the French in Indochina can in no way facilitate the negotiations..."
Our delegation's firm statement showed clearly what was the actual situation in Viet Nam and had a resounding echo in France. The reactionaries branded this statement undiplomatic and unfriendly. The progressive people saw in our delegation's attitude a determination to defend our national independence and national unity and, at the same time, a desire to find a satisfactory solution to the relationship between Viet Nam and France.
It took the two sides quite a few days to reach mutual agreement on the agenda which included the following main points
- The status of Viet Nam in the French Union and its relations with other countries;
- The reunification of the three parts of Viet Nam by negotiations and a referendum;
- The drafting of an Agreement between France and Viet Nam.
Besides a sub-committee to work out an agenda the conference set up committees to hold specific discussions on political, military, economic, financial and cultural affairs.
In these discussions, the French delegation revealed the policy adopted by France as regards her overseas territories. Despite some modifications in name and organization, this policy remained, in essence, one of maintaining the former colonial system. In Indochina, it would mean putting the peoples of the three countries of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia under the control of a federal government headed by a governor-general.
As to the urgent problems raised by our delegation such as a cease-fire in Nam Bo, the timing and modalities for the holding of a referendum there, the French delegation adopted an evasive attitude. The conference was in an impasse for several days. For some sessions, half of the French delegates failed to turn up.
▴ XX ▾
President Ho did not attend the Fontainebleau negotiations. In his capacity as a distinguished guest of the French Government, he stayed in Paris.
He worked without respite, sometimes as much as 14 hours a day, as the comrades in our delegation later told us.
President Ho met and talked with almost all major political organizations in France. All the three leading Parties in power sent their representatives to see him. The delegation of the French Communist Party, which then had a membership of half a million, consisted of such important leaders as Thorez (then Vice President of the French Government). Duclos, Cachin, Billoux, etc. Some of these had known him back in the twenties and thirties at the Tours Congress, in Moscow and at the Conferences of the Communist International. He met with representatives of several international mass organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation. These organizations were given information on the activities of the Vietnamese workers, youth and women, and admitted the Vietnamese labour, youth and women's organizations as affiliated members. Some young people from other countries who had a chance to meet President Ho at that time were already calling him by this name full of love and respect "Uncle Ho."
He met many influential personalities in Paris, politicians, economists, financiers, military men and intellectuals including journalists and writers such as Louis Aragon, Ilya Ehrenburg, Anna Seghers, Elsa Triolet, Richard Bloch, Pierre Emmanuel...
He was fully aware of the importance of enlightening all the people on what was happening in Viet Nam, its revolutionary movement and the Vietnamese people's legitimate aspirations for independence and reunification. This work couldn't be done in one day or even one month. Representatives of the new Viet Nam were now present in Paris. But it was not easy to give people a correct understanding of our people's urgent problems and legitimate aspirations when the reactionaries were doing everything in their power to distort the facts.
President Ho exerted a great influence on the Paris press circle. The correspondent of the daily Combat reported on his meeting with President Ho
"Mr Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, received me without ceremony, his manners being always simple. He is an elderly man with shrewd and kind eyes and a face radiating benevolence and determination. A black beard accentuates its Asian character. He wore a military jacket without decorations, in a manner reminiscent of the men of the October Revolution. He spoke slowly with a thorough knowledge of the French language and all its subtleties - his voice was clear and distinct, his style plain and unaffected. With him were some intelligent and patriotic young people. On his shoulder, he carried firmly the destiny of a nation of whose characteristics he was the representative..."
Some of the journalists who had formerly distorted our people's struggle began to write more truthful articles following their first contacts with President Ho.
Later, a French journalist wrote "with his brilliance, his eloquence and his prestige, his words had a deep effect. Some journalists approved of him, others criticized him but the whole world spoke of him."
President Ho's image, described in identical terms by the press - bright eyes, broad forehead, scanty beard, a plain suit and simple gestures - won the French people's love and left a deep impression in their hearts. A Vietnamese resident in France, noticing that the President had been wearing the same suit of plain cloth since his arrival in France, hastened to get his measurements with the intention of making him d new suit, presumably more in keeping with fashion and his status. But President Ho found out about it in time and stopped him.
The French authorities were unable to find any excuse which they could use to obstruct the contact between their distinguished guest and various political organizations, influential personalities and the press.
One week after the opening of the Fontainebleau Conference, President Ho gave a press conference in Paris. In an attempt to keep the Viet Nam question out of the limelight, Bidault then President of the French government had had the Conference held 60 km. away from the French capital, pleading the need for a quiet place for the sake of the talks. The journalists, cameramen and photographers could not spot anything behind the high walls of Fontainebleau palace. They thus rushed to the press conference in large numbers.
President Ho pointed out the 6 points of the Vietnamese side's negotiating positions
1. Viet Nam demands independence. Its independence does not mean a complete severing of relations with France, but would be an independence within the French Union, thus both countries may profit from it. In the economic and cultural fields, Viet Nam is willing to cooperate with France.
2. Viet Nam firmly rejects a federal government.
3. Southern Viet Nam is part and parcel of Viet Nam, no one has the right to separate it, no force can separate it.
4. Viet Nam will protect French properties. But the French must abide by the labour regulations of Viet Nam and Viet Nam reserves the right to purchase those properties which are important for its national defence.
5. If Viet Nam needs advisers, French people will be given preference.
6. Viet Nam has the right to send its ambassadors and consuls to other countries.
President Ho said
"For our part, we are very sincere. We hope that other people will also treat us with sincerity. We are resolved not to lower ourselves. But neither do we wish to degrade France. We have no desire to push the French out of Viet Nam; but we want to say let them send to Viet Nam those who respect us. Only mutual trust and cooperation in all sincerity and equality can bring about a friendly relationship between the two countries."
While the Fontainebleau negotiations were being kept in the dark, President Ho's statements brought the problem to light and were followed by a heated debate in the press. The majority of the press regarded his statements as reasonable and sincere. One paper wrote "Those statements show that President Ho and the Vietnamese Government are resolved to settle Franco-Vietnamese relations through a mutual and amicable understanding between the two nations." French progressive opinion was on our side, and criticized the provocative comments of a few reactionary papers.
Over half a month had passed and no progress had been made at the Fontainebleau conference. Unexpectedly, on July 23, the Paris press reported that D'Argenlieu, the French High Commissioner in Indochina, was convening a federal conference in Dalat on August 1. The composition of this conference would include representatives of Laos, Cambodia, Cochinchina, Southern Annam and the Central Highlands... This suggested that D'Argenlieu wanted not only to cut off the South from Viet Nam but also to split Viet Nam into several "countries" and regions. On the same morning, our delegation lodged an energetic protest at the Fontainebleau Conference. The French again tried to evade the problem by promising to submit the protest to their government.
Because of the High Commissioner's action and the French Government's calculated indifference, the conference, already in a state of tension, became further stalemated.
On July 26, at noon, President Ho paid a visit to Fontainebleau. The Vietnamese delegation, the French delegation and representatives of the local administration and people welcomed him with bouquets of flowers. After the welcoming banquet given by the head of the local administration, the director of Fontainebleau palace showed him round the palace with all its ancient luxury and the splendour of its architecture. After that, President Ho suggested a walk in the woods. The director again accompanied him.
On his return, the President inquired into the situation of the conference and talked to the members of our delegation.
The conference was now in a hopeless impasse. The representatives of the French Government in the negotiations, acting on their leaders' instructions, openly evaded the implementation of the Agreement, contending that they should not create a precedent for other French colonies to oppose the mother country. They still clung to obsolete reactionary ideas on the colonial question. The system they wanted to set up in Indochina was hardly different from what the French had established here before World War II.
President Ho went back to Paris in the evening.
The French Government maintained silence in the face of our delegation's protest against D'Argenlieu's convening of a so-called "federal conference" in Dalat on August 1. On that day, our delegation declared that it would postpone the session until it received a proper answer to its protest. Our delegation left Fontainebleau never to return.
The period of florid greetings and promises was over.
The French inter-ministerial council on the Indochina question met under the chairmanship of Bidault from August 10 to 12 to discuss the breakdown of the negotiations. Earlier, Varenne, a former governor-general in Indochina and now Minister of State in Bidault's Government, who had just been appointed chairman of the inter-ministerial council on Indochina, declared to the Press "The third republic has created across the ocean a splendid work which brings glory to the genius of France! Are we going to abandon and destroy this work ? For the French such an action would be an irremediable disaster. We are a people who fully understand what we are saying and we will do everything in our power to ward off this disaster."
A few days later, even De Gaulle made his voice heard. While censuring the draft constitution which was about to be put to a referendum, he severely criticized the statute of the French Union as laid down in the draft. He considered that the principle of "free self-determination" could only lead to anarchy, division and finally foreign domination.
All the meetings, discussions and exchanges of views held throughout the month of August could not help to get the Fontainebleau Conference under way again.
▴ XXI ▾
Early in August, French news agencies unofficially reported President Ho's imminent return to Viet Nam. This news coincided with our delegation's declaration that they were suspending the Fontainehleau conference. Evidently, the negotiations held no prospects of success.
During these days, the French troops had repeatedly carried out provocative acts along the Hanoi-Lang Son route. As had been agreed upon by both sides, the French army was permitted to go to Lang Son to replace the withdrawing Chiang Kai-shek troops. The modalities for the logistical supplies for French troops stationed far from Hanoi had been clearly laid down. But. the French army units assigned to this task were constantly violating these provisions. They often went without an authorized pass, including even armoured vehicles in the supply convoys and seldom failing to provoke our soldiers at the sentry posts along the road.
On August 1, a French military lorry drove from Lang Son to Hanoi. Our sentry post at Duong bridge asked to see their pass. When the French replied that they had left it behind, our men requested them to stay where they were while they telephoned a report to the Central Liaison and Control Commission. However, the French drove on across the bridge. Our men blew their whistles to stop them, but in reply the French opened fire hitting five of our national defence guards and two civilians. Our soldiers returned the fire. The lorry rushed over the bridge and headed for Gia Lam.
We knew that the French reactionaries in Indochina were deliberately making trouble so as to wreck the already precarious negotiations at Fontainebleau. The delicate problem now was that president Ho and our delegation were still on French soil. Faced with the French troops' provocative acts, we tried to find a peaceful settlement while remaining firm in our dealings with them. However, our people, burning with pent-up anger against the French invaders, were liable to fight back at once, particularly when the enemy caused losses to life and property.
Two days after the incident on Duong bridge, on August 3, a French convoy of twenty lorries drove from Hanoi to Lang Son. When crossing Duong bridge, the French soldiers wantonly opened fire shooting at the sides of the road. They fired into a sentry post two kilometres from Bac Ninh, killing one national defence guard. The convoy raced on into Bac Ninh town, firing away all the time. Our soldiers and self-defence force fired back. The clash went on from 7.30 a. m. until noon.
Instead of joining us in an effort to find a settlement, the French command in Hanoi sent up a detachment of reinforcements accompanied by armoured cars. On their way, the French troops opened fire and set on fire several houses in the Duong bridge area and Yen Vien and Tu Son districts. They arrived in Bac Ninh at 10 a. m. Thus, the dash worsened. The Vietnamese-French Joint Commission came in the afternoon but its intervention was to no avail.
On August 4, the French major commanding the operation requested our authorities in Bac Ninh to let him station his troops in the barracks of the former "Indochinese Guard." We rejected this absurd request. A few hours later, four French aircraft came to attack the town, hitting civilian houses. The French troops refused to withdraw from the town.
On August 6, Crepin, Commissioner of the French Republic in the North, acting in place of Sainteny who had returned to France, came to see us at the Bac Bo palace. He protested against the French casualties caused by our side in Bac Ninh. We replied that the clash had been brought on by the French troops' provocation. The Vietnamese side had agreed to send a joint commission to investigate with a view to a settlement but the trouble continued because the French troops refused to pull out of Bac Ninh, thus seriously violating the provisions of the Agreement signed by the two sides.
Crepin said "If you allow such action to go on, clashes will surely break out." This was a veiled threat. I replied "You know very well the cause of clashes of this type. French troops have been mainly responsible for them. We have expressed our good will on several occasions. There will be peace if you want peace, war if you want war."
Faced with our firm stand, Crepin lowered his tone and changed the subject. He offered to ship to the North a quantity of rice from the South.
D'Argenlieu lost no time in distorting and exaggerating the clash in Bac Ninh and reported it to Paris as an incident which had caused heavy losses to the French army and which "involved the responsibility of the Vietnamese government."
A few days later, new provocative acts took place along the Vietnam-China border. On August 10, French troops made unprovoked attacks on our army in Tien Yen and Dam Ha. On August 13, they stationed local bandits in Lang Son. They harassed our compatriots in Ha Long Bay and on the Hong Cai seaboard. Meanwhile, it was reported that French troops were moving south from Son La. Earlier, D'Argenlieu had revealed his desire to set up in the North a "Nung - That republic" on the pattern of his "western republic" in the Central Highlands. The enemy's activities, which were noted around the same time along the whole border from the coast to the mountains and from the east to the west, signalled the beginning of this scheme.
On July 18, Leclerc, the French general who had had a more or less correct understanding of the Viet Nam problem, had returned to France and the French government had appointed Valluy to replace him. In mid-August, Valluy left Hanoi. Until then, despite the French continuous provocations, Valluy had maintained a flexible attitude. On his arrival in Saigon, he even sent a cable expressing his thanks for our send-off and his desire for friendly relations between Viet Nam and France.
On August 17, Morlière who replaced Valluy, flew to Hanoi. This major-general had spent several years in North Viet Nam during the French domination. Later, he had gone back to France and had taken part in the resistance against the German fascists.
He had been credited with some achievements during the fight for the liberation of France.
I met Morlière at the airport. He seemed grateful for the presence of a Vietnamese government representative. He told me that before leaving France he had had the honour to meet President Ho and he was bringing a letter of introduction from President Ho addressed to us. He added that he had come to Viet Nam with the spirit of a new France and he strongly approved of the liberation of Viet Nam under the leadership of President Ho. He expressed his confidence that the Fontainebleau negotiations would end in great success.
In his contacts with us, this old general reiterated his desire to see a great improvement in the relations between France and Viet Nam. He often presented himself as having a great sympathy with the Vietnamese people and a high appreciation of their good qualities. To illustrate this, once in a talk with me, he extolled the "native soldiers" in the former colonial army and heaped praise on one of his servants who was a very skilful and honest cook! A few months later, Morlière was to send us one ultimatum after another - for a time, he was nicknamed "the general of ultimatums" - It was during his tenure of office as Commissioner of the French Republic and commander of the French Army in northern Indochina that the clash in Hai Phong broke out which led to war spreading all over our country.
Today we have sufficient documentation to form a clearer picture of this general. A report written by Morlière in January 1947 on the clashes in Hai Phong and Hanoi was made public recently in France. From this report, we can see that, although Morlière's outlook and mentality remained very much those of a "colonial", nevertheless he was someone who meant well and desired peace. In his capacity, he had tried to prevent the war-eager colonialists in Indochina from kindling a large-scale war. It was because of this attitude that he was recalled to France and "shelved" for a time. He was to be promoted and given an appropriate appointment only much later, when the French government realized its mistake in pursuing the war in Indochina.
Later, in August, the first trouble over the customs took place in Hai Phong. As was said above, the French were very concerned about this question, which was raised by the French delegation at the Dalat and Fontainebleau conferences. No settlement had yet been found to the contradictory viewpoints of the two sides. The presence of French troops at a northern seaport made it possible for them to attempt to encroach upon our rights in the field of customs.
As a rule, foreign merchants who imported goods at Hai Phong port paid their duties to our Customs. Instigated by the French, some of them now tried to evade them claiming that the Sino-French Treaty had provided that Hai Phong was a free port. In August, we detained a foreigner who had brought with him an amount of new French currency which we had not yet allowed to be put in circulation, and confiscated from him 100 cases of cigarettes for tax evasion. On August 15, the French interfered in the matter, demanding the release of the detainee and the return of the confiscated money and cigarettes. The French military command in Hai Phong told the local authorities '"Hai Phong is a federal port and only the French are entitled to carry out a customs control. The French army will not tolerate foreigners being searched and their goods confiscated. If such incidents are to happen again, the French army will resort to military action. Of course we could not accept this absurd demand for there had been no agreement on federal customs reached between the Vietnamese and the French governments.
A few days later, while carrying out its duties in the port, the boat "Seagull" of the Hai Phong Customs was accosted by a French gunboat. French soldiers jumped onto our boat and attacked our customs officers, finally seizing our boat together with its men.
On the afternoon of August 29, Colonel Debès in Haiphong sent tanks, armoured cars and troops to besiege our custom-house and police station in the port. They arrested a number of our policemen, pillaged the goods in the custom-house and occupied the two buildings. We sent along our troops and a fight took place. The Vietnamese-French Liaison and Control Commission in Haiphong came to settle the conflict. We resolutely demanded the release of the detainees and the withdrawal of the French troops from the places they had illegally occupied.
Several anti-French demonstrations broke out in Haiphong. In the areas where they were stationing their troops the French had been terrorizing the popuiation and old people and children began to evacuate the city. Our struggle went on. Not until two weeks later did Debès release our men and withdraw his troops from the custom-house and the police station in the port.
However, this was but the first, minor conflict in the customs problem.
▴ XXII ▾
September 2, 1946.
The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was one year old.
The streets were submerged under a sea of flags and flowers. Everywhere, there were flags, portraits of Uncle Ho, lanterns, festoons, and triumphal arches.
By this day last Autumn, the revolution had just succeeded. The century-long night of slavery had ended. Uncle Ho had come back at the country's dazzling daybreak, the beginning of a new era of independence and freedom. The year which had passed had contained so many historic events. It was a year which had testified to the vitality of the democratic republic and to the skill of the helmsman who had successfully steered the nation's boat over untold perilous swirls and surges. Today, the new masters of the country had asserted their identity, realized their responsibility and were fully aware of their abilities. Though the revolutionary road ahead was still very long and arduous the flame of hope and confidence was burning ever brighter day by day.
The celebration of the first anniversary of Independence took place in the absence of Uncle Ho. But our people had striven to live up to his advice given at his departure. The negotiations between us and the French were passing through moments of extreme difficulty. On the eve of the anniversary, Uncle Ho sent a cable recommending our compatriots to do everything possible to avoid clashes with the French in order to create favourable conditions for the continuing negotiations.
7 a. m. A long blow of the siren sounded. The whole capital city turned south where part of the country was fighting. A minute's silence was observed to pay tribute to the martyrs who had laid down their lives for national independence and reunification. As the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was one year old, its southern part had now been fighting for nearly one year. The first difficult days had gone by. The temporary retreat in face of the enemy's violent onslaught had ended. The whole of southern Viet Nam, which had matured after one year of combat, was rising up to return the enemy's blows. As he expanded the occupied area and sent part of his force to the North, the enemy was revealing more and more weaknesses. His expeditionary corps had first moved from Saigon to various towns and then spread out to the rural areas. Now, they were being driven out of the large rural areas back to the towns and even to Saigon. The enemy admitted that beyond the range of his sentries' guns he had no control, The illusions of some of their Excellencies the French commanders on a quick war and quick victory had been shattered. Southern Viet Nam had learned how to fight the enemy who now found themselves bogged down in a long war.
At the beginning of this jubilant day, the entire country turned to southern Viet Nam, grateful to it for having, during the past year, given evidence of the vigour of the new regime, the indomitable strength of a whole nation which had awakened to stand up in arms as one man to fight for independence and freedom. Starting this happy day, the whole country pledged to live up to their sacred oath to fight to the end for the defence of their national independence and unification.
The minute's silence ended. Large numbers of people streamed to the Lake of the Sword area where a military parade was to take place on the occasion, of the National Day. A grand stand had been built in Chi Linh Park. The previous year, on September 2, on the stand in Ba Dinh square, President Ho and the Government had come before the people for the first time. Then the Government was a Provisional Government and no foreign guests were present. This year, on the stand were seen Acting President Huynh Thuc Khang and the ministers, elected by the people themselves and now familiar to them. Besides, there were British, American, Chinese, French... representatives. Morlière and some other French military officers were also present. The organizing committee showed them to their designated places like other foreign guests. The Commissioner of the French Republic in North Indochina, who had spent several years here in the golden days of colonialist rule, didn't show any displeasure.
After the Order of the Day addressed to the army, people's militia and self-defence forces by the Military Commission, a parade of the armed forces began.1
1 General Vo Nguyen Giap delivered the Order of the Day (Publisher's note).
Since the founding of the Republic, this was the second big military review. On September 2 the previous year, a detachment of the liberation army, just arrived from the revolutionary base and carrying assorted captured weapons, had beenlined up in front of the stand. It had been impossible to hold a military parade then. Our fighters had gone through many battles but they were unused to the rules of parading in formation. Now, a regiment of the national army of Viet Nam, properly equipped, clad in green uniforms, golden-starred caps and leather boots and carrying rifles, were proudly parading before the stand to the stirring music of the military band. Preceding each unit was the commanding officer armed with a long sword with the political commissar marching beside him.
After only a year of training while fighting, our army was reporting to their new government and compatriots their monumental growth and their readiness to enter a protracted fight should the enemy spread the war. In fact, our army was carrying only light arms that day. Besides rifles, each company had one or two medium sized machineguns and a few submachine-guns. This, however, was the result of enormous efforts made by the parade's organizing committee. The presentation of a regiment of the regular army today was just like the well-timed appearance of a liberation army detachment in Hanoi just following the success of the revolution. At a time when red-bereted French paratroops were tramping the pavements and vehicles of the Second Armoured Division were roaring up and down the streets of Hanoi, this event was highly significant.
This was also our Army's report on its progress before engaging in its long nation-wide war of resistance. The second military parade was not to be held in the capital city until nine years later when the last battle fought against the French expeditionary army had ended in victory in Dien Bien Phu.
In the afternoon, a great gathering was organized. Large numbers of people amid a sea of flags and posters streamed down to the square in front of the Municipal Theatre. Flower-bedecked floats of multiple forms and colours appeared, turning the square into a blossoming park. Half a million people from the plain to the mountain regions came here today to hear the new administration's report on what had been done during this year of liberation from the old regime and of building a new life.
The Government's report was also a review of the people's achievements for this year in the realization of the three big tasks laid down by President Ho - to fight hunger; ignorance and foreign aggression in order to build and consolidate the revolutionary power.
Today, the new administration was in a position to put before the people many concrete questions.
The Franco-Japanese policy of forced delivery of foodstuffs had deprived our people of hundreds of thousands of tons of rice, thus causing a horrible famine. At the time when the revolution succeeded, the Red River had risen to an unprecedented level of 12.6 metres and the August floods swept away another 400,000 tons of rice from our people in the North. Moreover the rice growing acreage had been considerably diminished as a result of the Japanese policy of forced cultivation of jute and castor.
Industry and commerce were completely paralysed. Handicrafts were ruined.
The new administration had been set up when, in the coffers of the Treasury, there remained only 1,230,000 piastres half of which were worn out small-change banknotes. The time for the collection of direct taxes had passed. Customs which formerly had made up the greater part of the budgetary revenues of the whole of Indochina now brought in almost nothing because of the recession of commerce. Meanwhile, the value of the piastre had gone down from 500 to 10 Thanh Hoa coins. In November, the French-owned Bank of Indochina refused to advance money to our Government and illegally annulled the validity of the 500 piastre banknote. To make matters worse, the circulation of Chinese currency by Chiang Kai-shek's army was going on uncontrolled.
Our people were faced with a grave famine. Moreover they had to feed 200,000 Chiang Kai-shek soldiers and 60,000 Japanese soldiers.
Such was the economic and financial situation in our country during the first days. In the meantime, in the North, the internal traitors and reactionaries, relying on the Chiang soldiers' bayonets, sought every means to overthrow the revolutionary power in the South, the French imperialists started their invasion.
Responding to the call of the government, our people built and consolidated hundreds of kilometres of dykes to prevent flood.
President Ho's call for the increase of production to ward off famine brought about marvellous successes. The rice-growing acreage increased by 50%. The sweet potato acreage quadrupled while total yields increased five times. The maize acreage increased by five times - total yields four times. In July that year, the price of rice in the North went down from 700 to 200 piastres per hundred kilos The revolution had thus defeated the famine. This was a stupendous achievement for the democratic republic right in the first period of reconstruction.
Thanks to an amendment of taxation regulations to lighten and equalize the people's burden, to the calf for sacrifices on the part of civil servants and army-men, to the people's voluntary contributions and to the issue of Vietnamese banknotes, our administration was able to pay for its expenses, particularly its big expenses in national defence.
In the field of education, the struggle against ignorance achieved unprecedented success. Eighty thousand men and women teachers; working voluntarily without pay in sixty thous,and classes, helped to eradicate illiteracy for one and a half million persons.
The struggle against foreign invaders and internal enemies was waged resolutely and won great successes. The two hundred thousand Chiang Kai-shek soldiers were driven back to their country. The dark designs of their henchmen, the reactionaries, were utterly smashed. In the South, our army and people, getting stronger and stronger as they fought, foiled the enemy's scheme of a quick war and quick victory. The revolution was still standing fast in twenty out of the twenty-one provinces of South Viet Nam.
The democratic republic had been consolidated the new administration, after a year of hardships and troubles had successfully held the first general election in the history of the country, convened the National Assembly and formed the official Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. The first democratic constitution in the history of the country had been drafted and was to be discussed and adopted by the National Assembly. Almost all the Administrative Committees and People's Councils from village to provincial level in Central and North Viet Nam had by now been officially elected. The people were in a position to exercise their right to democratic liberties. Before the revolution, there had been twenty newspapers and reviews. Now, there were as many as one hundred and twenty. Over ten million people had been admitted to various associations and organizations for national salvation.
It was with no ordinary elation that today the people, dressed in their best clothes, came to take part in the great festival commemorating the first anniversary of the foundation of the democratic republic.
The meeting was followed by a parade of half a million persons extending over five kilometres. The decorated float of the Viet Minh National Committee bearing the national golden-starred red flag headed the parade. Another float carried a model of the rostrum (in Ba Dinh square) from which President Ho, in his first appearance before the people the previous year, had read the historic proclamation of independence. On the Viet Nam. General Confederation of Labour's decorated vehicle was a globe which symbolized the world wide movement of the working class and the labouring people. On another decorated platform was a golden bird with widespread wings symbolizing the new regime in its vigorous growth. Several other vehicles carried posters reading "Hail to Viet Minh. Gratitude to the Front which has liberated the nation and won back national independence." There was a sudden downpour. But the sea of people carrying flags, posters, portraits of President Ho and flowers carried on imperturbably, rain or shine, bringing their endless joy to the streets of the city also submerged in flags, flowers and portraits of Uncle Ho.
In the evening, the whole city glowed in the pink light of tens of thousands of paper lanterns hung under the front porches of houses. A group of young people of the capital city held high a torch, symbol of the revolutionary flame, and ran round the Sword, Lake to thundering cheers. People were holding parties right on the street pavements and inviting passersby from distant provinces to join in. The whole capital city became a single giant party which could hardly contain the immense joy of the nation on the first anniversary of Independence Day. Artistic performances such as concerts, song and dance shows, plays, traditional dramas, and operas went on in various city quarters till very late at night.
Just as, when enjoying a ripe fruit, we are grateful to the grower of the tree and when drinking sweet ecol water, we are grateful to the digger of the well, so in that day's jubilation, everyone could not but think of the source of his happiness. This was the moment when President Ho's image came to one's mind, an image bathed in all the national hues, simple yet warm, unaffected and bright. On this great day of jubilation, he was far away, facing all sorts of cares and worries for the sake of the people, and the country.
▴ XXIII ▾
Late in August, the Western press reported that President Ho had sent a note to the French Government. Then Moutet and Varenne were said to have stated "The Fontainebleau Conference may be resumed."
But even the beginning of September saw no resumption of the conference because a great disparity remained between the viewpoints of the two sides. This fact was confirmed by the French Government's note sent a few days later in reply to that of President Ho "The difference between the viewpoints of the two sides on fundamental problems is too great to make a resumption of the conference practicable, for such a resumption would not have any success."
Now came a point about which we had been very anxious if no agreement could be reached by the two sides, the French reactionaries, undoubtedly aware of the trend of developments in Indochina, might try to obstruct the return of Uncle Ho and our delegation to Viet Nam. However we believed that Uncle Ho would be able to find a solution.
The following days saw a swift succession of news. The French press reported on September 10 that President Ho and our delegation were preparing to leave for home on September 14. On September 12 and 13, it was reported that the Vietnamese and French delegations were working out a summary agreement. But the following day, on September 14, all the French news agencies carried the information that our 15-man delegation had left for Toulon port on September 13 in order to take the ship back to Viet Nam. At the same time, there was a report that President Ho was to leave Paris on September 14 and was to return to Viet Nam aboard a French warship. Thus the reported summary agreement that we had supposed to be a conciliatory action by our delegation before leaving, would not be concluded.
On September 15, according to the latest news given by the French agencies, an Agreement between Viet Nam and France had been signed on Saturday night, September 14, and on Monday morning, September 16, President Ho would leave Paris. Though the content of the Agreement hadn't been made public, we felt somewhat relieved.
A few days later, Franc-Tireur published an account of the signing of the September 14 Modus Vivencli. It said roughly
The meeting between President Ho and Mr. Moutet on the night of September 14 took place in a tense atmosphere. The main difficulties were all derived from the problem of Southern Viet Nam. Every time, President Ho Chi Minh suggested the participation of both sides, Viet Nam and France, in the settlement of the southern Viet Nam problem, the French government's representative replied "This would be a violation of French sovereignty. It is unacceptable. Moutet showed himself inflexible. He said "Will your Excellency, please, sign the Agreement, to avoid a breakdown ?" In reply to Mr. Moutet, President Ho Chi Minh reiterated his determination to set out for Viet Nam at 8 a. m. on Monday, then rose to leave. President Ho and the Minister parted coldly at 11 p. m.
The situation became very strained. Those who accompanied President Ho were of the opinion that the Agreement would not be signed.
On his return from Mr. Moutet's, President Ho went into his room and pondered over the matter. At half past midnight, when all his assistants had gone to bed, he met again with Mr Moutet. He once more raised the problem of southern Viet Nam. In his persuasive voice, he discussed things with Mr. Moutet and put several questions to him.
"Why does the French government refuse the cooperation of Vietnamese government representatives in bringing about an armistice in southern Viet Nam?"
As a result, the presence of a Vietnamese representative by the side of d'Argenlieu was agreed upon in principle. Then President Ho asked:
"If so, why can't we agree with each other that such a representative would have the duty to participate in the implementation of the Modus Vivendi?"
This point, too, was approved.
"But will this representative have the right to go to southern Viet Nam?"
Mr. Moutet kept silent. However, Moutet had agreed that Vietnamese would have the right to freedom of movement in southern Viet Nam and that the Vietnamese army could stay on there.
Yet, the question of the movement of the Vietnamese representative by the side of Admiral d'Argenlieu was left pending. However, at long last, the two sides agreed to sign the Modus Vivendi.
We read this article on the news bulletin of a French agency and we were not sure of its authenticity. Two days later, the Modus vivendi was made public. What Franc-Tireur had published was not inconsistent with its content. But the developments which had lead to the conclusion of the Agreement were not clearly known until the return of Uncle Ho and the delegation. The negotiations between our side and France had gone through excruciating movement. And, like the conclusion of the Preliminary Agreement half a year earlier, it was Uncle Ho who made the decision at the eleventh hour.
The struggle for freedom and democracy in France was encountering untold difficulties. The reactionaries' counter-attacks became more frantic at every success of the democratic forces. The monopolies had never eased their grip on the State apparatus. Even after De Gaulle's resignation, they maintained their firm control over the key posts of the French government. With Bidault's coming into power, they were able to further consolidate their rule. As regards the problem of French overseas territories, none of the successive governments had ever suggested any amendment in the French policy going beyond De Gaulle's statement in Brazzaville on March 24. It was noteworthy that the Inter-Ministerial Council on Indochina had always been in the hands of those who backed De Gaulle's policy towards colonies, with men such as Bidault, Michelet and then Varenne. This was the mainstay of d'Argenlieu after de Gaulle's withdrawal from the government.
This fact had been the stumbling block in the earlier negotiations between our side and France at Dalat and the cause leading to the impasse of the Fontainebleau conference. It was under such circumstances that Uncle Ho signed the September 14 Modus Vivendi. The document as its name indicated, had only a provisional character and did not contain decisions on questions of principle. These, by mutual agreement, were to be further discussed in early 1947 between the two Governments. It was noteworthy that President Ho had succeeded in his demand for a provision to be inserted in the document that "France undertakes to put into effect democratic freedoms in southern Viet Nam and to cease all acts of force."
▴ XXIV ▾
On September 16, 1946, the dispatch ship Dumont Durville was preparing to leave Toulon for Indochina. The captain received an unexpected order to remove all passengers and cargos for another mission.
The French Government had decided to use this ship to take President Ho home. Accompanying him, besides his assistants, were some overseas Vietnamese.
On the morning of September 18, the warship weighed anchor and sailed out into the Mediterranean.
A French warship flying a red flag with a golden star was indeed an unusual sight for the people of Africa. She passed through the Suez canal and entered the Red Sea. On the way, several ports fired salutes in honour of the first Head of Stale of a free Viet Nam. Uncle Ho visited Djibuti at the invitation of the French Governor General who had been informed by the French Government and had made preparations for his reception. The ship called at Colombo on its way through the Indian Ocean. Uncle Ho came ashore to visit Ceylon for a day. Gandhi and Nehru sent envoys to the Ceylonese capital to meet Uncle Ho and present him with a banner of the Indian parliament. The previous month, the Indian people had celebrated Gandhi's 77th birthday. On that occasion, Uncle Ho had sent a cable wishing him a happy life, twice as long as his present age.
The warship sailed at a rather low speed. The French seemed to be deliberately prolonging President Ho's return trip. She once stayed in a port for several days for "maintenance." She even conducted shelling exercises on the sea, supposedly part of her "routine drill." In face of this procrastination, Uncle Ho maintained his calmness and composure.
As his companions recounted, the crew on the ship were amazed at the utmost simplicity of the President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. He travelled to France without any luggage. He took with him just one change of clothes and said he would do the washing himself. The French sailors assigned to serve him found themselves seldom called on. President Ho spent much time in conversation with the officers and men, inquiring after their families. Through his talks, they got a better understanding of the Vietnamese people's struggle for independence.
Throughout the voyage, he chatted with the overseas Vietnamese almost every day, in the morning, afternoon and evening. Later, they realized in retrospect that they had attended a special study course tutored by President Ho himself.
There were four "students." They were intellectuals who had been living away from the country for a long time. They were the luckiest among the many Vietnamese residents in France who had wished to go back to Viet Nam with Uncle Ho and our delegation to serve their country. Each country that the ship passed by became a subject for a talk. In Djibuti, Uncle Ho spoke of the French colonialists' exploitation in Africa, the life of the black people and their struggle. In Colombo, he spoke of the difference in the policies applied by the French and the British in their colonies, and the Ceylonese people's struggle for liberation. When the ship was sailing on the Indian Ocean, he talked of the collusion between the British imperialists and the French colonialists in the repression of the Indian people's struggle for independence. In some places, he predicted the revolutionary movement's eventual strong growth despite its present immaturity. Every day, he talked of the struggle for independence at home. He told many stories about the August Revolution. He cited the examples of poor labouring people who had joined the revolution, been tempered and grown up in the struggle and who had now become outstanding cadres having achieved glorious successes.
He paid attention not only to their knowledge but also to their life style and habits. Having nothing to do on the ship, they often got up very late. Once he came in the early morning when all of them were still in bed. He asked if they had slept well. From then on, they rose with the sun. He always urged them to mix with the masses. This was a new sort of work which they found very difficult. He took them to see the sailors and talked with them so that they could learn from it.
Once he asked comrade Pham Quang Le
"Back at home, you'll have the opportunity to do good work, but there'll be many difficulties and hardships. Can you bear them?"
"I can, Uncle."
"A resistance war may break out. Our material basis is still beset with difficulties. Do you have the determination to overcome them?"
"I do."
A few months later, Comrade Le became director of the Armaments Department of our Army.
Before the ship arrived in Hai Phong, the study course had been completed. As a result, though they had been living far from the country and from the revolutionary movement at home, the intellectuals felt much better informed and were all eager to begin their work.
One month after her departure from Toulon, the dispatch ship entered the sea off central Viet Nam. Admiral d'Argenlieu, for the second time, gave a welcoming ceremony for President Ho on the sea.
The Dumont Durville entered Cam Ranh bay with D'Argenlieu and Morlière, the latter having just arrived from Hanoi, were present on the Cruiser Suffren to welcome President Ho. Several journalists were also invited on board.
French sailors, lined up on the ship's deck, cheered repeatedly as President Ho came aboard. The Admiral walked up to greet him. President Ho inspected the guard of honour and went into the banqueting room.
D'Argenlieu toasted President Ho's health and asked about his trip. President Ho said
"Excuse me, Admiral, for my poor French, but I assure you that I'm speaking in all sincerity. I put much hope in the negotiations that will soon take place. The French people, including the press circles, have come to understand us better. There were a few papers which attacked me but that didn't do me much harm... "
President Ho talked with the High Commissioner for two hours on the implementation of the September 14 Modus Vivendi. He requested d'Argenlieu to organize immediately the joint commissions to settle the conflict m southern Viet Nam, as provided for by the Modus Vivendi. D' Argenlieu agreed with him on the appointment of a Vietnamese government representative to work by the side of the High Commissioner.
After the talk, President Ho and the High Commissioner met the press. President Ho urged the journalists to work for the cessation of the current clashes and for the implementation of the provisions of the Modus Vivendi with a view to making a good preparation for the negotiations which would be continued the following January. Following President Ho's address to the journalists, the High Commissoner added with a persuasive smile "I believe that a real step forward has been made on the road to cooperation."
▴ XXV ▾
Our delegation, having left Toulon port two days before Uncle Ho, arrived in Hai Phong on October 5. We were thus better informed about the negotiations in France. Everyone felt unceasingly anxious while the warship Dumont Durville continued to linger on the Indian Ocean. The news that the ship had entered Vietnamese waters and would soon arrive at Hai Phong port was a great relief to us. The entire nation exalted in expectancy.
Delegations of the Government and mass organization went to Haiphong to wait for Uncle Ho on the evening of October 19. A representative of General Morlière, Commissioner of the French Republic in North Indochina, accompanied them. Along Highways, the towns and villages were covered in red flags.
Our comrades in Haiphong had made very good preparations for Uncle Ho's welcome. The army was to play a part in the welcoming ceremony, in which a French army unit was also to participate, under our command. The entire armed forces in Haiphong were mobilized to maintain order and cope with any possible emergencies.
On the afternoon of October 20, when we went to the port, people from Hai Phong, Klen An and the adjacent rural areas were standing along the two sides of Pham Hong Thal, Ho Chi Minh and Tran Phu Streets. Self-defence units and security forces had formed cordons all along the road.
At 4 p.m., the Dumont Durville sailed into Ngu landing place. The golden-starred red flag fluttered by the side of the Tricolour on top of the tall ship's mast. The ship emitted a long siren blast. Never in this port had a ship's siren so stirred the hearts of hundreds of thousands of people as on this afternoon!
The Vice-Minister for the Interior, the Mayor of Haiphong and Colonel Debès, commander of the French forces in Haiphong, went on board to pay their respects and to report the programme of the welcoming ceremony. A familiar figure in a faded khaki suit appeared on the ship's deck, There he was. Immediately thunders of applause and shouts of "Long live President Ho!" drowned everything out.
And the moment when Uncle Ho left the ship and stepped on the soil of the home port a siren blast sounded from the Haiphong Municipai Theatre to spread the happy news throughout the city. After his long sea voyage, he looked healthy with a sun-tanned complexion. He smilingly nodded his greetings to the representatives of the government and the provinces who had gathered here to welcome him. The Vietnamese and French national anthems were played. He attended the ceremony of saluting the flag and inspected the guard of honour. Our soldiers, simply dressed in green uniforms, soft caps, carrying rifles With fixed bayonets, and their officers, whose caps bore a golden star, holding drawn swords, had the honour of presenting to him the greetings of the entire nation on his long-awaited return. Then he moved on to the French unit. At the Vietnamese officer's order, the Tricolour was lowered to salute him by the French guard of honour, dressed in their white ceremonial uniforms.
The ceremony having ended, he came back to Ngu landing place to express his thanks to the various delegations, accepted a bouquet from the Haiphong population and embraced two children who came running to him.
Thunders of applause resounded all along the route. Many people couldn't hold back their tears when they saw him.
He went to stay at the City Administrative Committee premises. After dinner, he briefed us on his return voyage. His attitude was as simple and composed as it had been formerly when he used to chat with us after dinner before the trip. He inquired about our health and the situation at home. As he had just arrived back after a long journey, it was not planned for him to receive any visitors that evening. But while he was sitting with us, a comrade from the City Committee reported that there was an old man with damaged eye sight who was insistently asking for an audience. He told him to show the man in. It was not cold but the old man was wearing a peculiar woollen blue suit which looked like a military uniform. As soon as he saw him, Uncle Ho rose, came up to him and took him to a seat. Thirty-five years previously, the old man had worked on a ship with Uncle Ho. Having learned that Uncle Ho had returned and was staying in Haiphong, he had put on the suit in which he had worked on the ship and asked one of his grandchildren to take him here. No sooner had the old man said "Respected President Ho..." than our Uncle interrupted him, saying "Just call me Ba as before." Uncle Ho spent a long while with him. The old man was too moved to speak much.
At 5 a. m. on the following day, Uncle Ho went for a walk in the city, then returned to receive his visitors who were many. There were representatives of mass organizations and political parties from Hanoi, representatives of various offices and organizations from Haiphong and representatives from the provinces Kien An, Hon Gai, Quang Yen, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh, Bac Ninh... An aged man presented him with an embroidered scroll bearing this inscription in classical Chinese "Only one word and the nation is uplifted", another with a walking-stick made from one hundred vertebrae of a boa constrictor.
At 10 a.m., the special train taking him to Hanoi left Haiphong.
The rows of people coming to welcome him back extended all along the railway line. At every station, there was a big mass gathering amid a sea of flags and posters reading "Long live President Ho" "Long live the victorious revolution" "North and South are one country" Everywhere, triumphal arches had been put up. The train made a short stop in Hai Duong town where the local people held a grand meeting at the station to welcome him It took the special train no less than five hours to cover the 100-kilometre journey from Haiphong to Hanoi. During the whole time, Uncle Ho stood by an open window waving to the welcomers.
In Hanoi it was a beautiful autumn day with splendid golden sunshine. Red flags fluttered over the moss-covered roofs and green tree tops. It was past 3 p.m. As it began crossing Long Bien bridge the train gave a long whistle.
At 3.30 p.m., it pulled into Hang Co station. On that day, all the Hanoi population had taken a day off to welcome him back. Acting President Huynh headed a delegation of the government, National Assembly and various mass organizations which was waiting for him on the station platform. People crowded in front of the station and along the road leading to the Bac Bo palace. Standing out in the sea of people were the soldiers in their green uniforms, the military band with its brass instruments and young girls dressed in white shirts and blue skirts in the "New Life" style.
Morlière who had just returned from Cam Ranh was present at the station. The French Command also sent a guard of honour and a military band.
Uncle Ho attended the welcoming ceremony at the station, then drove to Bac Bo palace. The motorcade went through countless triumphal arches. On behalf of the whole country, Hanoi applauded, waved flags and scattered flowers to welcome him.
The whole country was overwhelmed with elation. Uncle Ho shared the same joy, which showed on his radiant face. He came back safe and sound. With his hands at the helm, the Fatherland's boat would move forward, overcoming all stress and storm. The sun shone more brightly! The colour of the flags became brighter! The trees were greener and the sky grew more lofty!
Uncle Ho met Comrade Nhan and all the other members of the Party Standing Bureau in the Bac Bo palace. At this time, as the struggle was becoming more complicated, some of our leaders were not working in the open. After nearly four months, we again had the opportunity to gather round him. As he talked with each one, he showed his solicitude for every one of us.
Before long, there was a throng of people in front of the palace. He went to the window to wave to them. More and more people kept coming. Young pioneers paraded by, beating drums and shouting: "Uncle Ho has returned! Uncle Ho has returned!" This was also the cry of the entire nation, resounding everywhere on this jubilant day of his return.
On October 23, President Ho issued a statement to the people
"(...) I went to France in response to the French Government's kind invitation with the aim of settling the question of Vietnamese independence and the reunification of North, Central and South Viet Nam. Because of the present circumstances in France, these two questions have not yet been settled. More time is needed. However, I can assure you that sooner or later, Viet Nam will be independent and North, Central and South Viet Nam will be reunified..."
To the people in Nam Bo and Southern Trung Ba he stressed:
"North, Central and South Viet Nam are the same country. We have the same ancestors and forbears; we are kith and kin. North, Central and South Viet Nam are like three brothers of one family.
"Since no one can divide the members of one family no one can divide our Viet Nam."
"So long as the country is not yet reunified and my compatriots are still suffering, I am unable to eat well and sleep peacefully. I solemnly declare to you, compatriots, that with your determination, with the determination of all people in the country, our beloved south will certainly return to the bosom of the Fatherland."
▴ XXVI ▾
Since the signing of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement more than seven months had passed. Yet over our territory the aggressor's guns had never ceased to sound. Availing themselves of the political confusion in metropolitan France and supported by financial circles with vested interests in the colonies, the Gaullists in Indochina headed by d'Argenlieu adopted a policy of faits accomplis to further their aggressive designs. D'Argenlieu had grossly violated the clauses of the Agreement. However he had never suffered any reprimands for this from the French Government even after de Gaulle had left the political arena. It was not difficult for the wily defrocked priest to realize that his entire activity in Indochina had never run counter to the political line followed by the new French government. He had received firm support from the inter-ministerial council on Indochina presided over by Bidault.
In North Viet Nam, after the withdrawal of the Chiang Kai-shek troops, d'Argenlieu began to carry out a "nibbling" policy - the piecemeal invasion of our territory. He had been devoting his efforts to consolidating and expanding the French footholds and at the same time vigorously recruiting reactionary elements and former lackeys who had been lying low, in preparation for the establishment of "autonomous zones" to encircle the revolutionary forces and create the conditions for overthrowing the revolutionary power. In South Viet Nam, d'Argenlieu continued to extend the war of aggression. He had openly repudiated the articles of the Agreement on South Viet Nam, even going to the length of declaring that South Viet Nam remained legally a French colony. He had given orders to Nyo, commander of the French Expeditionary forces in south Indochina, to use every possible means to undermine the revolutionary power, suppress the people's resistance and rapidly reestablish the colonial administration as it had been before 1939.
For our part, over the past period we had been conducting a struggle to make our adversary observe the Agreement and check his nibbling tactics while at the same time carrying out resolute retaliatory strikes against his acts of aggression. By combining our efforts to maintain detente with strong military counter-blows, we were able to consolidate and develop our forces in every field and improve our ability to deal with any eventuality.
Our Southern compatriots' continued and widespread uprisings over the past months had changed the political and military situation in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo.
Our resistance in the South had continued.
In Nam Bo our armed forces had been developing rapidly. In the months of May, June and July we had formed new regiments. Like their brothers and sisters in the North, our troops in the South were mostly of peasant origin. But, particularly in the eastern zone of Nam Bo where there were many factories and rubber plantations, workers joined our army in large numbers. Officers and men of the 13th Regiment were all workers. Most of the officers were political cadres put in charge of the armed forces by Party committees. A number of them had been politically active since the 1940 Nam Bo uprising.
Nam Bo is a land with few forests and mountains. But our Party had pointed out that, though favourable terrain plays an important role, the essential factor is the support of the people. By firmly relying on the people's support, our armed forces had been able to hold their ground, build up their organization and obtain more equipment.
Our motto was "Capture the enemy's guns and use them against him." In this way many units had managed to replace almost all the weapons they were originally supplied with.
The Resistance forces had succeeded in establishing large bases embracing several provinces such as War Zone D, the Plain of Reeds and the U Minh Forests. Every province had medium and small-sized bases covering two or three districts or five or six villages. In many regions, these bases were linked up with each other. As for Saigon city it had become a source of supplies providing the resistance bases with weapons, explosives, machines, medicines, medical apparatus and also with technicians, medical workers and doctors. Our armed forces had frequently made their presence felt there. The mass organizations in urban centres had "adopted" various army units each military zone each regiment had set up a factory to manufacture military equipment.
In southern Trung Bo we had been able to form some regiments using the reinforcements dispatched clown from the Fifth and Sixth Zones in July.
In the Tay Nguyen Highlands cur first regular regiment had been formed incorporating one battalion composed wholly of young men of various ethnic minority groups - the M'To-rang-lon Battalion.
Many small guerilla bases had sprung up in the delta and mountain areas of southern Trung Bo.
Our armed forces had everywhere stepped up guerilla activities. The army in coordination with the guerillas and self-defence units attacked and ambushed the enemy, thwarted his mopping-up raids, launched successive campaigns of attrition' and annihilation and did their utmost to protect the people and their property and to expand the liberated areas. They controlled many strategic communication links and thrust deep into urban areas and the enemy's military, political and economic centres.
The development of guerilla warfare compelled the enemy to take urgent counter-measures. The enemy forces had to maintain 24-hour patrols around their scattered bases. Their mobile forces, limited in numbers, were thrown into unending and fruitless "pacification" raids.
Our armed forces in the meantime had learned various methods of fighting. Many units had gained experience in surprise assaults on small posts, in ambushes along roads and rivers. Gradually we became able to defeat the enemy's large-scale raids and check his thrusts into the free zones.
In Nam Bo, on September 22, the enemy committed 2,000 troops covered by aeroplanes, tanks and armoured cars in a big raid on Due Hoa. Our army and guerilla forces intercepted them there. In the battle, which raged for the whole of that day, we destroyed tens of tanks and other vehicles, killed a large number of troops, captured many weapons and shot down one French plane. (Was this the first enemy plane to be shot down by infantry fire in Viet Nam?) In Vinh Loc the enemy troops were apparently encircling a section of the 12th Regiment when they found themselves being surrounded and shot at. It turned out that our troops, having received in advance information of the enemy plan, had secretly moved out and laid an ambush. The battle ended in heavy losses for the marauders. In southern Trung Bo, our army and people beat back enemy attacks on Deo Ca, An Khe and Kontum. We also launched many attacks on the enemy's newly-established network of posts, especially against those in the Kimbrai area, the battle of Van Gia. In the Central Highlands, guerilla warfare was beginning to develop.
The resistance in the South could be said to have entered a new stage.
On September 13, our government, by Decree 182, decided to reorganize the Resistance Committee of Nam Bo so that this committee would assume leadership of the resistance movement in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo. A week later, on September 22, the Provisional Resistance Committee of South Viet Nam was inaugurated, becoming the only legal administration in the South. The Committee declared its readiness to implement the provisions of the Modus Vivendi signed on September 14 between the Governments of the DRVN and France.
Under the Modus Vivendi, the government of France had undertaken to observe the ceasefire, put into effect democratic freedoms in Nam Bo and hold a referendum as soon as favourable conditions had been created. Like the March 6 Preliminary Agreement, the Modus Vivendi in its turn threw the traitors into confusion. The political struggle, which had been strong after March 6, now had new conditions in which to develop. The press launched seething attacks on the puppet ruling clique. Hundreds of intellectuals, many of them well known figures, called for the overthrow of Nguyen Van Thinh. After barely two months the struggle had reached such a pitch that Thinh committed suicide by hanging. The French and their agents, frightened by the upsurge of the political struggle in urban centres hurriedly banned all marches, meetings and demonstrations.
The political struggle was accompanied by extensive attacks launched by our armed forces. As a result, large sectors of the puppet administration were smashed while more and more of its civilian agents and soldiers surrendered to the Revolution. Our propaganda work among the enemy ranks achieved good results. We were able to organize a full company of European and African deserters in the Thu Duc-Gia Dinh area and once a full squad of European soldiers surrendered in Hoc Mon.
At his meeting with President Ho Chi Minh in Cam Ranh Bay, d'Argenlieu did not touch on the frenzied acts of sabotage committed against the March 6 Preliminary Agreement and the the September 14 Modus Vivendi by the French troops. Instead he complained that "Terror has assumed formidable proportions in Cochinchina since the conclusion of the Modus Vivendi" (by terror, he meant our activities against the traitors). In so doing the French High Commissioner was, in effect, simply admitting his anxiety over the new attacks of our Southern compatriots.
In spite of the French acts of sabotage, our Ministry of National Defence, on October 30, acting on the agreement reached between the two sides on a ceasefire, gave orders to our army and people in the South to stop fighting. The order was strictly carried out throughout Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo. Once again the enemy was surprised and embarrassed to find that we were in full control of South Viet Nam. His claim that "Hanoi controlled no one and nothing in Cochinchina" had turned out to be either a blindfold on his own eyes or a bluff.
▴ XXVII ▾
On his return from abroad, Uncle Ho and the Standing Committee of the Party's Central Committee began a review of our people's struggle on the military, political and diplomatic fronts over the last months.
The systematic undermining of the Agreement, the continuation of the aggressive war in the South and the intensification in occupation attempts in the North advocated by the chieftains of the French Expeditionary corps in Indochina obviously had the support and encouragement of the French authorities. Because French big business had not given up its ambition to maintain its domination over former colonies and dependencies, our negotiations with the French had ended in an impasse. The prevailing political trend in France offered even more favourable conditions for the French reactionary colonialists in Indochina to extend the war. We, however, found it advisable to exploit every chance to maintain the detente. As a matter of fact, the French financial magnates were facing many difficulties. The struggle of the democratic forces in France was continuing. The French political situation was still fluid. The French government remained a provisional one. The Modus Vivendi we had concluded with the French, though not containing decisions on principles had compelled them to reaffirm their commitment to the spirit of "reconciliation and cooperation" of the March 6 Agreement, undertake to put into effect democratic liberties in Nam Bo and pledge to join us in fixing the time and procedure of the referendum in Nam Bo.
One policy was to wage a relentless struggle to force the enemy to honour and carry out his commitments and at the same time, to strike back resolutely against his invasion and other acts of sabotage. We drove home to the masses the necessity of building up and developing our political, military and economic potential, keeping watch over the enemy's manreuvres and getting ready to cope with any eventuality, including the extension of the war by the enemy to the whole country.
The convening of the National Assembly became an urgent problem.
Since its last session in March, many important events had taken place. The government's activities ought to be reported to it. The first democratic constitution of the DRVN had been drafted and was awaiting approval. As for the Resistance Coalition Government itself, it had been, we may recall, formed in an unusual situation at the beginning of March. Though its general composition had met the requirements of the time, some of its members had never been elected by the people. Now that both in the Government and the National Assembly there were vacant seats because some of their members belonging to the Nationalist Party and the Revolutionary Alliance had fled along with the Chiang Kai shek troops, Uncle Ho and the Standing Bureau of the Party felt it necessary to have a new strong, popular and efficient government which could fulfil its tasks in leading the people in the changed situation.
The National Assembly met on October 28 at the City Theatre.
The seating at this session was somewhat different from that at the previous ones. The assembly hall was divided into three sections left, right and centre. Sitting on the far left were the Marxists, including those members of the Indochinese Communist Party who were working in the open. Coming next were deputies from the Socialist Party wearing red neckties and those from the Democratic Party. The centre found the deputies without party affiliation but who had participated in the Viet Minh Front. Deputies from the Nationalist Party and the Revolutionary Alliance were on the right, the former sitting at the far end. Nearly half of the 70 seats reserved for these two organizations at the first session were unoccupied this time.
Foreign guests included the British, American and Chinese consuls and General Morlière's representative. They were seated among journalists in the private boxes in the circle.
The agenda consisted of the following items
1. Reports of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and of the Government.
2. Discussion and approval of the draft constitution.
3. Formation of a new government.
Uncle Ton, a deputy from South Viet Nam, was elected leader of the Assembly's Presidium.
A deputy from Rach Gia province, Comrade Nguyen Van Tao, read a message of greetings to the Assembly on behalf of all South Vietnamese deputies. He spoke of the deputies of South Viet Nam absent from the present session - Lawyer Thai Van Lung had been tortured to death in Saigon jail, Architect Huynh Tan Phat and other patriots were being detained by the enemy on Poulo Condor prison island. As he stepped down from the rostrum, President Ho Chi Minh came across to embrace him. Tears trickled down the President's cheeks.
The South Viet Nam representative proposed that the National Assembly express confidence in and support for President Ho Chi Minh, our 'First Citizen', who had led our nation out of slavery. In response, all the deputies gave him prolonged applause. In its report to the National Assembly the Government recounted its activities since its formation including the negotiations with the French Government in Fontainebleau and the conclusion of the September 14 Modus Vivendi.
On October 31, the Government was questioned by deputies. Altogether there were eighty-eight questions concerning national defence, foreign relations, the economy, finance, justice and home affairs, which were forwarded to the Ministries concerned. President Ho Chi Minh, on behalf of the Government, gave replies on foreign policy, the conclusion of the Modus Vivendi and the desertion of Nguyen Hai Than, Nguyen Tuong Tam, Vu Hong Khanh...
He said
"The Government's foreign policy and the September 14 Modus Vivendi... have been dealt with at length in previous reports... In short, as regards the democratic countries, we stand on very good terms with them; though they have not officially recognised us they have great sympathy for us. As far as our diplomatic efforts with France are concerned, the Government, in the process of its negotiations for the March 6 Preliminary Agreement, at the Dalat and Fontainebleau Conferences and for the September 14 Modus Vivendi, has shown a great resolve to safeguard Viet Nam's independence and territorial integrity and at the same time a readiness to cooperate with France on sincere and friendly terms. Naturally, on the principle of equality, they must cooperate with us.
He continued
"Will the Modus Vivendi affect future agreements? In human society what does not have an effect on something else? However, the Modus Vivendi can in no way have a binding effect on future negotiations. Whether future negotiations will lead to a fruitful result depends on the implementation of the Modus Vivendi..."
He added
"About the Vice-President, Mr. Nguyen Hai Than, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Nguyen Tuong Tam, and the Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission, Mr. Vu Hong Khanh... They are not here... Our country has been in difficulties. Our people have entrusted important tasks to those in whom they had confidence yet these gentlemen have abandoned their posts. They ought to consult their consciences. Those who have quitted work either do not care to share in the burden of State affairs or are incapable of shouldering it! Now that they have left, we who remain are ready to shoulder it ourselves."
There was prolonged applause. Uncle Ho continued
"But should they find they cannot betray their consciences, should they change their minds and return to the people and the motherland, we should gladly welcome them back."
Before sitting down, he ended up by saying to the Assembly
"If any other member of the Government has made mistakes, I will accept the responsibility and offer my apology to our compatriots."
The afternoon and evening sessions were reserved for replies by the Ministries. When the Ministries concerned had answered the last question, many deputies raised further questions. After the final question had been put, President Ho, on behalf of the Government, again took the floor to answer them. With familiar, simple words, he said
"Concerning the national flag, the Government has never intended to demand that it be changed. As a few members of the Government had made a proposal to that effect, the Government had considered it its duty to submit their proposal to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. Since then, the situation has greatly changed. Our red flag with its golden star has been soaked in the blood of innumerable Vietnamese fighters in Nam Bo and Southern Trung Bo.
Everywhere it has been carried, from Asia to Europe and from Europe back to Asia, it has been respectfully saluted."
His eyes brightening up, the President emphasized
"Now, no one except our twenty-five million people can invoke any right to demand a change in the national flag."
The meeting hall burst into resounding applause. Uncle Ho continued
"As for the question of integrity, the present Government has made great efforts toward this end. However, from Ho Chi Minh to those who work in village committees the Government is very numerous. Nevertheless, it' has been doing its best to set a good example. Wherever this effort is not successful, legal measures will be taken against those who take bribes. We have punished, are punishing and will punish them until corruption is eradicated.
Again, there was resounding applause.
"Certain deputies maintain that the Modus Vivendi has been signed on unequal terms. The Government begs to differ. Under its terms, each side makes certain concessions. If we ensure the French some economic and cultural interests here, they have to ensure the putting into effect of democratic freedoms in the South and the release of detained patriots. As to whether the French will sincerely implement the Modus Vivendi or not, we ought to keep in mind that in France there are good as well as bad people. I can affirm that now the majority of the French people approve of our independence and territorial unity."
In the same way - simple, informative, articulate and concise - he answered the other questions raised. No more questions were asked after his replies. It was just midnight.
On behalf of the Government, President Ho submitted its resignation which the National Assembly accepted. Then the National Assembly unanimously requested him to form a new government.
On the rostrum once again, having expressed thanks to the National Assembly for its confidence, Uncle Ho said
"This is the second time the National Assembly has entrusted me with forming a government. As long as Viet Nam is not independent and reunified, anyone, whether myself or any other person, entrusted by the National Assembly with this task, must strive to fulfil it. I now accept the task and would like to declare before the National Assembly, our people and the world that Ho Chi Minh is not the kind of man who hankers after power and tries to cling to his position seeking the "spoils of mandarinship." The government to be formed must be one of national unity, grouping able men irrespective of political affiliation... Though the decision of the National Assembly did not contain the term 'integrity', I would like to declare before the National Assembly, our" people and the world that the Government to be formed must have integrity. In accordance with the Assembly's decision it must be efficient, courageous, and determined to pursue the cause of national construction and struggle for the achievement of national independence and unity. Despite all dangers, the members of the Government will rely on the strength of the National Assembly and the people and resolutely pursue the aims defined for them by the National Assembly and the people."
That session ended at one o'clock in the morning. Starting on November 1, the National Assembly began its discussions of the first draft constitution of the DRVN.
On the afternoon of November 2, President Ho announced that he had completed the formation of the government. At 5 p.m., he arrived at the Assembly and was warmly acclaimed. He said
"This Government may not fully meet your aspirations but has been formed in conformity with the guide-lines you have set. It has the participation of eminent personalities from the North, South and Centre. The honourable Huynh Thuc Khang wanted at first to retire due to advanced age but, at my request, has decided to stay on for another term."
The National Assembly greeted the list of ministers submitted by President Ho with prolonged applause.
The National Assembly, by vote, unanimously approved the new government. Nearly seven weeks later, due to the enemy's policy of aggression, war spread all over our country. The Government formed in November by President Ho was to lead our people in a nation-wide resistance that would last 8 years.
The National Assembly continued its debates on the draft constitution. On November 8, 1946, with 240 votes against 2, it passed the constitution of the DRVN.
At the final session, on the new constitution, Psident Ho said
"Our country has enjoyed freedom for only 14 months. Yet, the first democratic constitution in our history has been adopted by the National Assembly. This constitution proclaims to the world that Viet Nam is an independent country that its people already enjoy all the democratic freedoms; that in the enjoyment of citizen rights the Vietnamese woman is equal to the man. This constitution upholds the solid unity of the various nationalities in Viet Nam.
▴ XXVIII ▾
According to the stipulations of the Modus Vivendi, the French Government was to carry out the following main provisions in Nam Bo
1. Release of Vietnamese citizens detained for political reasons and participation in any activities related to the resistance.
2. Guarantee for Vietnamese citizens in Nam Bo of democratic freedoms such as the rights to free association, free speech and free movement.
3. Ceasefire.
On October 26, our military command in a message to the Supreme Commander of the French Expeditionary Corps proposed that the two sides put into effect a ceasefire from zero hour on October 30. A few days later, Valluy in his reply said he had ordered his troops in South Viet Nam to stop firing on that date.
At the beginning of November, d'Argenlieu in a statement to the press said hostilities had ceased at zero hour on October 30. He also said that more than two hundred "political prisoners" had been freed, that other cases were being considered and that General Nyo had been dispatched to Hanoi to discuss the establishment of a Franco-Vietnamese military commission with the Vietnamese Government. In a letter to President Ho Chi Minh, d' Argenlieu confirmed all this.
On November 4, Morlière took Nyo to call in President Ho at the Bac Bo Palace. With the President were myself and the Vice-Minister for the Interior. Nyo was introduced as Head of the French military delegation appointed by the High Commissioner. Previously, President Ho and his assistants, myself included, had agreed with Morlière to set up, at the earliest possible date, a joint military commission and to hold urgent talks on the implementation and control of the ceasefire in Nam Bo.
However, while Nyo was in the North, it was reported that the French had opened fire in many places in Nam Bo and Southern Trung Bo. Under the circumstances our armed forces had been compelled to take defensive measures.
On November 7, the Franco-Vietnamese joint Military Commission held its first session at the premises of the former Chamber of Commerce. The French delegation was headed by Nyo. At the session our delegation condemned the French for their ceasefire violations, pointing out that these violations had not been brought to an end on the contrary, they were continuing on an ever larger scale. We stated that we wished to get the situation stabilized by introducing into Nam Bo and Southern Trung Bo a joint ceasefire Commission. This was turned down by Nyo. We also raised the question of the accreditation of our representative to the French High Commissioner as stipulated by the Modus Vivendi - a point which had been agreed upon by President Ho and the French High Commissioner at their talks in Cam Ranh Bay as well. To this Nyo replied that that question was beyond his authority. The meeting ended with no questions solved. The two sides agreed to continue that discussions later.
The same day, our Government received from d'Argenlieu a message of protest against our establishment of a Provisional Administrative Committee in South Viet Nam saying that this was not in keeping with the spirit of the Modus Vivendi and that the activities of the said Committee could be detrimental to the implementation of the Modus Vivendi.
In his reply, President Ho said
"The Nam Bo Provisional Administrative Committee was set up in August 1945 and has been functioning under the central Government ever since. Moreover it had official relations with the Allied military authorities and with the French authorities in October last year.
"The fact that Nam Bo is under both the occupation forces and the Vietnamese administrative and military authorities was recognised by the March 6 Preliminary Agreement and the September 14 Modus Vivendi. Under these agreements the status quo is to be maintained in South Viet Nam until a referendum is held. The activities of the Provisional Administrative Committee and the Vietnamese military authorities are simply directed towards the strict implementation of the political and military provisions of Article 9 in the Modus Vivendi concerning Nam Bo. They can only be of help in the policy of goodwill and cooperation which our two governments wish could be carried out unobstructedly."
On November 12, another message from d'Argenlieu was transmitted to us by Morlière. In this message the French High Commissioner said that, as Nam Bo was a French colony, a change in its political status could only be decided on by the French National Assembly on the results of a referendum. The Nam Bo Provisional Administrative Committee remained "illegal"; although Cédile had entered into relations with it in October 1945 this had been done out of a desire to avoid bloodshed. Now; if the Vietnamese Government meant to implement the agreement it had signed, it should stop forthwith or else disavow such actions.
To d'Argenlieu's cynical allegations, President Ho sent a laconic reply
"The government of Viet Nam wishes to remind the French High Commissioner that that Administrative Committee in no way goes beyond Article 9 of the Modus Vivendi whose aim consists in restoring for Nam Bo a just and lasting peace despite any obstacles and difficulties however great they may be and wherever they may come from.
"The President of the DRVN believes that, in order to attain a peace so cherished by the two nations, forceful methods are not only useless but might even block the implementation of the Modus Vivendi. If this happens the Vietnamese Government does not accept responsibility."
The position of the French colonialists in Indochina with regard to the implementation of the Modus Vivendi had thus been made clear.
According to French historians, d'Argenlieu during the first days of November was busying himself in preparations to meet the adverse situation should the French progressive and democratic forces win the coming elections. In that case, de Gaulle's policies could only be continued through a large-scale war in Indochina. He was meeting with all the administrative and military officers in Saigon in turn in order to reassert that "only a new military stand could prevent the situation from deteriorating in Hanoi's favour."
The man who fully understood the High Commissioner's intentions was Valluy. In a secret directive to his subordinates, he wrote "Decent attempts at a compromise are no longer appropriate and a severe lesson is now needed." On November 21, at the same time as Valluy informed us that he had given orders to French troops in Nam Bo to stop firing he also instructed Debès in Haiphong to seize control of this town and neutralize our resistance there.
▴ XXIX ▾
On November 11, President Ho had lodged a strong protest with the Bidault Government over France's unilateral control of customs and foreign trade in Hai Phong.
Before the conclusion of the Mollus Vivendi, on September 10, in Saigon, d'Argenlieu had instructed Morlière to try to establish French control of customs in the Hai Phong area as from October 15.
At the Fontainebleau negotiations, France had raised the customs issue several times. This issue had also been taken up by Moutet in his talks with President Ho in Paris. Customs revenue, as was known, used to make up a large percentage of the total revenue of Indochina. President Ho told Moutet that customs was not an issue that could not be solved by negotiations. The talks between the President and the representative of the French Government, Moutet, resulted in Article 6 of the Modus Vivendi.
"Viet Nam forms a customs union with the other nations in the Indochinese Federation. A coordinating committee on customs and foreign trade shall study necessary measures for putting this into effect and make preparations for the organization of customs in Indochina..."
This Article was completely distorted by the French authorities in Saigon. As Viet Nam had recognized that customs was a federal issue, they said, the coordination committee would simply define control procedures over the exchange and analysis of the customs already collected. On October 14, just one month after the signing of the Modus Vivendi the French in Saigon declared in a circular that the High Commissioner's September 10 decision on customs would take effect on October 10. In defiance of the stipulations of the Modus Vivendi, the French unilaterally decided that we would need a permit from them for the export of coal, ores, cement, metals, wood, cereals, salt, paper, etc... This was an extremely insolent action. As President Ho had not returned, Huynh Thuc Khang, as Acting President, lodged a strong protest with the French. President Ho, at his meeting with d'Argenlieu in Cam Ranh Bay, said that the customs issue could be solved through the Coordination Committee set up under the terms of the Modus Vivendi. According to him, this committee should meet at once in Hanoi. D'Argenlieu wanted the committee to meet in Dalat so as to link this issue with the other Federal issues. In the end, however, he was obliged to accept Hanoi as the venue. But no meeting of that Committee was ever held.
Aware of the plan of the French reactionaries in Saigon to stage a fait accompli, President Ho Chi Minh sent the Bidault Government a message of protest on November 11. Morlière sent the message to Saigon where it was withheld and it was not until November 26 that it was finally transmitted to France. The delay was not unintentional - the Hai Phong incident had been provoked six days earlier.
The incident began with a minor clash.
On the morning of November 20, a Chinese barge carrying petrol with a permit from the Vietnamese Customs Office sailed into the mouth of the Cam River -in Hai Phong. On arrival, it was searched and seized by the French under the pretext that the petrol was contraband. Their act was thus a violation of our sovereignty. Our police intervened. As if they had been waiting for just such an opportunity, the French opened fire. One of our policemen was killed and our men in a self defence unit nearby retaliated. The clash had begun.
At 11 o'clock, a French armoured detachment attacked the railway station area, which was a long way from the site of the morning's incident. It met with strong resistance from our self-defence forces. Gunfire began to be heard all over the city. This was not the first time that the French troops and our civil defence forces had clashed in Haiphong. Previously, the Franco-Vietnamese Joint Control Liaison and Control commission had been able to bring the clashes to a stop. But this time, when the Commission members tried to intervene, the Commander of the French forces in Haiphong, Colonel Debès put on a most arrogant attitude. He demanded that we release all the detained French soldiers, dismantle the police posts and the barricades erected in the streets and, even more insolently, he demanded the withdrawal of our armed forces from their positions in the Chinese residents' quarters.
At noon, Debès sent an ultimatum under which we had to meet the above demands before 2 p.m. We agreed to release five French soldiers captured in the morning clashes and demanded the release by the French of ten persons from our side kidnapped some days earlier. Debès's other absurd demands were rejected.
At 2 p.m. the French launched new attacks. This time the forces deployed were quite big. Covered by tanks, French troops made their way to the Municipal Theatre. Those defending the Theatre fought very valiantly, driving back wave upon wave of the attackers.
To exclude any negotiations, the French slanderously alleged that we had killed Camoin, a major and chief of the French team to the Liaison and Control Commission, who was known to be a man of sense and judgment. In Hanoi, we learned of the clashes immediately after they had taken place. Our representative in the Central Liaison and Control Commission requested that the French High Command intervene to prevent the hostilities from spreading. The French pretended surprise - we should not dramatize the incidents, they said, and hostilities could in no way be spreading. Hostilities in Haiphong, however, did spread that afternoon.
To create conditions for a settlement our Ministry of National Defence, at 3 p.m., moved reinforcements into Haiphong and gave orders that our troops should act only in self defence.
In the evening, on Morlière's orders, Colonel Lami, who was in charge of political affairs, had a meeting with the head of our military delegation. The two sides discussed the cessation of hostilities in Haiphong and reached an agreement which consisted of the following points immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Vietnamese and French troops to their former positions; formation of a mixed commission headed by Comrade Hoang Huu Nam and Lami to arrive in Haiphong the next morning.
Morlière approved of the agreement and kept Debès informed of it.
At 8 p.m. our comrades in Haiphong reported that our troops had ceased firing. But the French troops refused to follow suit and even used artillery, placed in Cat Bi. Gunfire was heard all through the night.
On November 21, in the morning, a mixed Franco-Vietnamese delegation travelled to Haiphong by rail. At kilometre zero outside the town, it got a signal from French soldiers to stop for the line was broken. The delegation then had to go into Haiphong by car from Thuorig Ly. Haiphong was smelling of gunpowder and gunfire was still continuing in many places. Indeed, after arriving at Debès's headquarters, the delegation was able to note that the ceasefire order was not being observed. It was found imperative that the ceasefire should be at once put into effect and the troops on either side withdrawn to their previous positions.
Our representative saw the Haiphong Party Committee and learned from it that our troops and civil defence units had strictly observed the cease-fire order since the previous evening and captured French soldiers had been returned. He rang up Lami and brought this to his notice.
Gunfire in the city did not cease until 2 p.m. However, Debès still refused to pull his troops back to their old positions claiming he could not carry out the orders of his Hanoi-based superiors because they did not understand the situation. French troops were unable to leave the positions for which they had shed blood. Morlière's representative thus failed in his efforts to persuade Debès who showed an obstinacy with regard to his superiors that is rather difficult to understand.
Pending further instructions from our government, our representative and Lami discussed the matter and agreed on the following points
1. A strict ban on either side opening fire for any reason whatsoever.
2. Withdrawal of all French armoured vehicles to their camps.
3. Limitation of night-time movement.
4. Formation of a mixed contingent to be posted at the railway station as a guard force to ensure normal communications.
Debès not only refused to put into effect the fourth point but even demanded that the Municipal Theatre be put under French occupation and that our troops .be withdrawn from the former European residential quarter. Our representative rejected this demand.
Finally, the two sides could only reach an agreement on troops remaining where they were and the banning of provocative acts by either side.
At last, on the afternoon of November 21, gunfire stopped in Haiphong.
On November 22, in the afternoon the mixed delegation journeyed back to Hanoi to report on the situation. On the way, Lami told us the French wanted to have some sort of settlement.
While hostilities in Haiphong were still going on, President Ho, on November 20, received Lacharrière who had been delegated by Saigon to discuss customs issues, and suggested to him that the mixed commission on customs and foreign trade should meet immediately in Hanoi. Lacharrière relayed the President's suggestion to Saigon.
▴ XXX ▾
The situation in Haiphong looked as if it were heading for a settlement.
All of a sudden, on November 23, at 7 a.m. Debès sent an ultimatum to the Haiphong Administrative Committee demanding that our troops be withdrawn from the Chinese and the former European residential quarters and that our self defence units in the Lac Vien Sector (the 7th Sector), where the French had been badly cut up, be disarmed. He insisted that his demands should be met not later than 9 a.m. otherwise the French would strike. We rejected all these demands. The French extended the deadline for 45 minutes.
At exactly 9.45 a.m., the French artillery began firing. Covered by talks and armoured vehicles, French troops attacked the Chinese residents' quarters. Even their planes bombed Haiphong and the adjacent town of Kien An. Our troops and self defence units, behind barricades and entanglements made of bedsteads, wardrobes and other wooden furniture, returned the enemy's fire. Molotov cocktails and grenades were thrown down from upper floors and verandas onto French armoured vehicles. Resistance was mounted at every street comer and from every block of houses.
In Hanoi, the same day at 9 a.m. the head of our military delegation arrived at the French headquarters and requested an urgent meeting with Morli è re. The latter kept away but delegated the colonel commanding the Hanoi garrison to meet him. Our side demanded an explanation of Debès's ultimatum. The colonel said it had been approved by his superiors in Saigon. He added that the French troops in Haiphong would be allowed to use fire if we did not accept it. The French command in Hanoi had made a sudden volte face.
According to documents later made public, things had passed off in this way as early as November 21, in the afternoon. Valluy, then in Saigon, had instructed Debès to avail himself of the existing situation to expand the French-occupied area in Haiphong. Carrying out Valluy's instructions, Debès then repudiated, all agreements reached between Morlière and our representative in Hanoi. On November 22, Valluy instructed Morlière to demand the total withdrawal of our armed forces from Haiphong. Feeling that this demand constituted an "ultimatum" which could bring about a large-scale conflict, Morlière refrained from conveying it to our government and instead asked Valluy to take into consideration the consequences which might arise from such a demand. Morlière was completely unaware of the fact that, along with his instructions to him, the new French Commander-in-Chief had also personally directed Debès to use all the means at his disposal to make himself master of Haiphong. Valluy was only carrying out instructions issued to him by d'Argenlieu who had left Indochina a week before.
On November 23, at noon, President Ho made a direct appeal on the Voice of Viet Nam radio
"I call on General Valluy Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces and the Acting High Commissioner and the other French generals in Viet Nam to stop forthwith the bloodshed between the French and the Vietnamese.
"I call on our entire people to remain calm and on our army and self-defence forces to be prepared to safeguard the sovereignty of our Fatherland while protecting the lives and property of foreigners.
"The government will always stand with the entire people to defend our country.
"Long live the independence and unity of Viet Nam."
The French attacks in Haiphong were of a very brutal character. Their troops were ordered to burn down every house which stood in their way once they met with resistance. But on the very first day they were forced to a halt and Debès had to appeal to the Navy for artillery support.
At 3 p.m. our troops launched a counter-attack. They stormed and recaptured the Municipal Theatre which had been held by the French for the last two days. Fighting was fierce whether it was for the control of a street, a lane or a house. The self-defence units, especially those of the 7th Sector were very brave.
On November 25, we made a strong attack on Cat Bi airfield, destroying the ammunition depot and petrol store there and succeeded in putting it under our full control.
Our valiant fight in Haiphong was, in a sense, a rehearsal for the battle lasting many days which took place in Hanoi one month later.
On November 25, our troops and self-defence forces moved out and took up new combat positions outside the city.
Even so, French patrol teams were afraid to enter many of the places we had evacuated.
On November 27, Morlière saw us. He conveyed a message from the French High Command demanding that we dismantle the entanglements and barricades put up on the roads linking French posts and ensure French troops free movement between Haiphong and Do Son. He explained that everything that French troops had done in North Indochina had been in accordance with orders from above. That reminded me of Valluy, when he came to give an explanation of the French occupation of the Tay Nguyen Highlands, it was, he said "orders from above." Morlière and Valluy had such a similar vocabulary. Then d'Argenlieu had been Valluy's superior, now it was Valluy who was Morlière's superior.
On the morning of November 28, our Ministry of National Defence received a message from Morlière to confirm what he had said the day before - "Today I confirm to you the military conditions set forth by the French High Command."
In this message, Morlière also defined the boundaries of the French-occupied zone which was to include the city of Haiphong and the adjacent areas. He reiterated the demand for free movement of French troops on the roads linking their posts and between Haiphong and Do Son.
The situation had become very serious. In order to gain more time for our army and people in Haiphong to make preparations, we briefly replied to the French that as their proposals were of extremely great importance, the two sides should set up a mixed commission to discuss them.
In the afternoon, Morlière sent us another message, the second in one day. "...I would like to bring to your notice that the conditions set forth in my letter of November 28 originate from very clear instructions received by me. As a result, there is no question of setting up a mixed commission to consider this as you have proposed. In my opinion it is pointless to form such a commission otherwise than for defining the measures needed to fulfil the conditions already put forth."
As a reply to the French messages with their demands for the expansion of their occupation over a larger area we ordered our troops and self-defence forces to tighten their encirclement of the enemy forces in Haiphong and thoroughly undermine the roads linking French posts especially the Haiphong - Do Son Highway.
The battle in Haiphong marked a new level of the French aggressive war. The enemy had now extended his aggression from the southern half of our country to the whole of Viet Nam and to the whole of the Indochinese peninsula.
▴ XXXI ▾
In France, a bitter struggle between the democratic and progressive forces and the reactionary capitalists was going on throughout the month of October over the constitution of the Fourth Republic.
In comparison with the draft rejected by the May referendum, the present draft was a backward step. However, it still contained progressive ideas. Under this Constitution, legislative power was voted in the National Assembly elected through universal suffrage; Republican Councils elected by representatives of communes and prefectures were simply consultative bodies. It ensured the newly-gained social and economic rights of the citizen, and equality between men and women in all fields. It was opposed to wars of plunder and colonial repression and undertook to respect the right of dependent nations to self determination. If this draft were adopted it could well be the most progressive constitution of bourgeois democracy since the founding of the French Republic.
For this reason the French bourgeoisie resorted to every possible device to prevent its adoption. This class wanted to maintain the existing instability in France in order to cause anxiety among the masses and, by proving the helplessness of democracy, to open up prospects for the setting up of a dictatorial regime. De Gaulle renewed his strong attacks on the draft Constitution. He maintained that the National Assembly had been given too many rights, while the executive had been left with almost no powers and the principles of freedom governing the French Union would only lead to the disintegration of the Empire. He even asserted "If the constitution is approved, there will be a rebellion." Such a threat had its effect on the French middle classes.
In the meantime, the French Communist Party made every effort to promote the people's struggle and to maintain and defend democratic institutions.
On October 23, the Constitution was put to a referendum. Nearly one third of the electorate abstained. However the constitution was adopted with 9.5 million against 8.1 million votes. The democratic forces had won an arduous battle.
The majority of the French electorate in the colonies voted against the draft constitution. In Indochina in particular, the Gaullists opposed to the draft constitution made up a very large majority. 8,313 votes were cast against and only 1,701 for. This shows the reactionary political tendencies of the French living in the colonies as a whole and in Indochina in particular.
On November 10, France held general elections to the National Assembly whose term of office would be 5 years. In the results, the French Communist Party headed the list gaining 24 more seats. The Socialist Party lost 20 seats. The victory of the Communist Party was remarkable. But the reactionary forces also gained strength. The MRP, the Cartel des gauches (a rightist group) for instance won more votes than before. Thus the French political forces had lined themselves up in two opposing blocs.
In those circumstances, the Indochina issue, far from being obscured, emerged as a question of prime importance in French politics, the progressive forces believed that, in her relations with the countries associated with her, France should respect the principles of democracy and self-determination and replace the policy of force and repression by one of "reconciliation and cooperation" while the reactionary forces held that, if France was ever to restore her strength and prestige on the international arena, she must pursue a tough policy to maintain her domination over her overseas territories.
It is noteworthy that the French ruling groups - big business men and the politicians in their pay - seemed to have learned nothing of the great and profound changes that had taken place in Indochina over the past years. They were still cherishing the "golden dream" of Empire as regards Indochina which although it made up only one-sixteenth of the area of all French colonies, accounted for two-fifths of the population and brought France annually over a billion francs. Between 1900 and 1945 the profits of the Bank of Indochina increased 33 times. Before World War II, the greatest investment of the French monopoly capitalists had been in Indochina - more than fifty-two billion francs.
The financial magnates believed that, with money and weapons supplied by their imperialist allies, they would not have any difficulty in restoring "order" in Indochina. The then U. S. and British positions on the Indochina question were very favourable to France. Having ousted France from Syria and the Lebanon, Britain had made a volte-face and set out to make peace with her. In the United States, Roosevelt had died and Truman who was now in power, began cajoling France De Gaulle was invited to Washington; a French representative was asked to attend the Japanese capitulation ceremonies and, later, France was offered a loan. As a matter of fact, what the U. S. was up to was to dominate France through the Marshall Plan and turn her into an anti-communist stronghold in Europe. As regards Indochina, the United States had long been keeping an eye on this Southeast Asian peninsula. It had attacked French Indochina policy demanding that France give the Indochinese countries more rights or that Indochina be internationalized for fifty years. These proposals had been strongly opposed by France and cold-shouldered by Britain. The United States had also considered using Chiang Kai-shek to drive the French out of Indochina but Chiang proved too weak. Now the United States wanted to help France put down the revolutionary movements in Indochina to give it time to work out a long-term scheme. Thus the French monopolists became dependent on the United States.
The general elections over, Bidault was now to hand over executive power to the National Assembly. As the new constitution would not take effect until mid-January 1947, the National Assembly nominated a provisional government. The political parties were again busy girding themselves for the battle for the presidency of this provisional government to be contended for at the beginning of December.
In mid-November, d'Argenlieu got back to France. The September 14 Modus Vivendi endorsed by the French Government had, in a sense, dealt a heavy blow to the policy pursued by the reactionary colonialists in Indochina. The French government's reaffirmation of its respect for the spirit and some clauses of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement had demoralized the Vietnamese traitors in Saigon. The new developments in France such as the adoption of the new constitution and the emergence of the Communist Party as the front-runner in the general elections... had made d'Argenlieu and the French reactionaries in Indochina worried. He .had thoroughly discussed his future policy with Valluy before he left Saigon.
In the outgoing Bidault cabinet which ha.d stayed on as a caretaker government, the High Commissioner found reliable supporters. D'Argenlieu soon became aware of the anxiety felt by French ruling circles about the weakening of France and her obscure role in the international arena. Playing on these feelings, he tried to drive home that Viet Minh was seeking ways to drive the French out of Indochina, that only a tough policy could uphold the Empire and that concessions to the Indochinese Communists and to President Ho Chi Minh would endanger the whole French Union.
The Haiphong clashes gave d'Argenlieu a chance. Our resistance to Valluy's acts of aggression was presented by the High Commissioner as evidence of the use of force by the Vietnamese to drive the French out. The French rightist press immediately made a hullabaloo the French Expeditionary Corps had once again fallen victim to a Viet Minh plot! There must be a tough policy to replace that of compromise and retreat!
On November 23, a meeting of the Interministerial Council on Indochina, which was still presided over by Varenne, was convened. After hearing a report by the High Commissioner, the Council decided that force could be used against violations of the agreements when necessary. D'Argenlieu at once cabled Valluy that a hard political line had been adopted by the government and all the parties.
▴ XXXII ▾
During the clashes in Haiphong, we captured from the enemy an important circular dated April 10, 1946. The French military commanders were instructed as soon as they were posted to a locality to draw up a security plan for its protection and, above all, a plan for moving forces about the town. These initial plans were to be completed, at the earliest possible opportunity, by a study of various measures aimed at gradually transforming the purely military operational plan into a "scenario for a coup d'Etat." They should also gather information about the organizations in the town and about our local leaders, their backgrounds, habits, lodgings... and keep them under close and constant watch.
At the same time, disguised special force detachments were to be formed, which would, on order, kidnap or liquidate our men... This secret document revealed the insidious schemes of the French reactionaries and laid their foul behaviour up to now bare.
The attack on Haiphong port, the second largest city in North Viet Nam, by Valluy's army marked a new stage in the French invasion. Dark clouds were looming up portending a widespread war. On the following days, one incident was quickly succeeded by another, like a chain reaction.
Future historians will dig into those events, make a thorough analysis of the enemy's objectives and actions and prove beyond doubt our Party's clear-sighted line as well as its practical and well-timed directives and highlight the ardent patriotism of our people and army and their preparations for a great resistance war. I have no intention of assuming the historian's role. I will just make a review of the main developments, which are commonly known, and from this background, bring out Uncle Ho's activities in December 1946, the last month of this greatly significant period.
Morlière's note, delivered to us on November 28, which evidently bore the character of an ultimatum put forward by the High Command of the French Expeditionary, Corps, was unacceptable. And Morlière rejected all negotiations.
Early in December, Sainteny arrived in Hanoi. He went to the Bac Bo palace to pay his respects to President Ho. For the whole of Sainteny's stay in France, the post of High Commissioner had been in the hands of the military for d'Argenlieu was unwilling to work with those who had been directly involved in the signing of the March 6 Agreement. It was Moutet's decision in November to send Sainteny back to Indochina. He had been kept in Saigon for a time before being allowed to go on to Hanoi.
President Ho stated that we would stand strictly by the stipulations agreed upon in the September 14 Modus Vivendi. He demanded the return of the French forces to the position they had held before the hostilities. Sainteny promised to send an urgent report home and to inform us of the French government's latest decisions as soon as he received them.
The French army began to intensify its provocative actions in Hanoi. Bands of red capped Foreign Legionaries roamed Trang Tien Street, looting shops, tearing up the press publications and photos displayed in the Information Centre and even on one occasion snatching off the Vietnamese flag on the wall. French motorcycle patrols rode recklessly through crowded streets. They deliberately brought on road accidents and needled our traffic police. A running jeep suddenly halted. Black-bereted soldiers jumped down, grabbed a passer-by and hauled him up on the car which then rushed into their barracks... the kidnappings which had ended with the repatriation of the Chiang troops were now resumed by the French forces. French soldiers even fired from the upper storeys of their houses on passing trams. French armoured cars rumbled in the streets night and day. Fierce clashes could break out any time.
On December 7, the French army in Haiphong launched a new offensive to force their way to Do Son. They met with a stiff counter attack from us and had to pull back.
On December 8, the French illegally increased their strength in Hai Duong on the Hanoi-Haiphong road.
On December 9, the French illegally landed 800 Foreign Legionaries in Da Nang. President Ho sent a note of protest to d'Argenlieu and the French government.
On December 12, French soldiers attacked our army in Tien Yen and Dinh Lap. In the Northeast the fighting spread.
On December 13, a big French cruiser called at Da Nang.
On December 14, 400 more Foreign Legionaries were sent as reinforcements to Haiphong.
On December 15, AFP reported that a large contingent of French soldiers in Algeria was being rushed to Marseilles to board ships for Indochina.
In view of the way the situation was developing, our Party had foreseen the inevitability of a widespread war. While doing our best to promote the possibility of reconciliation, we stepped up the preparations which had already been started for a protracted national war which would be waged on every front.
On December 7, a correspondent of the newspaper Paris-Saigon had an interview with President Ho. In this, President Ho said "My compatriots and I sincerely desire peace. We don't want war and I know that the French people don't want war either. But if a war is forced on us, we shall fight. The fight will be atrocious, but the Vietnamese people would rather endure all than lose their freedom."
The French reactionaries' belligerence in Son La, Lang Son, Haiphong, Kien An had given rise to a movement of protest throughout the country, from North to South. On behalf of its 9 million members, the Viet Minh National Committee sent an open letter to President Ho and the government, urging them to defend national sovereignty resolutely and expressing their readiness to sacrifice their lives to safeguard every inch of the fatherland. Mass organizations of youth, women, teachers... issued appeals calling for their members active contribution to the efforts of rhe entire people to smash the French army's scheme of aggression.
Such slogans as "The entire people participate in the resistance", "Ready to wage a long war of resistance", "Active preparations for the resistance war", "Resistance means life non-resistance death" appeared daily in the newspaper Cuu Quoc (National Salvation). Defence committees composed of representatives of the army, civilians and administration were set up in various zones, provinces and towns (later, these became Resistance Committees). Masses of cables from the people in all corners of the country flooded into the capital city, expressing absolute confidence in President Ho and the government and a determination to fight to the end for the defence of the independence and freedom of the fatherland.
Old persons and children began to evacuate Hanoi and other towns garrisoned by French soldiers, in case the enemy suddenly attacked.
By this time, our army had considerably expanded. The National Defence Guard had been strengthened and reorganized into the National Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. The first artillery unit had been founded.
In mid-October, our Party had convened a National Military Conference. It had made a thorough analysis of the military situation in the whole country and taken several important decisions in order to heighten the quality and combativeness of the armed forces.
The Party network within the army had been completed before that, the Party Central Committee had set up the Central Military Committee to give leadership to the various armed forces. Now, alongside the establishment of the base areas, Party Committees of the various military zones were formed. More members and cadres from the Party were assigned to work in the army. The system of commander and political officer, both of them sharing the leadership of the unit, was applied throughout the army. There was a political commissar for every military zone, a political officer for every unit from regiment down to platoon level. Organs for political work were also established from the highest to the lowest levels. After some time, Comrade Van Tien Dung was put in charge of political work in the army.
Our Party assumed exclusive leadership of the armed forces and directly led the army. The local Party organizations were leaders of their regional armed forces.
Militia and guerilla forces were consolidated. These had grown considerably and now numbered nearly one million members. The building of fortified villages was pushed forward.
The army and militia forces would be drilling day and night, striving to improve their combat skills and preparing themselves to face any eventuality in the event of an early war.
We had at once drawn experience from the battles fought in Nam Bo, and above all, from the recent engagements in Haiphong and Lang Son, with a view to mapping out a general plan of resistance and directing the war preparations in various regions. We had also planned the destruction of roads and bridges, and the implementation of a "scorched earth" policy. If the enemy widened the war we were determined to leave them nothing.
Many former French factories and workshops were transformed into arms manufacturing plants. Conscious of being new masters of the country, the workers, together with technicians, mostly from the French schools of practical technology, set out energetically to repair damaged rifles and artillery pieces. We also began to manufacture a quantity of the weapons needed for the infantry, ammunition, grenades, mines, anti-tank bombs...
On President Ho's instructions, the Viet Bac base area had continued to be consolidated. Now, many of our factories and stores were being gradually moved there. He sent Comrade Sao Do (Red Star)1 back to Viet Bac to prepare for the evacuation of the Party and government leading organs whenever necessary.
1 Nguyen Luong Bang.
One day, after a meeting of the government council, when everybody had left, Uncle Ho asked me
"How long can Hanoi be held, if the enemy widens the war in the North?''
I replied
"Possibly for a month."
He again asked
"What about the other towns?"
"We can hold them more easily."
"And the countryside?''
"We can surely hold the countryside..."
He pondered for a while and said
"We shall return to Tan Trao."
▴ XXXIII ▾
The preparations for the defence of the capital city were made with urgency from November, when the situation in Haiphong became explosive. The Party decided to set up the Hanoi Front Party Committee, with Nguyen Van Tran as its secretary, and Dao, Tien... as members. Tran Quoc Hoan was appointed especial envoy with a leading capacity and also sat on the Committee. Zone XI, covering the Hanoi area, was established. Vuong Thua Vu was appointed Commander in Chief, with Tran Do as Political Commissar.
The French forces here consisted of the Foreign Legion units which had arrived. in Hanoi from France after the signing of the March 6 Agreement and Legionaries who had been imprisoned by the Japanese and then free. by the Allied Forces. They were equipped with new American automatic weapons, besides heavy artillery, tanks, armoured vehicles and aircraft.
The greater part of the French forces was stationed in the citadel area. The rest was in Don Thuy hospital, the former Governor General's palace, Buoi school (now Chu Van An School) and Gia Lam airport. According to our investigations, there was also a detachment in the Metropole Hotel (now the Reunification Hotel). This building was almost in front of the Bac Bo Palace and the French soldiers here were disguised as civilians. By mutual arrangement there were, besides, small French units, sharing sentry duty as a take-over force with our army on such important spots as Long Bien bridge, the railway station, power plant, water works, Bank of Indochina. The families of French residents totalling about 8,000 and a few other places of the city had all been armed by the French forces.
The French troop disposition was not as densely concentrated as the Chiang forces formerly. But if we didn't keep a close watch, they would be able to deal a surprise attack on our leading organs, which would cause us heavy losses. With the mobility of tanks and armoured vehicles, they could swiftly block every access to the capital and divide up the city in order to annihilate the resistance forces piecemeal.
Our strength in Hanoi, then, was made up of the army units, the detachments of the combat self-defence force, the city self-defence force and the guard squads which had been freshly formed in various city quarters.
Our army was stationed partly within and partly outside the city. Within the city, their number was not very large, but these were all crack units. As their core there were the units which had fought the Japanese in the base area. The battalion commanders were all battle tested. However, most of the rank and file were young new recruits.
Our army was concentrated in Bac Bo Palace, the National Defence Guard camp and some other key places. Besides, smaller units protected the State organs, the factories and shared sentry duty with the French forces.
We had, till then, worked hard to equip our army better. But due to numerous difficulties, we were still very short of weapons and ammunition. We formed our first artillery companies with a number of heavy guns captured from the French and the Japanese, some 75-mm A.A. guns converted into field guns. Before the war started, the munitions service had supplied the army with 80 anti-tank bombs.
Our self-defence forces in Hanoi were quite strong. They were the combat self-defence force and the city self defence force and numbered about 8,500. They were present everywhere in the city and knew thomughly every by-road and back alley. Prompted by their ardent patriotism, these young people, who came from all strata of the urban population, earnestly trained day and night. Their discipline and morale were superb. They were eager to learn how best to fight the enemy. They were mostly armed with weapons acquired or made by themselves. For a long time, these fighters wearing square badges with a gold star in the middle were the enemy soldiers' most redoubtable adversaries.
The building of fortifications in Hanoi was chiefly done by the self-defence forces and the city population.
The armed forces and people of Hanoi were given the duty, in the event of a war started by the enemy, of decimating an important part of the enemy forces, besieging them and seeking every way to detain them as long as possible, to pave the way for the rear to complete the preparation and organization of forces for the state of war. To attain this objective, it was necessary to wipe out the enemy forces piecemeal and take full advantage of the city-terrain to check their advance, so inflicting losses on them while at the same time saving and enhancing our own strength and safeguarding the key areas and positions. It was also an indispensable necessity to have a successful combination between the forces inside the city and those striking from outside so as to drive the enemy into a state of confusion as a result of having to face attacks from both sides, thus keeping the enemy pinned down for a long time.
A detailed combat plan for the defence of Hanoi was made.
The City Hoang Dieu organization of the Viet Minh called on its members and the entire people to further strengthen their unity and step up their preparation so as to be ready to fight when the order was given. The people in various city quarters and in the suburbs held meetings and passed resolutions demanding the French troops' withdrawal to the positions they held prior to November 20, urging the government to deal firmly with the invasion by the French reactionaries and reporting to the government and President Ho their readiness to defend every street corner and every house of the capital city.
The Viet Minh National Committee's appeals and calls to prepare for resistance, published daily in Cuu Quoc, met with a warm response from the entire populatfon of Hanoi. Slogans appeared on the walls and doors of every house "Better death than slavery!" "Better to die gloriously than live in humiliation!" Those who had firearms tried to get more ammunition. Those who had nothing, tried to acquire grenades, swords, spears, machetes... Every day, crowds of people thronged the city district committees, asking to be enlisted into guard squads, first-aid teams and logistic services. Women put away their gracefull long robes, cut their hair short, wore military uniforms, carried firearms, swords and shared in patrol and sentry duty. The Evacuation Committee had ordered old people and children to leave the city. But many old men insisted on staying and formed groups to go and encourage the young to prepare for the resistance war. Old and young women collected voluntary contributions of cotton, cloth, wool, yarn,... to make blankets and knit warm jerseys for the fighters who were getting ready to destroy the enemy. People vied with each other to contribute rice and medicines to the resistance stores.
The war preparations in sector I, lying adjacent to the French garrison, were particularly feverish. Day and night, the sounds of hammers and crowbars resounded everywhere. The houses now communicated with each other through openings made in the partition walls. Roof terraces, balconies and windows became firing vantage points. Apertures were broached in the walls for loopholes. House floors were dug up for combat trenches and shelters. People got the furniture in their houses ready to be thrown out on the streets as barricades to check the enemy's advance. Dwellers in Sector I laid in a stock of foodstuffs to last them for three months. Sector I was given half of all the weapons in the Hanoi arsenal.
Early in December, the suicide squads held their oath-taking ceremony and received arms to be ready for their assignments. These fighters, carrying anti-tank bombs, would throw themselves at the enemy's tanks and armoured cars.
Government offices, store houses and public works such as the post-office, the banknotes printing press, the central pharmaceutical enterprise, the army engineering works... were, one by one, moved out of the city. Hospitals and army clinics were also moved further away.
In the meantime, we decided to refrain from such actions as might be used by the enemy as pretexts to challenge us. The erection of barricades was done only when the situation became critical. And even then, we blocked only the street quarters the French forces didn't have to go through. However, the French army command reacted strongly when they saw earth works, strengthened with wooden pillars and iron bars, growing up in many places of the city. They dispatched several protest notes. Once, Morlière met the chairman of the Hanoi Administrative Committee. He asked, with tongue in cheek
"Mayor, are you stepping up the repair of the city streets?"
The mayor replied
"That's right. It's because your tanks and armoured cars are driving around so wildly.
The big trees lining the streets had holes drilled in them for dynamite.
The workers got the railway carriages and tramcars ready to be overturned when necessary to complete the blocking of the streets still left open for French force movements.
▴ XXXIV ▾
In face of the dangerous situation induced by the French reactionaries in Indochina, Uncle Ho sought, by all means, to check their criminal hands.
On December 6, the Voice of Viet Nam broadcast President Ho's appeal to the French National Assembly. He reiterated the Vietnamese people's sincere desire to cooperate with the French people. He denounced certain Frenchmen in Indochina who were betraying the spirit of the September 14 Modus Vivendi and pursuing a policy of strength. He called on the French National Assembly and Government to order the French authorities in Viet Nam to withdraw their troops to the positions they had held before November 20 with a view to facilitating the implementation of the provisions laid down in the Modus Vivendi, thus averting useless bloodshed.
A week had gone by but President Ho's urgent appeal remained unanswered.
France at that time was witnessing acute inter-party conflict for the post of president of the provisional government.
In the first ballot on December 4, Maurice Thorez, the Communist Party candidate, led the poll, but he did not gain the absolute majority needed to win the election. In the second ballot, no candidate got the necessary proportion of votes. The French Communist Party did not enter its candidate this time and declared that it would not join any government headed by the MRP.
The. Socialist Party put forward Leon Blum. Before the voting, Leon Blum expressed his opinion on the Indochjna problem - "The one and only way to preserve French civilization in Indochina is to make a just settlement with the Indochinese people, on the basis of independence. The right to decide the Viet Nam problem should not belong to the French military and residents in Viet Nam. It should be in the hands of the Paris Government." He urged that the French Government be formed immediately in order to solve the Viet Nam problem. The French Communist Party declared "We shall vote for Mr. Blum, but this does not mean that we shall, later on, invariably support him."
On December 13, the French National Assembly voted for the third time. Blum won the election but he had only a lead of seven votes over Schumann, the MRP candidate backed by the great monopolies.
On December 15, President Ho sent a telegram to the new French President. Again, he referred to our basic position and set out certain concrete conditions for the settlement of the present deadlock
- On the Vietnamese side: to bring those who had been evacuated back to the towns, to cease the protective measures taken in self-defence, to restore normal communication between Hanoi and Haiphong and Hanoi and Lang Son.
- On the French side: to bring the French troops back to the positions they held prior to November 20 in Haiphong and Lang Son, to withdraw the reinforcements landed illegally in Da Nang, to end the raids and terror in Cochinchina and southern Trung Bo.
- By both sides: to set up without delay, the projected commissions for the implementation of the Modus Vivendi, to stop hostile propaganda by radio and in the press.
But, like all of his other messages addressed to the French government, this one was delayed in Saigon by the High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps. When it eventually arrived in Paris, eleven days had gone by and the war had expanded.
What would Leon Blum do to fulfil his statements on the Indochina problem?
As soon as Blum won the election, a right-wing paper in France wrote "Realities will prove stronger than theories. And even though it will be contrary to his stated ideas Leon Blum, after taking office, will not dare to abandon Indochina any more than than Clemenceau, when coming into power, dared to abandon Morocco." We certainly did not lay our hopes on Leon Blum whose Socialist Party was acting counter to the French labouring people's interests... Despite his occasional progressive pronouncements regarding colonial policy, he was openly opposed to the Communist Party. Half a year before, it was Blum who had been delegated by the big monopolies to go to the United States for negotiations on U.S. loans.
Blum met with opposition from several sides in the formation of the new government. The Communist Party demanded some amendments in his programme. The right-wing parties insisted on a tough political line as regards the question of the French Union. His first cabinet list was rejected by the MRP.
On December 17, Blum submitted for the National Assembly's approval a Government list exclusively composed of the Socialists. Moutet remained Minister of Overseas France. This was the first time, since De Gaulle had held elections that the Communist Party was not given a share in the Government despite the fact that in the recent general elections it was the Party with the largest number of seats in the National Assembly. One wondered if the rumours about a Blum-US bargain in March were completely without foundation.
Then it was reported that d'Argenlieu had left Paris for Saigon. His appointment as High Commissioner in Indochina had been confirmed. Moutet declared "I have the impression that Admiral d'Argenlieu has never shown any signs of disagreement with me on the policy we have applied with a view to settling this problem."
The policy that Moutet referred to was reaffirmed by d'Argenlieu before a large number of journalists - "The Indochinese people must be made to believe that France cares for her presence in Indochina. If France shows indecision or reluctance, they will lose this belief. We should indicate this desire by maintaining our forces there." The High Commissioner recalled the method of "display of strength"' by Lyautey, a French colonialist general notorious for his brutality in the war of aggression in Morocco.
So, we met again the same old hands and the same old policies.
▴ XXXV ▾
From mid-December, the French forces increased their provocative actions in Hanoi.
On December 15, French soldiers opened fire in several parts of the city. They shot at our policemen of Precinct VIII in Hang Dau park. They threw grenades wounding two National Defence guards in Ham Long Street. They challenged members of the self-defence corps in Tran Quoc Toan Street, seized a rickshaw and brought it into Don Thuy hospital.
All day December 17, French aircraft flew reconnaissance flights over Hanoi.
Then at 10 a.m. for the first time, the French Army sent armoured cars to demolish our fieldworks in Lo Duc Street and carried away the wooden pillars. When the joint Liaison and Control Commission came to intervene, French soldiers said they were obeying their superiors' orders.
At the same moment, a military troop car came to one end of Hang Bun Street and dropped down a band of Foreign Legionaries. These climbed onto an earth rampart and fired on the people in the street. Our self-defence force fired back. More French soldiers were sent in and broke into the people's houses, massacring women and children. One man had his throat cut and was left dying in a pool of blood. They carried off a number of women. Not long after, bands of Foreign Legionaries again swept into Yen Ninh Street nearby, ransacking the houses, killing and wounding more people.
At noon, the French lined up their troops from the citadel gate to Long Bien bridge. They besieged the police station of Precinct II.
At the Yen Phu power plant, where a mixed guard team had been set up just a few days previously, a French soldier suddenly turned his gun on a Vietnamese soldier sharing sentry duty with him and shot him dead. Immediately all the workers in the plant staged a vigorous demonstration to condemn the French troops' action.
In the afternoon, the French pounded Hang Bun Street with mortar shells. Bands of Foreign Legionaries swarmed into the streets, breaking the glass windows of many houses.
Strictly observing the orders of their leaders our army and self-defence forces refrained from opening fire. They continued to consolidate their positions and calmly followed the enemy's movements.
Later on, we learned that, on December 17, Valluy had unexpectedly left Saigon for Haiphong to meet Debès. Morlière and Sainteny were also summoned there.
On the morning of December 18, the city seemed quiet. Our men working at the Hanoi Joint Liaison and Control Commission were not so busy with urgent phone calls from various places as they bad been the previous day. But, towards the end of the morning's work captain De Chatillon, head of the French Joint Liaison and Control team, handed us a letter which read as follows
"The French army command here is obliged to take measures to ensure the safety of its forces, and of the French civilians and foreign nationals. Therefore troops will be sent to be stationed in the Department of Finance and at the house of the chief of the Communications Service on Pasquier Boulevard1. Anything which may obstruct the French troops' movement must be removed, otherwise the French troops will destroy it themselves."
1 Now, Dien Bien Phu Boulevard.
This was the first ultimatum from the French in Hanoi.
Two hours later, at midday, fully loaded French troop carriers, escorted by tanks and armoured cars, charged into the streets around the citadel area. They besieged the Hong Ha, East Gate and Hang Chieu areas. They sent armoured cars to destroy our ramparts and trenches on Hang But street.
In the afternoon, towards the end of working hours, the French team on the Joint Control Commission handed us a second ultimatum from the French command
"On December 18, 1946, the Hanoi city police failed to perform its task property. If that state of affairs continues the French army will take charge of security within Hanoi by the morning of December 20, 1946, at the latest."
Our team of the Joint Liaison and Control Commission made a prompt reply
"The allegation that the Vietnamese police failed to perform its task properly is a complete lie. The French army should not take this as a pretext to violate our rights in the maintenance of security, the supreme right of the free State of Viet Nam."
That same day, while enemy reconnaissance aircraft were flying over Hanoi, in a village by the side of a small river in Ha Dong, the Party Central Committee met to assess the situation and work out an appropriate policy. Uncle Ho asked us
"How are the crops this year? Have the people enough to eat?"
Some comrades replied
"The weather this year has been favourable. A bumper harvest was reaped in many places. The people are better off than last year."
Looking pleased, he asked again
"If the war breaks out, have we got enough rice to feed our soldiers?"
"The districts in the outskirts of Hanoi and the provinces have built food stores to supply the army. Every village has a supply committee."
"How is the destruction of communication lines getting on?"
"All the highways around Hanoi have been cut. Enemy mechanized forces can no longer use them. But as for the roads on top the dykes, we are not destroying them, only building earthworks to block them. That's why it is taking a longer time."
After analysing the situation in all respects, he said
"The French scheme of extending the war has moved to a new phase. The period of conciliatory efforts is over. We have made concessions. But the more we concede, the more the enemy presses forward. Our people will not go back to another life of slavery. Our people's resistance war will be long and hard but it is bound to be victorious."
Early on December 19, we received yet another ultimatum from the French army command, the third within two days. The demands they made on us were to disarm the self-defence forces in Hanoi; to cease all preparations for a resistance war to hand over to the French army the maintenance of security in the city.
Compared with their demands of the previous day, the French had gone one step further the disarmament of our self-defence forces.
What had happened in Haiphong in late November was happening here now. In Haiphong, Debès had also made a number of conditions which he could be sure would be unacceptable to us before opening his offensive to take the city.
President Ho wrote a short letter to the Commissioner of the French Republic in North Indochina
"The situation has become more tense these last few days. This is very regrettable. Pending the decision from Paris, I hope that you, together with Mr. Giam, will find a solution in order to improve the present atmosphere."
Uncle Ho gave the letter to Hoang Minh Giam. Our Liaison and Control team informed their French counterpart of Comrade Giam's request to see the Commissioner of the French Republic that very afternoon. Sainteny refused to receive him, saying that Mr. Giam should wait till the following day.
The following day, December 20, was the day on which, according to Morlière's declaration, the French army would "take action" if we didn't hand over to them the right to handle security affairs. Did the French mean to refuse all settlements? Replying to the 'Paris-Saigon' paper in an interview a few days back, the Commissioner of the French republic had said that France was standing in a position of strength and would calmly wait. For half a month, now all French soldiers, excepting those sent out in the streets for ravaging and provocation, had been forbidden to leave camp. Time was flying swiftly by. When would they start? Tomorrow or even earlier?
On the afternoon of December 19, together with Tran Quoc Hoan and Vuong Thua Vu, I visited the army and the people who were preparing for combat.
At O Cho Dua in the suburbs, many houses were securely closed but trams were still running. Those coming from Ha Dong were almost empty. Some old persons and children continued to leave Hanoi on rickshaws hemmed in amid bundles of clothes and bedding. Little did these evacuees suspect that it would be many years before they could return to their beloved streets. A few self-defence members., one carrying a shotgun, another with a grenade tucked under his belt, were checking the mine holes drilled into the tree trunks.
We climbed over a rampart to enter Kham Thien street. While O Cho Dua looked deserted, Kham Thien street was all noise and animation. Groups of self-defence forces, accompanied by a few National Defence guards wearing caps with golden-starred badges, were walking up and down exchanging opinions. Carts full of earth were rolling out of the alleys, pushed by enthusiastic men and women and accompanied by cheerful shouts to the people to keep clear. Some restaurants and cafes were still open.
The rampart at the other end of Kham Thien street, near the railway station, was full of action. Earth, walls were being heightened. Some railway sections had been ins.erted, their heads pointing outwards. Two self-defence corps members, rifles in hands, were standing sentry in their fieldworks. Just a few score metres away in front of them, was the Shell Oil depot where there was a garrison of French soldiers. And not much further on was the railway station where there were also French soldiers. Meanwhile the self-defence members were driving wooden pillars into the ground and strengthening the rampart with earth. Women were bringing up more earth and steel sleepers. A service team was singing to cheer them on. From time to time, the roar of an armoured car could be heard from the direction of the railway station.
We inspected the firing positions and talked with the combatants. They cheerfully told us that a French armoured car had come at noon, but when the driver saw the upturned earthen pots on the ground in front of our rampart, he thought they were land mines and pulled back.
These young people were making energetic preparations for a fierce battle against the enemy. They knew but little about war. Nevertheless, talking with them, I could see that they were awaiting it with optimism and confidence. They had no idea what would befall them on the morrow. But their appearance told us that they would surely overcome all trials.
Dusk fell. The whole city was unusually quiet. It was cold and dry. The houses seemed to shrink back and to be standing warming themselves in the yellowish electric light. Outwardly, the city seemed to grow lazy in the cold and go to bed early. But beneath this calm surface, line upon line of surging wave was ready to rise. All the combatants were present at their posts. It was reported that not a single French soldier was to be seen in the restaurants, bars or streets. And enemy armoured cars began to push out and stood blocking some crossroads...
▴ XXXVI ▾
It was on a winter evening that President Ho's call for the national resistance war - dated December 20, 1946 - was broadcast by the Voice of Viet Nnm radio from a place not far from Hanoi as the station was being moved to a base area.
Since the previous night, the historic December 19, the war had spread all over the country. Just over a year after Nam Bo had risen up in arms, and after the battles already fought by our army and people in Son La, Lang Son and the port city of Haiphong, the army and people of Hanoi now began Lo strike back against the invaders. Nam Dinh, Hai Duong, Bac Ninh, Bac Giang, Hue, Da Nang - also rose up to destroy the enemy for national salvation.
The national resistance war had thus broken out.
*
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Today, at the Hanoi Museum of the Revolution, we can see on display a manuscript in President Ho's handwriting with the headline "Urgent work at present" dated November 5, 1946. By this rare document, we learnt that as soon as he returned from France, President Ho had foreseen the inevitability of a widespread war started by the French imperialists. He had himself mapped out the fundamental lines in dealing with a possible emergency situation and outlined a plan for staging a resistance war and, at the same time, for building the country.
On the long resistance war, he wrote
"We must understand and make the people understand that the resistance war will be very hard and arduous.
"Even if the enemy is driven to almost complete failure, he will, all the same, strive to hit back. For a defeat in Viet Nam would lead to a disintegration of all his empire.
"Starting from scratch and with only a few revolutionary activists hiding in the jungle we were able to build up an anti-Japanese, anti-French base. Now that we have an army and the people what can we not do? Though Nam Bo has unfavourable terrain and was not well prepared, it has been able to fight for over a year. Over the whole country, we have good terrain, stronger forces. We can surely right for several years, till victory..."
*
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As we desire peace, we have made concessions. But the more concessions we make, the more the French colonialists press on. All the efforts he made till the last moment could not stay the criminal hands of the enemy. The flame of the war of aggression spread to the entire country.
"No! We would rather sacrifice all than lose our country. Never shall we be enslaved! Compatriots, rise up!"
That winter, fifty-six years old, with a bamboo walking-stick and a pair of rubber sandals, he set out for the resistance war, the first sacred resistance war.
If we endure through this cold winter, we shall see spring.1
Responding to his call, the entire nation rose up with great determination, a high fighting spirit, superb heroism and noble sacrifices and achieved resounding military exploits from the very first winter days of the national resistance war.
Since then, under the banner of President Ho and the Party, our people have overcome untold hardships during the three thousand days and nights of combat, continuously increasing in strength, winning ever bigger victories and ceaselessly advancing on the road to the spring of the nation, the historic victory of Dien Bien Phu.
These notes were begun in the spring of 1970, some time after Uncle Ho's death. I was unable to complete them at an earlier date.
With the documentation that could be gathered and the active contribution of many comrades, you, readers, and I have recalled the activities of President Ho during a short but very important period of the history of our revolution.
Early in the twentieth century this eminent son of the Vietnamese nation, who had set out, with an ardent heart, in the thick night of colonialism to find a way to save his country, his people, saw a radiant light on the horizon. A new era had started for mankind with the great Russian October Reuolution. Nguyen Ai Quoc was the citizen of a colonized country who had quickly found the road to national salvation in the new era, that is the road of proletarian revolution, the road of Leninism.
More than forty years of revolutionary struggle by our Party have proved that the "revolutionary road" he chose for our nation was the only correct road to genuine independence, freedom and happiness. It is also the road to liberation for numerous other countries which are writhing under colonialist and imperialist rule.
Uncle Ho was a great patriot. His immense love for his country and his profound solicitude for his people knew no bounds. He devoted his whole life to the cause of national salvation and of liberating his people.
Uncle Ho was the first Vietnamese Communist. His love for his compatriots was linked with his love for the toiling and poor people. For him, the cause of national liberation was inseparable from that of class emancipation, the emancipation of that part of mankind who were suffering from the injustices of a society in which exploitation and oppression existed.
Uncle Ho was the Leader of our Party, of our people. His revolutionary activities during the past sixty years show beyond doubt that he was an exceptionally brilliant strategist, the man of the great turning points. The decisions taken by him and the Party mere of historical, political and military significance, bringing the Vietnamese Revolution to ever bigger and more glorious victories.
*
* *
The tempestuous onslaughts of the soviet Army pursuing the German fascists to their last lair had enabled the working class and the labouring people in several East European countries to rise up and seize power. The imperialists were infuriated at the appearance of a great socialist revolution. They even thought of rearming the beaten fascist armies in preparation for a new world war to stamp out communism. The cold war between the West and the East started.
At that time, our Party, fifteen years old and with a membership of five thousand, led the entire people to stage the victorious August Revolution. We seized power from the Japanese fascists and their henchmen and founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the first people's democratic state in Southeast Asia.
The red flag of the national liberation thus fluttered over a free Viet Nam, making its proud appearance in imperialism's immense forbidden realm hitherto inviolate. The Vietnamese revolution signalled to the five continents the collapse of the colonial system, the new growth of the revolutionary torrent of national liberation. This was not only a challenge but also a menace to imperialism.
Armies of all skin-colour, enemies of national independence and freedom, simultaneously swarmed into every corner of our country. One hundred and eighty thousand Chiang soldiers, the basest anti-communist soldiers, thronged our capital city and every other town of the North. They had gathered a dangerous gang of lackeys in an attempt to topple the young revolutionary power. The French Expeditionary Corps, equipped by the US imperialists and given the green light by the British imperialists, started the invasion in the hope of reoccupying South Viet Nam by a lightning offensive. Sixty thousand brutal Japanese fascist soldiers who had smashed the French colonialists' power over this peninsula within one night, could still be seen all over the country from the North to the South.
Never had Lenin's words been so significant as at this moment - "It is difficult to seize power but it is even more difficult to hold it."
The fate of the Fatherland was in constant danger and, at times, seemed to hang on a hair - A bit of confusion, a little moment of indecision would impair the revolution beyond remedy. This was the time when an exceptionally clear-sighted and keen leadership was badly needed.
Move with lightning speed either to attack defend.
Talent and nimble feet will give you the upper hand.1
1 Ho Chi Minh - Learning to Play Chess Prison Diary.
That we had the Party and Uncle Ho was a great blessing for our people and revolution.
Historical realities have given full evidence of the correctness of the Party's and Uncle Ho's political line which was firm in principle and flexible in tactics. just as Comrade Le Duan remarked
"We would at one time reach a temporary compromise with Chiang Kai-shek in order to get our hands free to cope with the French colonialists, only to do the same later with the French in order to drive out the Chiang Kai-shek troops and wipe out the reactionaries, their agents. We thus gained time to consolidate our forces and prepare for a nation-wide resistance to French colonialist aggression, which the Party knew was inevitable. Those extremely perspicacious moves will go down in the history of the revolution in our country as magnificent examples of the Leninist tactics of exploiting contradictions within the enemy's ranks and granting concessions while holding firm to principles."1
1 Le Duan - The Vietnamese Revolution - Fundamental Problems, Essential Tasks.
If the capitalists' system of ownership has at times "turned them from mutual allies into fighting wild beasts"2, here Ho Chi Minli, the Communist, armed with the wisdom of Marxism-Leninism and high morals and behavior was able to tame these ferocious wild beasts and sometimes use them in the interests of the revolution. Thus, he was able to protect the newly-born Democratic Republic of Viet Nam against a pack of wolves and take it safely through the vulnerable stage of its infancy.
2 Lenin, Complete Works, Vol. 30, p. 570. Su That Pub., Hanoi, 1971. (in Vietnamese).
Thanks to the leadership of the Party and Uncle Ho, the Vietnamese revolution was able to stand firm in face of the rigorous trials of the early period and to set out bravely to fulfil the great tasks that history had entrusted to our people.
*
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The imperialists and the representatives of their interests in their own countries as well as in the colonies were both unwilling to recognize and unable to realize the fundamental changes that had taken place on this peninsula during the years of World War II.
De Gaulle fancied that he had "bestowed generous favours" on the Indochinese people by his March 24, 1945 Manifesto. Most of the French bourgeois statesmen and army officers believed they could reestablish their rule in Indochina by military strength They advocated restoring the weakened French position on the international arena by holding on to the colonies. While the majority of the French people condemned colonialism and supported our people's just struggle for independence and unification, those in colonialist circles who were more or less enlightened, like Leclerc, and chose to protect their interests in a different way were very scarce. Only when the French Expeditionary Corps had been completely routed did De Gaulle acknowledge his mistake on the Indochina problem.
Imperialism, avaricious, brutal and muddle-headed, had become a stain for the whole of mankind to clean up. Our entire Vietnamese people, millions rising as one, were determined not to let the enemy annex our country for a second time. And that winter, Uncle Ho voiced the profound aspiration and determination of the whole nation.
"We would rather sacrifice all than lose our country. Never shall we be enslaved! Compatriots, rise up!"
It was his own grave that the enemy was digging, he forced the war upon us. This well-deserved lesson was taught to the French imperialists eight years later in Dien Bien Phu. We have proved a new truth of our era - A nation, even a small one, which has a correct political line and resolutely rises up in arms against the aggressors, is fully capable of defeating even mighty imperialists.
The man who negotiated with the French authorities in Paris in Autumn 1946, became "the wrecker of French colonialism."
By the historic victory of Dien Bien Pliu, our people won back half of the country. The liberated North has been advancing steadily on the road to socialism and has become the impregnable bulwark for the revolutionary cause in the whole country.
The senile and decrepit French imperialists have been put out of action. For colonialism the bell has tolled. However, the long hard fight between our people and imperialism has not ended. The US imperialists, the imperialist ringleader, are still bent on clinging to South Viet Nam. With their tremendous economic and military potential, US neo-colonialism, more perfidious and much more brutal, has not yet drawn the necessary lesson. The war which was started on this peninsula by French soldiers released by British forces from Japanese prisons in Saigon has not ended with the French Expeditionary army's ignominious defeat. It is still continuing over half of our country and has nowadays become the biggest, fiercest and longest war since World War II.
In realization of their global strategy, the US imperialists have mobilized over one million and a half US, satellite and puppet troops for their war of aggression in South Viet Nam. They wanted to stamp out the revolutionary national liberation movement which, blazing here, was vigorously fanning up the anti-colonialist flame already kindled everywhere, threatening to destroy the whole lifework of the imperialists. They have employed here the most modern means of destruction of the western world. They have unleashed on this peninsula a quantity of bombs and shells greater than what they had used en all battlefronts during World War II. The "Huns" of this century have unleashed on our country the most atrocious war of aggression in the history of mankind.
Again President Ho's anti-US appeal resounded all over the country
"They may send here five hundred thousand, a million or even more troops to step up the war of aggression against South Viet Nam. They may employ thousands of aircraft to intensify their attack against the North... The war may drag on for five, ten, twenty years or even longer, Hanoi, Haiphong and some other towns and enterprises may be devastated. But the Vietnamese people will never be intimidated. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom.
In response to the call of Uncle Ho and the Party, our entire army and people, braving all hardships and sacrifices and heightening their fighting spirit and superb heroism are determined to live up to his teaching: "So long as there remains a single aggressor on our soil, we must fight on to drive him out.
South Viet Nam, tenacious and staunch, which started fighting the first and will put aside its arms the last and which deserves the title "the Brass Wall of the Fatherland" has grown stronger and stronger as it fights and driven the aggressors, armed to the teeth, deeper and deeper into the quagmire of their criminal war. From the flames of a long and fierce fight, the revolutionary power has emerged. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam is carrying out its historic mission of leading the army and people to drive out the US imperialists, liberate South Viet Nam and advance towards the peaceful reunification of the country.
The North has stood firm in face of the enemy's barbarous and wanton bombing. It has beaten off the air pirates who came to perpetrate crimes and poured its efforts into aiding South Viet Nam while continuing to advance steadily on the road of building socialism.
We have frustrated one strategy after another of the enemy's war of aggression. The aggressor army of the US imperialists, over-supplied with arms and ammunition, cannot, certainly, avoid the doom that has befallen the other invaders on this soil.
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Over forty years of our people's revolutionary struggle since the founding of the Party are for ever engraved in radiant relief on cur nation's history of undaunted struggle to build up and preserve the country. The significance of our Party's and people's struggle for national liberation has gone beyond that of a country's resistance against aggression, for it stands as witness of the new truths of the present era.
Against this magnificent background appears President Ho's image, majestic yet simple, noble yet familiar, dazzling yet pure and fresh like the sunlight at dawn.
The short period from the successful August 1945 Revolution to the beginning of the National Resistance War on December 19, 1946 was of great importance in the history of our Party's and people's revolutionary struggle. By these unforgettable days alone, we can form a picture of Uncle Ho.
President Ho was the most eminent son of our Fatherland.
President Ho was an outstanding combatant of the world communist movement.
President Ho was a great strategist who guided the Vietnamese revolution through untold stress and storm to victory.
President Ho was the new Vietnamese man. He was the leader, the teacher and comrade. He was the quintessence of the qualities and the moral values of a new society which was taking shape.
President Ho was the new man of the new epoch.
Thanks to the Party and President Ho, a new generation, the Ho Chi Minh generation, was born.
This generation has undertaken the mission of a shock team fighting for a new era of their country and of mankind: the era of Independence, Freedom and Socialism.
This generation, trained after the example set by our great Uncle Ho, is unceasingly going forward to realize his and the Party's ideal: "To build a peaceful, reunified, independent, democratic and prosperous Viet Nam, thus making a worthy contribution to the world revolutionary cause."
This generation is advancing steadily in response to his call: "Forward! Complete victory will surely be ours!"
Spring 1972